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INCOME TAX ON GAINS AND LOSSES IN
LITIGATIONt
WILLIANMi T. PLUmiB, JR.*
2. Defendants
a. Disputed receipts
A client entered the office of Attorney John Smith 66 and showed him a
summons which had just been served upon him in connection with a title
dispute. After discussing the case for some time, the client's thoughts
inevitably turned to his income tax.
"Mr. Smith," he asked, "I'm earning a substantial income from this prop-
erty which the plaintiff is claiming, and if I lose the suit it will all be taken
from me. Do I have to pay an income tax on it in the meanwhile, and if so
what will be the effect if I ultimately lose ?"
Mr. Smith is an average lawyer with a broad general practice who makes
no pretense of specializing, least of all in the labyrinthine field of taxation.
But frequently his clients ask him such questions of tax law connected with
their cases. Mr. Smith feels that he should be equipped to advise upon ques-
tions which are so intimately connected with the cases he handles. Further-
more, in manyinstances, if so equipped, he may be able to assist his clients
in making legitimate tax savings and to save his clients from "the many tax
pitfalls which gape in the path these days of the general lawyer trying to
practice what he thinks is non-tax law."' 67
tIn Part One, in (February 1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 221, the writer considered the
income tax problems of plaintiffs. Parts Two and Three, herewith, deal with the prob-
lems of defendants and the general question of deducting legal expenses.
In Part One, at 231, it was stated that when a recovery is had with respect to a loss
sustained in a prior year or a debt previously charged off, the recovery is taxable as
income only if the deduction resulted in a tax benefit to the taxpayer. No later cases
have appeared, but the Bureau of Internal Revenue has withdrawn its acquiescence in
the cases there cited and has revoked its rulings to that effect. See G. C. M. 22163,
(July 8,_1940) INT. REv. BULL. No. 28, p. 4. The present position of the Bureau is
that, at least if a debt is actually charged off and allowed as a deduction, a subsequent
recovery of the debt is taxabl income even if, as a result of a net loss, no reduction
of income tax resulted from the deduction. Reliance is placed upon Burnet v. Sanford
& Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931) and Lake View Trust and Savings
Bank, 27 B. T. A. 290 (1932).
With respect to the treatment, for excess profits tax purposes, of income from claims
and judgments which are abnormal in class or disproportionate in amount, see section
721 of the Internal Revenue Code, as added by the Second Revenue Act of 1940.
*The views expressed herein are entirely those of the writer, and nothing herein con-
tained is to be construed as the official opinion of the Treasury Department.
'
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"The events and characters depicted in this photoplay are fictitious. Any similarity
to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental."1 6 7Letter from Randolph Paul to the writer. In the preface of his Studies in Federal
Taxation (1937), Mr. Paul said, at page iv:
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The answer to his client's question lies in the application of the principle
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in North American Oil Con-
solidated v. Burnet:1 8
"If a taxpayer receives earnings under a clain of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is re-
quired to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged
liable to restore its equivalent."'' 6 9
The two prime essentials are that there be a claim of right and no restric-
tions upon the disposition of the receipts. Therefore, if money is received
through some mistake, which is admitted although not promptly rectified
by repayment, it is not income.' 70 Money received as agent for another is
not taxable to the recipient, of course,' 7 ' and when the taxpayer resists an
adverse claim to receipts by setting up a right in a third party, rather than
"It is now clear to many that things can no longer go on in the good old way;
that a lawyer not possessing a reasonable knowledge of tax law is as incompetent
as a tax man who knows nothing about non-tax law; that (to quote Professor
Griswold of Harvard Law School) tax lawyers can no longer afford to 'blind them-
selves too much to the rest of the law'; and that, conversely, lawyers in general
practice can no longer afford to shut their eyes to tax law."
168286 U. S. 417, 424, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932). Italics supplied.
169This principle has been most unpopular with the leading writers on taxation. PAuL
& MERTENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Cum. Supp. 1939) § 11.25, note 68;
MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME (1936) 177-182 [reprinted from (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 933,
945-9501; Montgomery, Accounting and the Concept of Income, in LECTURES ON TAX-
ATION (Columbia Univ. Symposium 1932) 55 (characterizing the rule as "taxing gross
income with a vengeance").
The rationale of the rule has been variously expressed. One reason, sometimes called
the "bird-in-the-hand" reason, is that the taxpayer may be insolvent and may no longer
have the receipts if their taxability is postponed until the right to them is finally deter-
mined, so they are taxed when actually received. See dissent in Alamitos Land Co.,
40 B. T. A. 353, 364 (1939), rev'd, 112 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), cert. denied,
61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1940). Judge Learned Hand declared, in National City Bank v.
Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), that although taxes attach to ownership,
the State should be able to collect taxes without taking sides in private controversies,
and the collection of the revenue cannot b& delayed until the claimants adjust their
rights; hence, the taxing authorities must, as a practical matter, look to possession as
prima facie ownership, if the possessor claims ownership and his present disposition of
the fund is unrestricted. Paul and Mertens, however, contend that, once the right is
determined, the Treasury should "look in the back of the book" and adjust the tax
accordingly. Loc. cit. supra.1 7 0Carey Van Fleet, 2 B. T. A. 825 (1925) (A).
The symbol (A) after the citation of a case in the Board of Tax Appeals signifies
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has acquiesced in an adverse ruling and
that it will be followed by the Bureau. The symbol (NA) indicates non-acquiescence.
Such acquiescence or non-acquiescence relates only to issues decided in favor of the
taxpayer.
'7 1 Comm'r v. Turney, 82 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 5th 1936); National Railway Time
Service Co. v. Comm'r, 88 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A. 7th 1937). But cf. J. R. Knowland,
29 B. T. A. 618 (1933) (money received after so long a period that claims were not
likely to be made).
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in himself, the receipts are not thereby rendered taxable. 172 Moreover, if
the taxpayer has not the unrestricted disposition of the disputed receipts,
because they are held in escrow or for some other reason, the rule does not
apply.173 But where the essential elements are present, the rule is now quite
firmly established that such disputed receipts are taxable.
Thus; it has been held that the income derived from property the title
to which is in dispute, as well as the gain from the sale of such property, is
taxable. 174 The profits of a patent infringer are taxable although he is later
'
72 Comm'r v. Brown, 54 F. (2d) 563 (C. C. A. 1st 1931), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 556,
52 Sup. Ct. 639 (1932) (by regulations of War Industries Board, taxpayer's profits as
a licensed wool dealer were limited to 5%, the excess to be disposed of as the Govern-
ment might decide; when distribution was ordered, taxpayer refused to comply, on the
ground that the plan was not fair to the growers, but he made no claim on his own
behalf; held, not taxable).
'73Sara R. Preston, 35 B. T. A. 312 (1937) (A). But cf. infra note 200. With
respect to receipts impounded under court order, see infra part 2 (c).
The fact that the taxpayer voluntarily sets up a separate account and indicates on his
books an intention not to exercise his absolute dominion over the fund until the right
is determined does not alone prevent its taxability as income. Comm'r v. Alamitos
Land Co., 112 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), ce-t. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1940).
In the absence of a dispute over the right to the receipts, escrow alone may not be
sufficient to prevent taxability. See 1 PAUL & MERTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INcOmE
TAxATION (1934) §§ 10.15, 11.26, and 11.27.
'
T 4 North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932);
J. H. Tippett, 25 B. T. A. 69 (1932) ; McDuffie v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 239, 85
Ct. Cl. 212 (1937) (all relating to current income from disputed property); Arthur
A. Cocke, 5 B. T. A. 606 (1926) (gain from sale of disputed property). The Treasury
originally took a contrary position, in 0. D. 1141, 5 Cum. BuLL. 134 (1921), and
G. C. M. 1582, VI-1 Cuas. BuLL. 171 (1927), but those rulings were modified in cqn-
formity with the above cases, in G. C. M. 16730, XV-1 Cum. BULL. 179 (1936) and
I. T. 2983, XV-1 Cum. BuLL. 299 (1936).
Cf. Ford v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 666,
52 Sup. Ct. 41 (1931), with Ford v. Nauts, 25 F. (2d) 1015 (N. D. Ohio 1928), reach-
ing conflicting results upon the same facts, with respect to the income from securities
prematurely distributed from an estate and subsequently returned under a consent decree.
The circuit court of appeals decision, although not a direct reversal of the district court
case, is in accord with the principle subsequently announced by the Supreme Court.
An early ruling held that when an investor in a "blind pool" receives what are sup-
posed to be profits of the pool, when in fact there are no profits, he may get a refund
of the tax paid thereon when he is subsequently required to restore the "profits" at
the suit of the pool operator's trustee in bankruptcy. I. T. 2326, V-2 Cum. BULL. 147'
(1926). Quaere, whether the "claim of right" principle would now be applied in favor
of the taxability of receipts subsequently adjudged to be fraudulent conveyances or illegal
preferences.
When the income of disputed property of an exhaustible nature is taxed under this
principle, it has been held that an allowance for depletion or depreciation is made in the
usual manner, even though a subsequent decree may establish that the taxpayer had no
interest in the property; the theory of the cases is that the fact that he is taxed upon
income he cannot keep does not require that he also be taxed upon capital he cannot
keep. Champlin v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 10th 1935); Obispo Oil Co. v.
Welch. 85 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 301 U. S.
190, 57 Sup. Ct. 684 (1937); L. 0. 1110, I-1 Cum. BULL. 104 (1923) (probably no
longer in force in view of the position taken by the Bureau in the cases cited). But see
dissent of Judge Wilbur in the Obispo case, supra, at 863.
The abbreviation "Cum. BULL." stands for the Cumulative Bulletin (Internal Revenue
rulings).
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compelled to account for them.1' 5 Improper compensation and secret profits
of corporate directors, partners, and other fiduciaries are subject to tax,176
as are the proceeds of embezzlement. 177 Dividends which may be recovered
back because unlawfully paid are nevertheless taxable income,' 78 and the same
is true of receipts pursuant to a contract which the other party is seeking
to rescind or to have construed in such a way that the income may later have
to be given up.179 The gain realized by a vendor from the resale of property
obtained by the foreclosure of a land contract may not be held in abeyance
pending litigation over the vendor's right to retain it.180 Receipts from illegal
gambling,' 8 ' usury, s 2 or short-changing of customers,1 .s although recover-
able from the taxpayer, are nevertheless taxable income.
The authorities are not in agreement, however, with respect to the effect
of an actual repayment of the money. It is generally agreed that disputed
1750. D. 1141, 5 Cum. BULL. 134 (1921).
"76Board v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 658,
52 Sup. Ct. 35 (1931) (diructor's profit on contract with corporation, contested by stock-
holders) ; National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 2d 1938) (director
held out part of profits on illegal oil lease, repaid to corporation during Senate investi-
gation) ; Griffin v. Smith, 101 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A: 7th 1939), cert. denied, 60 Sup.
Ct. 73 (1939) (corporate officer and director paid self excessive bonuses, refunded on
demand of stockholders) ; Saunders v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 10th 1939),
aff'g Lewis v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 543 (D. Colo. 1936) (officer's commission on
sale of stock, restored on demand) ; United States v. Wampler, 5 F. Supp. 796 (D. Md.
1934) (attorney misapplied client's funds) ; Penn v. Robertson, 29 F. Supp. 386 (M. D.
N. C. 1939) (corporate officer given right to purchase stock far below market, saving
held income although subsequently given up); D. H. Byrd, 32 B. T. A. 568 (1935)
(joint adventurer bought on his own account, later held accountable for profits);
G. C. M. 16730, XV-1 Cum. BULL. 179 (1936) (secret profits of director). An early
case to the contrary is Walter Cravens, 3 B. T. A. 282 (1926) (corporate officer paid
self commissions, amount disputed, repaid in later year; held, not income).
177G. C. M. 16572, XV-1 Cuat. BULL. 82 (1936). See contra: Rau v. United States,
260 Fed. 131, 136 (C. C. A. 2d 1919), which was expressly overruled on this point in
National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 93, 96 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
l3SAngelus Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Comm'r, 57 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), cert.
denied, 286 U. S. 562, 52 Sup. Ct. 644 (1932).
179Griffin v. Smith, 101 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 7th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 561,
60 Sup. Ct. 73 (1939) ; Earl M. Palmer, 3 B. T. A. 403 (1926) (A); Hans Pederson,
14 B. T. A. 1089 (1929) (NA), appeal dismissed, 48 F. (2d) 1080 (C. C. A. 9th 1931);
Arabol Mfg. Co., 26 B. T. A. 1068 (1932) (NA).
Under the completed contract method of accounting, the income therefrom is reported
when the contract is completed and payment made, and the profit cannot be held in
suspense pending settlement of all claims and contingent liabilities growing out of the
contract. Grays Harbor Motorship Corp. v. United States, 45 F. (2d) 259, 280, 71 Ct.
Cl. 167, 211, cert. denied, 284 U. S. 627, 52 Sup. Ct. 11 (1931). But cf. Carolina Con-
tracting Co., 32 B. T. A. 1171 (1935) (A).
28 0R. A. Rowan & Co.. 13 B. T. A. 975 (1928).
'STames P. McKenna, 1 B. T. A. 326 (1925).
182W. R. Hervev, 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932). See Barker v. Magruder, 95 F. (2d)
122, 123, 68 App. D. C. 211 (1938).
'
5 3Chicago. R. I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 618, 52 Sup. Ct. 7 (1931) (no claim of right, but extremely remote possibility
that unknown losers would seek or get refund).
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receipts are income which must be reported when received, but some cases
have held that the return in which the income was reported is subject to cor-
rection and refund of tax when the receipts are taken away in a subsequent
year; the usual theory of that line of cases is that the receipts were subject
to a constructive trust and the taxpayer, therefore, never acquired title to
them. 8 4 The Fifth Circuit went further and held that, even in the absence
of repayment, if the taxpayer's claim of right is wholly unfounded under
well-settled principles of law, the receipts are not taxable. 8 5 But the great
bulk of the more recent cases have followed the "claim of right" doctrine
to its logical extreme-as in fact they were justified in doing by a dictum
in the North American Oil case itself's 6-- and have held that the repayment
of the money in a later year, whether by compromise or by judgment, does
not affect the taxability of the receipts ;187 the repayment must be treated
'
8 4Ford v. Nauts, 25 F. (2d) 1015 (N. D. Ohio 1928) [a case which has been virtually
repudiated in the circuit of its origin, on the same facts, in connection with a later
year's return. Ford v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 666, 52 Sup. Ct. 41 (1931)]; Jesse E. La Dow, 3 B. T. A. 219 (1925) (court
had held taxpayer constructive trustee of stock) ; Walter Cravens, 3 B. T. A. 282 (1926)
(A); 0. B. Barker, 3 B. T. A. 1180 (1926) (A) (stockholder received liquidating
dividend, later held liable for corporate tax deficiency; held that his dividend was
impressed with a trust and was never income, to the extent of the tax liability sub-
sequently determined); Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 33 B. T. A. 512, 522 (1935),
aff'd on other grounds, 89 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 698,
58 Sup. Ct. 16 (1937). The Treasury at one time accepted this theory. 0. D. 1141,
5 Cum. BULL. 134 (1921) ; G. C. M. 1582, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 171 (1927) ; see also I. T.
2326, V-2 Cua!. BULL. 147 (1926). But it was repudiated in G. C. M. 16730, XV-1
Cum. BuLL. 179 (1936).
In Lewis v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 543 (D. Colo. 1936), the court declared that
the "constructive trust" theory was never applied unless the judgment of a court had
decreed that such a trust existed, or evidence was presented to the Board or the tax
court from which it could make such a finding; that a mere compromise did not per se
establish that the taxpayer had not had actual title between the time of receipt and the
settlement. In affirming, the circuit court declared, by way of dictum, that even a judicial
decree of liability to return the receipts would not render the original receipt not taxable.
Saunders v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 407 (C. C. A. 10th 1939).
'
8 5Comm'r v. Turney, 82 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 5th 1936). Judge Hutcheson dis-
sented, declaring that, no matter how unfounded the claim, the material factor is the
intent with which the money is received; it is a recognized obligation to account, not
a well-founded obligation, that renders it non-taxable. The Turney case was expressly
disapproved by Judge Learned Hand in National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d)
93. 96 (C.-C. A. 2d 1938).
The theory underlying the Turney case is supported also by Magill, When Is Income
Realized? (1933) 46 HARV. L. REv. 933, 945-950, arguing that the apparent validity of
the taxpayer's claim of right should be controlling, as bearing upon the likelihood of
his ultimately keeping the gains.
186286 U. S. 417, 424, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932). The Supreme Court declared, citing
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 50 Sup. Ct. 202 (1930), that if the income
were later given up, it would have to be deducted in the later year and not excluded
from the gross income of the year of receipt.
18 7Ford v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 206 (C. C. A. 6th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 666,
52 Sup. Ct. 41 (1931) (returned under consent decree) ; National City Bank v. Helvering,
98 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 2d 1Q38) (returned voluntarily under pressure of Senate in-
[Vol. 26
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'as a loss in the year in which it is made.' s8
The Supreme Court, in Freuler v. Helvering,189 refused to extend the
"claim of right" rule to cover income from a trust. Under Section 162 (b) of
the Internal Revenue Code, the trustee may deduct and the beneficiary is
taxed upon income which "is to be distributed currently," whether distributed
or not.190 The Supreme Court held that when income was improperly dis-
tributed to a life beneficiary, which a later court decree determined had to
be returned to the trust, the income tax was not currently "distributable" in
the first place, and was not taxable even though the beneficiary had received it
under a claim of right. The necessary corollary to this rule is that no de-
duction may be taken when a court orders its restoration, nor may sums be
excluded from the beneficiary's taxable income which the trustee retains to
make up the deficiency.' 91
vestigation) ; Griffin v. Smith, 101 F. (2d) 348 (C. C. A. 7th 1939), cert. denied, 60
Sup. Ct. 73 (1939) (returned in compromise); Saunders v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 407
(C. C. A. 10th 1939), aff'g Lewis v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 543 (D. Colo. 1936)
(compromise); Comm'r v. Alamitos Land Co., 112 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 9th 1940),
cert. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1940) (judgment collected, repaid after reversal) ; McDuffie
v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 239, 85 Ct. Cl. 212 (1937) (judgment compelled return;
court rejects constructive trust theory); Penn v. Robertson, 29 F. Supp. 386 (M. l.
N. C. 1939) (compromise) ; W. R. Hervey, 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932) (A) (compromise);
Arabol Mfg. Co., 26 B. T. A. 1068 (1932) (NA) (compromise); D. H. Byrd, 32 B. T. A.
568 (1935) (judgment); G. C. M. 16730, XV-1 Cum. BuLL. 179 (1936) (judgment).
Cf. J. H. Tippett, 25 B. T. A. 69 (1932) (adverse judgment, pending on appeal and
unpaid).
188Penn v. Robertson, 29 F. Supp. 386 (M. D. N. C. 1939) (an extreme case, per-
mitting deduction of the repayment even though the original receipt had not been reported
and the statute of limitations had passed, since it was properly taxable at that time) ;
W. R. Hervey, 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932) (A); see North American Oil Consolidated
v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932). A contrary result is required
under the constructive trust theory, since the taxpayer loses nothing he ever owned.
Jesse E. La Dow, 3 B. T. A. 219 (1925).
Of course, under this procedure, the transaction must be connected with the taxpayer's
business or a transaction entered for profit; otherwise the repayment is not deductible
as a loss even though the contested receipt was taxed. See infra Part 2 (d). Further-
more, he may have no income against which to offset the loss in the later year.
'18291 U. S. 35, 54 Sup. Ct. 308 (1934).
19 0This section has undergone several verbal changes, but the interpretation with
respect to propositions corollary to that of the Freuler case has been uniform (see note
126c, Part One). Section 2 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1916 provided that the entire
income was taxed to the trustee but the rate was made dependent upon the individual
shares, "so far as the income is to be distributed annually." Section 219 (d) of the
Act of 1918 taxed to the beneficiaries their "distributive share." Section 219 (d) of
the Act of 1921 taxed to the beneficiary the income "which pursuant to the instrument
or order governing the distribution is distributable." All subsequent acts have allowed
the trustee a deduction for income which "is to be distributed currently", and taxed to
the beneficiary "the amount so allowed as a deduction."
The Freuler case arose under the 1921 Act, but, as indicated above, the cases have
construed the later acts as making no change in this respect. See, e.g., Hubbell v.
Helvering. 70 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) ; De Brabant v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 433
(C. C. A. 2d 1937) ; Lawrence Fox et al., Exec'rs, 31 B. T. A. 1181 (1935) ; Marguerite
Hyde Suffolk & Berks, 40 B. T. A. 1120 (1939) (A).
19Mary V. Pyle, 16 B. T. A. 218 (1929) (1921 Act); Marguerite Hyde Suffolk &
Berks, 40 B. T. A. 1120 (1939) (A) (1932 and 1934 Acts).
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b. Vaitation of disputed titles
In many instances, Mr. Smith's client will not be interested in the valua-
tion, for income tax purposes, of his disputed title. For the actual cost of
the property, adjusted in accordance with the statute, will usually afford the
basis for depletion or depreciation, and adjusted cost and selling price nor-
mally determine the gain or loss if he disposes of it. However, in connec-
tion with property transmitted at death, acquired by gift or taxable exchange,
or owned prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value of the property is,
in certain circumstances, used as a basis for the purposes mentioned.9 2 It
has been held that when property the title to which is in dispute is acquired
through an exchange (which would ordinarily be taxable), if the title hazard
is such that the property could not be sold except at a great sacrifice, it has
no fair market value and no gain or loss is recognized; the property acquired
takes the basis of the old property, with proper adjustments, and the deter-
mination of gain or loss is postponed until the new property is disposed of.'93
However, for purposes of determining depreciation, depletion, or the gain
or loss upon the disposition of property which was acquired by inheritance
or gift, or which was owned prior to March 1, 1913, it is impossible so to
postpone determination of the value.'94 It has been held, therefore, that, if
the title was in dispute at the time to which the value must be related, the
valuation must nevertheless be based upon the value of the good title which
the taxpayer was later found to have, rather than of the disputed title which
he acquired. 19 5
192 See Internal Revenue Code § 113 (a).
For property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920, the basis for gain is the
donor's basis; for loss, it is the donor's basis or the fair market value at date of gift,
whichever is lower. [§ 113 (a) (2)]. For property acquired by gift before January 1,
1921, or property transmitted at death (at any time), the basis is the fair market value
at date of acquisition. [§ 113 (a) (4) (5)r. For property acquired before March 1,
1913, the basis for gain is the cost or March 1, 1913, value, whichever is greater; for
loss, it is cost. [§ 113 (a) (14)]. When property is acquired in a taxable exchange,
the selling price of the old and the cost basis of the new property are the fair mnarket
value of the new property. [§ 111 (b)].
See discussion in 5 PAUL & MERTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INcOm TAXATION (1934)
§ 52.01.
'
9 3Champlin v. Comm'r, 71 F. (2d) 23, 28 (C. C. A. 10th 1934). Cf. Helvering v.
Tex-Penn Co., 300 U. S. 481, 499, 57 Sup. Ct. 569 (1937). The cases were decided
under section 202 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which used the language, "fair
market value, if any." Section 111 (b) of the present Code lacks the words, "if any."
However, it is still recognized by the regulations that, "in rare and extraordinary cases,"
property received in an exchange may have no fair market value, presumably with the
effect indicated in the text. Regulations 103, sec. 19.111-1.
194Cf. Burnet v. Logan. 283 U. S. 404, 412, 51 Sup. Ct. 550 (1931).
19 5Heiner v. Hewes, 30 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 3d 1929). The case seems incon-
sistent in principle with the later Supreme Court case of United States v. Safety Car
Heating Co., 297 U. S. 88, 56 Sup. Ct. 353 (1936), which held that a mere cause of
action had no value prior to its final determination; but the Supreme Court expressly
[Vol. 26
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c. Impounded income
Shortly after the client brought his case to Attorney Smith, the plaintiff
procured the appointment of a receiver.
"Mr. Smith," asked the client, "I no longer can enjoy the income of my
property, and in fact I may never enjoy it. Must I pay an income tax
on it?"
The categorical answer to that question is that he need not, but the ques-
tion of who must pay the tax and at what time depends upon the nature of
the receivership.
Section 52 of the Internal Revenue Code requires that a receiver operating
the property of a corporation shall stand in the place of the corporation and
pay its income tax.' 96 It has been held, however, that that section relates
only to a receiver operating the entire property or business of a corporation,
and the receiver of a part of the property of a corporation is not taxable.197
Similarly, the receiver of all of the property of an individual stands in his
stead and must pay tax as a fiduciary ;19s but the receiver of part of the prop-
erty of an individual is expressly exempted from the statutory provision
respecting fiduciary returns, and is held not to be subject to tax.1 9
The non-taxability of receivers of part of the property of individuals or
corporations most clearly extends to such receivers as those appointed in
mortgage foreclosures and partition proceedings, where the equitable owner-
ship of the property and its income is not in dispute.20 0 The Supreme Court,
furthermore, has held that the receiver appointed pending litigation over the
right to property likewise was not taxable. 20 1  A more recent case in the
distinguished and preserved the case of Heiner v. Hewes (297 U. S. at 98). Cf. Security-
First National Bank of Los Angeles, Exec'r, 35 B. T. A. 815, 823 (1937) (for estate
tax purposes, a disputed claim for a tax refund was valued at face value, which w as
subsequently recovered).
Early cases in the Board took a contrary view. Charles P. Hewes, 2 B. T. A. 1279
(1925); Gilbert Butler, 4 B. T. A. 756 (1926).
With respect to determining the period for which disputed property has been held,
for purposes of the capital gain and loss provisions, see R. S. Goforth, 32 B. T. A.
1206, 1214 (1935) (NA), appeals dismissed, 84 F. (2d) 1003 and 86 F. (2d) 1Q00
(C. C. A. 10th 1936) (dictum that time of acquisition was not when title litigation was
settled by large payment from taxpayer).
'
00 United States v. Chicago & E. I. Ry., 298 Fed. 779 (N. D. Ill. 1924) ; Regulations
103, secs. 19.52-2 and 19.142-4.
In such a case, of course, no second tax is payable by the corporation when the income
is released. Cf. Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768, 776 (C. C. A. 10th 1935).
'
0 7 North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932);
Regulations 103, secs. 19.52-2 and 19.142-4.
198 Regulations 103, sec. 19-142-4.
199 1nternal Revenue Code § 142 (a) ; Benton Wilson, 33 B. T. A. 649 (1935) (dis-
cussing the history of this provision).2 00Regulations 103, secs. 19.52-2 and 19.142-4.
20ONorth American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932),
involving a dispute over property held by a corporation; the predecessor of section 52
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Tenth Circuit, however, casts substantial doubt upon whether that position
is correct.20 2 That case held taxable receivers in heirship disputes and other
cases where a title contest is not between definitely ascertained persons
(involving, for example, the validity, priority, or construction of a convey-
ance) but is among an indefinite number of unascertained persons claiming to
occupy a particular status. It was held that such a receiver is taxable as a
trustee for an unascertained person, 20 3 and that he is not exempted under the
exception for a receiver of part of the property of an individual 2 4 because
it is impossible at the time to know whether he holds all or part of any indi-
vidual's -property. Although the Supreme Court's rule respecting title dis-
putes between "ascertained" persons was distinguished, the distinction seems
specious, for the "potential taxpayer" is no more and no less known in the
ordinary suit concerning a defect in title than in the heirship dispute, although
the group in which he is to be found may be more clearly defined.
It seems, therefore, that either the Supreme Court's view or that of the
Tenth Circuit is in error, and that one position or the other should be fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion. On the one hand, it is arguable that no re-
ceivers are taxable unless they completely stand in the place of the owner,
and that the exception for receivers of part of one's property extends to all
other receivers, with the purpose of eliminating two partial returns for the
same person. On the other hand, the position seems equally supportable
(if the Supreme Court case can be disposed of) 20 5 that the exception is con-
of the Code, requiring returns of receivers operating the property of a corporation, was
held to be confined to receivers of the entire property. The same rule was applied to a
receiver in a dispute over the title to an individual's property in Benton Wilson, 33
B. T. A. 649 (1935). Contra: Ida Wolf Schick, 22 B. T. A. 1067 (1931).
But one holding impounded property other than in the capacity of a receiver is taxed
as a fiduciary under section 161 of the Code. Ferguson v. Forstmann, 25 F. (2d) 47
(C. C. A. 3d 1928) (corporation, by court order, held up duly declared dividend until
right to it was determined) ; Hart v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 1st 1932) (bonds
deposited with plaintiff by defendant to stay execution pending appeal; interest held tax-
able to plaintiff as fiduciary) ; Buckley v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 2d 1933)
(court placed condemnation award in hands of city chamberlain to be held for benefit
of whoever should become entitled to contingent remainder upon death of life tenant;
income of fund held taxable to custodian, expressly upon the ground that he was not
shown to be a "receiver" within the statutory exception).
202Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 10th 1935), aff'g 26 B. T. A. 1147
(1932). Cf. R. S. Goforth, 32 B. T. A. 1206 (1935) (NA), appeals dismissed, 84 F.
(2d) 1003 and 86 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 10th 19.36) (no receivership, but lessees
impounded royalties pending heirship dispute).203 lnternal Revenue Code § 161.204lnternal Revenue Code § 142.205The North American Oil case, supra note 197, upon which the other cases relied,
failed to consider the predecessor of section 161, but held only that the predecessor of
section 52 was inapplicable. Therefore, if properly raised, it could still be held that the
receiver in such a case is a separate taxable entity as a fiduciary holding for an un-
ascertained person. Cf. Helvering v. 'Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 348, 60 Sup. Ct. 551, 553
(1940).
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fined to cases where the equitable ownership is known, and that receivers in
title disputes of all varieties are taxable as fiduciaries.
In cases where the receiver is taxable, the ultimate distributee of the
income is not taxable upon it, since the law does not contemplate taxing the
same income tvice.20 6 But when receivers are not taxable, there must be
satme provision for taxing the income to its owner. Since he does not have
the unrestricted enjoyment of the income, and since he may never receive
it, the "claim of right" principle does not apply, and the income is too con-
tingent to accrue prior to its release by the receiver.20 7 Therefore, at the
time the receivership is terminated, the prevailing party pays tax upon the
accumulated income which is released to him.208 Under the "claim of right"
rule, however, if the defendant gives bond and obtains the enjoyment of the
income, he becomes taxable upon it at that time even though he may sub -
sequently lose it.2°  It has been held, furthermore, that if it is legally possi-
ble to end the receivership and withdraw the income by giving a bond, so
that the taxpayer can obtain the income at his own option, the income is
taxable as if he had done so ;210 this result seems questionable, however, for
the right to withdraw the income is far from unconditional when a bond
must be given, which frequently necessitates the furnishing of security.21'
d. Adverse judgments: if deductible
When a defendant loses in an action or makes a settlement thereof, is the
amount of his loss deductible from his taxable income ?212 Not every expendi-
206Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768, 776 (C. C. A. 10th 1935).20 7Income impounded by a receiver in a mortgage foreclosure or similar action, where
the defendant's equInable interest is undisputed and the income is to be applied upon his
debt, may well be taxable to the defendant withotit postponement, at least on the accrual
basis.208North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932);
Umsted v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) (oil lands descended to tax-
payer while in hands of receiver; held that accumulated income, when released to him,
was taxable income and not corpus of the estate) ; Comm'r v. Owens, 78 F. (2d) 768,
776 (C. C. A. 10th 1935); Trojan Oil Co., 26 B. T. A. 659 (1932) (NA); Nat'l Petro-
leum & Refining Co., 28 B. T. A. 569 (1933); Benton Wilson, 33 B. T. A. 649 (1935).
But cf. Obispo Oil Co. v. Welch, 48 F. (2d) 872 (S. D. Cal. 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 85 F. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds, 301 U. S.
190, 57 Sup. Ct. 684 (1937) (district court held corporation taxable during receiver-
ship; undoubtedly overruled by the Supreme Court in the North American Oil case).209Comm'r v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 6Z F. (2d) 505 (C. C. A. 2d 1933).
2Olbid.
211See dissent of Judge Learned Hand, id. at 507. Even when the taxpayer actually
gives bond and receives the income, it is hard to see that income is realized, for the
bond stands as a substitute for the withdrawn income and the situation is much the same
as if the income were escrowed..212At least if the settlement is bona fide, the right to deduct is not affected by the
fact that, by fighting the case, the defendant might have been held not liable. Humphrey
v. Comn'r, 91 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) ; Olympia Harbor Lumber Co., 30 B. T.
A. 114 (1934) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 79 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 9th 1935). Cf.
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ture made by a taxpayer may be deducted, but only such as are expressly
provided for in the Internal Revenue Code.213 The statute permits the
deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred ...
in carrying on a trade or business" ;214 of all uncompensated losses sustained
by a corporation ;215 and of uncompensated losses sustained by individuals "if
incurred in trade or business," or "if incurred in any other transaction en-
tered into for profit, though not connected with trade or business," or losses
"of property not connected with the trade or business, if the loss arises from
fires, storms, shipwreck or other casualty, or from theft. ' 216  With a few
exceptions, which will be discussed in due course,21 7 no judgments may be
deducted unless they fit one of those provisions. Expressly denied are
deductions of personal expenses2 18 and capital expenditures.219
Therefore, one may deduct judgments and settlements resulting from the
operations of a trade or business, as business expenses, 220 except where pub-
Gwathmey v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 2d 1935) (settled suit for accounting
of funds entrusted to taxpayer; he claimed that suit was unfounded and he made settle-
ment only to avoid long and expensive litigation; if suit was well-founded, no loss was
suffered, for taxpayer gave up only what rightfully belonged to plaintiff; deduction de-
nied for lack of proof that suit was groundless).
The reimbursement, pursuant to contract, of one conducting a test case in which the
taxpayer is interested appears to stand upon the same footing as a judgment or settle-
ment. Findley v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 715 (W. D. La. 1939).2 13
"Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed depends upon legislative
grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particular deduction be
allowed." New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440, 54 Sup. Ct. 788 (1934).2 14Internal Revenue Code § 23 (a) (1). On the meaning of "ordinary and necessary",
see 3 PAUL & MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION (1934) § 23.38.2 15 Internal Revenue Code § 23 (f). Note that the restrictions placed upon the de-
ductibility of individual losses, infra, do not apply to corporate losses. However, cor-
porate losses are presumably incurred in business; and it has been held that the statute
contemplates only losses in "normal business transactions". Pennsylvania Indemnity Co.,
30 B. T. A. 413, 415 (1934), af'd, 77 F. (2d) 92 (C. C. A. 3d 1935), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 588, 56 Sup. Ct. 99 (1935).2 16Internal Revenue Code § Z3 (e).
Although the damage to property suffered in an automobile accident, not connected
with one's business, gives rise to a casualty deduction [Shearer v. Anderson, 16 F. (2d)
995 (C. C. A. 2d 1927) ; W. S. Bronson, 9 B. T. A. 1008 (1927) (A) ; Regulations 103,
sec. 19.23 (e)-1], a judgment or settlement for damages to person or property suffered
by the other party is not a loss of property from casualty and is not deductible as such,
although it may be a business loss. Fred J. Hughes, 1 B. T. A. 944 (1925) ; L. Oransky,
1 B. T. A. 1239 (1925) ; B. M. Peyton, 10 B. T. A. 1129 (1928). The casualty provision
is, therefore, of no avail to unsuccessful defendants.2 1 7By virtue of the provisions for the deduction of interest [§ 23 (b)1, taxes E§ 23 (c) .,
and bad debts [§ 23 (k)], none of which are restricted to business transactions, certain
judgments or parts thereof may result in deductions. See infra, notes 257, 262, and 291.2 18 Internal Revenue Code § 24 (a) (1).21ORegulations 103, sec. 19.24-2.2 20 The problem of defining the term "business" is beyond the scope of this article,
except so far as considered infra notes 364, 369-372.
The fact that one is no longer engaged in the business at the time the judgment is
awarded or the settlement is made is immaterial if the liability is proximately connected
with the business. I. T. 1789, 11-2 CuM. BuLL. 121 (1923). Cf. I. T. 3325, 1939-2 Cum.
BULL. 151 (involving attorney's fees):
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lic policy forbids the deduction. 22 ' It appears, too, that a liability not falling
within the definition of a business expense may nevertheless be deducted
as a loss if it meets the above requirements for deductibility of losses. 2 On
the other hand, deduction may be denied even for a business liability if
it is connected with the acquisition of property or the protection of title to
property, such capital expenditures being added to the cost for purposes
of computing depreciation, depletion, or the gain or loss upon the disposition
of the property.22
3
The illustrative cases are so numerous and varied that they can best be
considered in categories representing the major fields of the law.
Contracts: Liabilities for breach of contracts made in the ordinary course
of trade or business are deductible.2 24 Liabilities incurred in connection with
2 2 1See Crimes, in!ra. Cf. Torts, infra.222The distinction between losses and expenses has never been clearly defined and the
terms are frequently used indiscriminately or alternatively in the cases, but the dis-
tinction is important because the deduction of losses is much less restricted. It would
seem that no true "loss" is sustained unless some asset has been acquired and lost, and
that other expenditures must meet the requirements for a business expense deduction.
See Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B. T. A. 39, 42 (1935) ; 3 PAUtL & MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDE SL INcOuz TAXAION (1934) §§ 26.29 and 26.35. In 3 id. § 23.49, damages are
treated as expenses. Although the word "loss" is frequently used in connection with
judgments, properly they should be treated as expenses since they are not related to any
asset. However, those liabilities and payments which are denied current deduction as
capital expenditures may become part of the cost and hence be reflected in an increased
loss or decreased gain at a later date. Nevertheless, there are a few cases which have
squarely held that an expenditure which fails to result in the acquisition of an asset is
deductible under the loss provisions. Seufert Bros. Co. v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 528 (C. C.
A. 9th 1930) ; North American Investment Co., 24 B. T. A. 419 (1931) (NA) (corpora-
tion's payment to cancel fraudulently issued stock; held, a loss, since nothing of recog-
nized value was acquired) ; Portland Furniture Mfg. Co., 30 B. T. A. 878 (1934) (NA)
(legal expenses in merger which was abandoned). And at least one case, in which the
Bureau acquiesced, allowed as a loss a judgment arising out of a non-business transaction
entered for profit. W. R. Hervey, 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932) (A). Cf. Marjorie Fleming
Lloyd-Smith, 40 B. T. A. 214, 222 (1939).
22SThe effects of holding an expenditure to be a capital expenditure are several. Al-
though no current deduction is permitted, the expenditure ordinarily becomes part of the
cost of the property in connection with which it is incurred, resulting in an increased
loss or diminished gain when it is disposed of, and greater depreciation or depletion
meanwhile. If it results in an increased loss, the benefit thereof may be had even though
it is not connected with business, if it is connected with a transaction entered for profit,
which would not be permissible if it were a current expense. If it decreases a gain, the
benefit thereof may be had in all cases, since gains upon the disposition of any property
are taxed. On the other hand, whatever the nature of the transaction, if the property is
within the definition of a "capital asset", the benefits will be restricted by the limitations
in section 117 of the Internal Revenue Code.
924Producers Fuel Co., 1 B. T. A. 202 (1924) (A); Raleigh Smokeless Fuel Co., 6
B. T. A. 381 (1927) (A): Frank L. Orth, 9 B. T. A. 249 (1927) (A); Fraser Brick
Co., 10 B. T. A. 1252 (1928) (A); Thorne. Neal & Co.. 13 B. T. A. 490 (1928) (NA):
Trinpensee Mf. Co., 15 B. T. A. 15 (1929) (NA) : Olvmpia Harbor Lumber Co.. 30
B. T. A. 114 (1934) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 79 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).
Respectinq the liability of an employer for dismissing an employee in violation of con-
tract, cf. infra note 234.
In all of the cases cited, the deduction was allowed as an ordinary and necessary
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one's employment are likewise deductible.2 25 On the other hand, of course,
contract obligations for which money or property (other than inventories)
was received are not deductible.
Corporations and Partnerships:226 When a corporation, by vote of its
dominant stockholders, makes a payment to a minority stockholder in settle-
ment of his threatened suit demanding preemptive rights in new stock, it
is' a mere distribution of assets and not a deductible loss or expense. 22 7
Similarly, when the corporation, to put an end to obstructionist tactics and
vexatious litigation by minority stockholders, makes a settlement with them
as a result of which their stock is surrendered, the transaction is viewed as a
purchase and no deduction results.228 But when an officer of a corporation
fraudulently issues its stock without consideration, and to avoid litigation the
corporation makes a partial payment to cancel the void stock, it has been held
that it acquires nothing of value and the payment is a deductible loss.
229
Conversely, when the corporation wrongfully cancels and transfers stock
on its books, a settlement of its liability therefor gives rise to a deduction. 230
When a retiring partner demands payment for his share of the good will
of the business, to which the other partners insist he is not entitled under
their agreement, and they make a payment to him "to avoid litigation," no
deductible expense or loss results, for the continuing partners thereby in-
crease their interest in the business.2 1
business expense. Whether it would be allowed as a loss if the contract, although con-
nected with business, did not concern the current carrying on of the business, or if con-
nected with a non-business transaction entered into for profit, does not appear to have
been decided. See supra note 222.
2251. T. 1182, 1-1 Cum. BuLL. 142 (1922) (liability of National Guard officer for
shortage in accounts).226Respecting violations of the anti-trust laws, see infra note 237.227 0ne Hundred Five West Fifty-Fifth Street, Inc. v. Comm'r, 42 F. (2d) 849 CC.
C. A. 2d 1930).228 Newark Milk & Cream Co. v. Comm'r, 34 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 3d 1929); A. R.
R. 701, 5 Cum. BuLL. 176 (1921). Cf. Burt L. Davis, 26 B. T. A. 218 (1932) (partner-
ship). But cf. Murray Hospital v. Rasmussen, 20 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 9th 1927), in
which vexatious suits by a stockholder were settled by purchase of his stock at a price
well above that fixed in the by-laws of the closed corporation, the excess being alleged
to be a payment merely for freedom from strife rather than for an asset; on demurrer,
this was held a good allegation of a business loss, but it was not established on the trial,
which resulted in a directed verdict against the taxpayer [see 35 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A.
9th 1929)].229North American Investment Co., 24 B. T. A. 419 (1931) (NA).
23OSuperheater Co., 12 B. T. A. 5 (1928) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 38 F. (2d) 69
(C. C. A. 2d 1930). The Board did not decide whether it was an expense or a loss.231Arthur P. Williams, 24 B. T. A. 1070 (1931). The Board rested upon its con-
struction of the partnership contract and the law, holding that the retiring partner actu-
ally had a right to payment for good will. A different result might follow if it should
find the claim unfounded. Cf. A. King Aitkin, 12 B. T. A. 692 (1928) (NA) ; Charles
F. Mosser, 27 B. T. A. 513 (1933) (NA) (amounts paid to partner in excess of his
interest, to obtain prompt dissolution, held deductible). Cf. also North American Invet-
ment. Co., supra note 229.
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In partnerships and closely held corporations particularly, the personal and
family quarrels and litigations of an officer may have such an adverse effect
upon the fortunes of the organization that the minority members consent to
a settlement by the corporation. Such payments, although legalized by the
assent of all parties interested, are in the nature of a diversion of corporate
or partnership assets for the personal benefit of a nmember, and are not
deductible.3 2  Similarly, if a corporation pays a judgment or claim against
an officer, for which it is not itself liable, the payment is not deductible no
matter whether it could have been deducted by the officer, if he had paid
it.23 3 A payment to an officer to induce him to resign has been held not
deductible in the absence of proof that it is reasonable additional compen-
sation. 34
The civil liabilities of directors and officers of corporations for fraud,
secret profits, negligence, and the like, arise out of their business of managing
the corporation, and are deductible by them.2 5 On the other hand, the statu-
tory liabilities of stockholders for the losses and liabilities of banks and other
corporations are in the nature of additional investment of capital, and may
not be deducted until their stock becomes wholly worthless or a loss is
finally realized by a sale.2 8
232White v. Comm'r, 61 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 9th 1932); Forty-Four Cigar Co.,
2 B. T. A. 1156 (1925). Cf. George D. Mann, 33 B. T. A. 281 (1935) (NA). The fact
that the activities of the opposing party would have ruined the organization's business
if continued does not change the essential character of the payment as a personal ex-
pense of the officer. Forty-Four Cigar Co., supra. The fact that the settlement enables
the officers to serve the organization without interruption and harassment may possibly
make the payment one in the nature of additional compensation to the officers, deductible
upon a proper showing that their total compensation, including this payment, is reason-
able. See Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 20 B. T. A. 661, 665 (1930), aff'd, 60 F. (2d) 257
(C. C. A. 10th 1932) (Board rejected this claim for lack of evidence that officers were
not otherwise reasonably compensated).233Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 10th 1932), aff'g
20 B. T. A. 661 (1930) (suit against directors for malicious conspiracy to prevent stock-
holders from carrying out an option contract; by resolution of same directors, corpora-
tion assumed liability and made settlement; corporation was no party to conspiracy and
was not liable, so may not deduct) ; San-Knit-Ary Textile Mills, Inc., 22 B. T. A. 754
(1931) (corporation settled judgment against president for automobile accident, not
shown to have been on corporate business). Cf. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 54
Sup. Ct. 8 (1933) (payment of another's debts, even for good business reason, is not
ordinary and necessary business expense).234National Cottonseed Products Corp. v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 6th
1935). Cf. Lewis Spencer Morris, Trustee, 40 B. T. A. 987 (1939), in which a similar
expense was held not to be "ordinary and necessary" in any event, and not to be com-
pensation for services since no nore services were to be rendered.
2350. D. 1091, 5 CuM. BuLL. 139; I. T. 1853, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 124 (1923) ; cf. Charles
R. Stuart, 38 B. T. A. 1147 (1938). See infra note 364. Public policy does not prevent
deduction of such liabilities, other than liabilities to the Government. See Torts, infra.
But cf. McGinn v. Comm'r. 76 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 9th 1935), arising under the
provision for the carry-over of losses.236First National Bank in Wichita v. Comm'r, 46 F. (2d) 283 (C. C. A. 10th 1931);
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Crimes: Fines and penalties paid to a government are not deductible even
though they arise out of one's business.2 7 It has been so held even with
respect to civil penalties for violations involving no elements of wilfulness,
negligence, or bad faith, although such violations may be to some extent
inevitable in the normal course of the taxpayer's business.25  For it is said
that unlawful acts are no part of the taxpayer's ordinary business, and the
same public policy which imposes a fine or penalty for acts involving no
wrongful intent forbids the deduction of such payments from taxable income.
Domestic Relations:- Payments made and judgments suffered on account
of breach of promise to marry are personal in nature and may not be de-
ducted.2 9 Similarly, alimony payments and payments for the support of
children are not deductible.24 0  Furthermore, the income of an alimony trust
Harry E. Lutz, 2 B. T. A. 484 (1925) ; John G. Paxton, 7 B. T. A. 92 (1927) ; Porter
Property Trustees, Ltd., 42 B. T. A. No. 103 (1940); Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-2;
0. D. 918, 4 Cum. BULL. 213 (1921). But cf. Charles R. Stuart, 38 B. T. A. 1147 (1938)
allowing deduction of a judgment for taxpayer's liabilty (upon what theory is not stated)
as a director for the defalcations of another.
Such liabilities are deductible if the stock is worthless and is not rehabilitated by the
assessment. I. T. 2843, XIV-1 Cum. BULL. 77 (1935). The loss is then an ordinary
loss rather than a capital loss. I. T. 3351, 1940-1 CuM. BULL. 87.237Fines for violations of anti-trust and price-fixing statutes: Burroughs Bldg. Material
Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 2d 1931) ; Columbus Bread Co., 4 B. T. A.
1126 (1926).
Prohibition law violations connected with business: Bonnie Bros., Inc., 15 B. T. A.
1231 (1929) ; cf. B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930).
Civil penalties for violations by railroads of federal safety appliance, hours of service,
livestock transportation, and quarantine laws, and customs regulations: Great Northern
Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 8th 1930), cert.. denied, 282 U. S. 855, 51 Sup.
Ct. 31 (1930) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618, 52 Sup. Ct. 7 (1931) ; Tunnel R. R. v. Comn'r, 61 F. (2d)
166 (C. C. A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 604, 607, 53 Sup. Ct. 396, 398 (1933);
S. R. 1448, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 140 (1925).
Cf. contra: Huff, Andrews & Thomas, 1 B. T. A. 542 (1925) (A), in which a whole-
sale grocer allegedly violated the Lever Food Control Act; investigators threatened to
deprive him of his license unless he gave $5,000 to such war charities as the Food Admin-
istrator might select (hence, not strictly in the nature of a fine or penalty); held de-
ductible.238 See the railroad cases cited in the preceding, footnote, and Bonnie Bros., Inc., also
cited therein.239Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-1; 0. D. 546, 2 Cum. BuLL. 157 (1920).
240J. A. L. Van den Bosch, 26 B. T. A. 679 (1932) (alimony); Regulations 103, sec.
19.24-1. Cf. the cases cited infra notes 241 and 242. Interest upon an alimony obligation
is also held non-deductible. Longyear v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 116, 64 App. D. C. 238
(1935).
Even though the children are with the divorced wife, however, the husband rather
than the wife has the benefit of the dependent exemption if his contributions furnish
their chief support, whether or not a specific portion of the alimony was segregated for
their use by the decree or settlement, provided that the decree or settlement purports to
make provision for such support. P. L. Taylor, 11 B. T. A. 441 (1928) (A) ; M. A.
Willem, 39 B. T. A. 898 (1939) (A) ; I. T. 2096, 111-2 Cum. Btn.L. 163 (1924) (deny-
ing deduction where decree did not mention support of children) ; I. T. 3274, 1939-1
Cum. B mL. 177 (granting deduction where support of children was provided for in de-
cree, although in no specific amount). Cf. Eleanor L. Mack, 37 B. T. A. 1101 (1938)
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set up for a divorced or separated wife by the husband is held to discharge
his continuing obligation to her, and, with exceptions fully considered in
Part One, is taxable to the husband.2 41  The income of trusts set up to dis-
(denying exemption to wife in such circumstances). Whether the divorced husband may
claim exemption as head of a family depends upon the circumstances of each case. See
Meier S. Block, 37 B. T. A. 945 (1938) (NA) ; Sidney Williamson Kirtland, 39 B. T. A.
959 (1939) (A); 0. D. 754, 3 Cum. BULL. 195 (1920) ; I. T. 2354, VI-1 Cum. BuLL.
75 (1927).
When a husband, to obtain an absolute discharge of his obligation to support his wife
(who is suing him for a divorce), transfers to her property which cost him much less
than its present value, it is held that no taxable gain is realized by him, although if he had
sold the property and given her the proceeds, such a gain would have resulted; the
reason given is that it is impossible to place a market value on the marital obligation
from which he is released in exchange for the property. L. W. Mesta, 42 B. T. A. No.
135 (1940).241Douglas v. Willcutts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935) ; Helvering v. Fitch, 309
U. S. 149, 60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1940) ; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780
(1940).
It is now established that the ex-husband is not taxable upon the income of an alimony
trust if, but only if, he absolutely and irrevocably discharged his marital obligation by
setting up the trust; it is requisite that he shall not have guaranteed, even contingently,
the income from the trust and that, by local law and the terms of the decree and the
settlement, the court has no power to modify the decree. Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S.
69, 60 Sup. Ct. 784 (1940) (husband not taxable, in view of Nevada law and the terms
of the trust). The burden is upon the taxpayer to establish the local law by "clear and
convincing proof." Helvering v. Fitch, supra (husband taxable; Iowa law) ; Helvering
v. Leonard, supra (husband taxable; New York law). Later applications of those prin-
ciples are found in Dixon v. Comm'r, 109 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) (Pennsylvania
law provided no alimony; trust provided fixed payments from income and principal, but
husband agreed conditionally to assign only a limited amount of securities to trust if
income fell below agreed amount; held not taxable to husband) ; Weir v. Comm'r, 109
F. (2d) 996, 999 (C. C. A. 3d 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 637, 60 Sup. Ct. 1080 (1940)
(same state law, by which alimony could not be decreed, but husband guaranteed income
of trust; husband held taxable); Tilles v. Comm'r, 113 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A. 8th
1940), cert. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 143 (1940) (trust held to be mere pledge to secure
guaranteed income; immaterial, therefore, that alimony could not have been de-
creed under state law; husband taxable) ; Arthur Letts, Jr., 41 B. T. A. 1172 (1940) (A)
(Nevada law and trust agreement terminated all obligation, no guarantee of income and
no power in court to modify decree; husband held not taxable); William H. Stanley,
41 B. T. A. 1233 (1940) (A) (obligation terminated under Illinois law and ter.ms
of trust; husband not taxable) ; Susan Sturgis Barry, 42 B. T. A. 1 (1940) (obli-
gation terminated under Maine law and terms of trust; wife taxable) ; Harold
Ingraham, 42 B. T. A. 44 (1940) (failed to meet burden of proving termination
of obligation under Connecticut law; husband taxable) ; Josephine S. Pearce, 42
B. T. A. 91 (1940) (agreement provided that purchase of annuity for wife should
discharge obligation, and Commissioner found that discharge was final under Texas law;
wife failed to overcome finding and was held taxable) ; Murray Innes, 42 B. T. A. 93
(1940) (no guarantee of income, but California law permitted court to modify decree
or agreement; husband held taxable) ; Harry T. Nicolai, 42 B. T. A. No. 131 (1940)
(husband set up trust of stock in controlled corporation, agreeing to cause corporation to
declare certain dividends but only "from available net earnings"; held that agreement and
Oregon law finally discharged his marital obligation; husband not taxable) ; William E.
Walter, 42 B. T. A. No. 136 (1940) (obligation fully discharged by Pennsylvania law
and by terms of settlement of litigation over trust). See full discussion in Part One,
(Feb. 1940) 25 CORNELL L. 0. 221, 235-238.
It should be noted that Clifford v. Helvernq, cited in notes 96, 97, and 100 thereof,
respecting a trust for a term, over which the grantor retains substantial control, was re-
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charge the divorced father's obligation to support his children is also taxable
to him.24 Although the question is disputed, it would appear that payments
to one's wife, whether or not in connection with a divorce, in consideration
for her release of her inchoate rights in the husband's property may not
be added to the cost of the property or deducted from the proceeds ;243 the
contrary rule would, in effect, permit a deduction on account of a transfer
of a property interest resulting from marriage, from which relationship it
has often been held that no gain or loss (for purposes of income tax) is
derived.
244
Labor Law: Awards of back wages made by the National Labor Relations
Board are deductible business expenses.24 5
Mortgages: Losses sustained by a mortgagor upon the foreclosure of a
mortgage are deductible when the mortgaged property is business property
or was purchased or used for purposes of profit, but not when it is residen-
tial or similar property.2 6 The loss, if deductible, is the adjusted cost
versed in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940). However, the
mere existence of a reversion in the husband, if on the facts of the case he is not re-
garded as "in substance the owner" in the interim, does not make him taxable upon the
income if he meets the terms of the Fuller case, since a reversion is not a "power" to
revest" within the meaning of § 166 of the Code. Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 60
Sup. Ct. 551 (1940) ; Comm'r v. Tuttle, 89 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) ; Lolita S.
Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940); 1. T. 3238, 1938-2 Cum. BULL. 204. See also the
remarks of Justice Douglas in the Fuller case upon the effect of the husband's retaining
voting rights in the stocks in the trust (which point, however, had not been properly
raised).242Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551, 56 Sup. Ct. 304 (1935) ; Helvering v.
Leonard, 105 F. (2d) 900, 903 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 310 U. S.
80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780 (1940); Harry S. Blumenthal, 34 B. T. A. 994 (1936), aff'd on
other grounds, 91 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 2d 1937); Ernestine Mitchell, 38 B. T. A.
1336 (1938) ; Arthur Letts, Jr., 41 B. T. A. 1172 (1940) ; Harold Ingraham, 42 B. T. A.
44 (1940). Even in those cases which held the income of the alimony trust under cQn-
sideration not taxable to the husband, under the exceptions referred to in the text, be-
cause there remained no obligation to the wife, nevertheless, so far as the income is
allocable to child mtpPort, the husband is taxable, since he cannot commute or discharge
that obligation. Cf. also G. C. M. 18972, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 231.243Frank J. Digan, 35 B. T. A. 256 (1937). Contra: Frank v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d)
923 (C. C. A. 3d 1931).
Cf. S. George Ullman, Exec'r, 6 B. T. A. 100 (1927) (Rudolph Valentino, seeking
divorce from Jean Acker, paid her $12,000 for release of her expectant community rights
in the income of a certain film contract; he soon abandoned the film contract so he got
the worst of the bargain; he claimed the difference as a loss in a "transaction entered
for profit," but it was denied that a transaction thus arising from the marriage relationship
was such) ; Frances R. Walz, Adm'x, 32 B. T. A. 718 (1935) (no loss deductible upjon
division of community property).244See Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas, 11 F. Supp. 537, 539 (W. D. K.y.
1935), aff'd on other grounds, 89 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 6th 1937). The basic case is
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917).
2451. T. 3412, (Sept. 23, 1940) I. R. BuL. No. 39, p. 5.
246Lloyd Jones, 39 B. T. A. 531 (1939). The case also summarizes the rules for
treating losses upon property which has been used both for residential and profit pur-
poses during the time it was held.
Quaere, if residential property were mortgaged to obtain funds for business or invest-
[Vol. 26
INCOME TAX ON LOSSES IN LITIGATION
basis 247 of the property plus the amount of any deficiency judgment or pay-
ment, less the amount due upon the mortgage.2 8  The question whether a
loss upon foreclosure is a capital loss or an ordinary loss, if "capital assets,"
as defined in the Code,249 are involved, is in confusion. 250  The Supreme
ment; in such a case, the mortgage is part of a business transaction or a transaction en-
tered into for profit, rather than a purely personal matter, and it might be held that any
loss directly traceable to the mortgage and its foreclosure would be deductible; deprecia-
tion and normal market decline, as distinguished from forced sale loss, could not be
deducted [cf. Helvering v. Owens, 305 U. S. 468, 59 Sup. Ct. 260 (1939)). No case has
considered the question, however.2 4 7Internal Revenue Code § 113.2 4 SJohn 0. Fowler, 40 B. T. A. 1292 (1939) (NA). If, of course, the mortgage does
not represent capital received but was given on account of business expenses for which
no deduction has been taken (the taxpayer being on the cash basis), the amount due upon
the mortgage will also be deductible when thus discharged.
24 9Internal Revenue Code § 117 (a) (1).250A capital loss must result from a "sale or exchange." It is the position of the
Board of Tax Appeals that a "sale or exchange" requires the assent of the parties and
a consideration moving to the seller. Lloyd Jones, 39 B. T. A. 531 (1939) (NA).
Therefore, if the taxpayer is personally liable on the mortgage debt (or other obliga-
tion), a capital loss is sustained if he voluntarily conveys or quitclaims the property for
a consideration of complete or partial release. [Estate of Will] Rogers v. Comm'r, 103
F. (Zd) 790 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 580, 60 Sup. Ct. 98 (1939) ;
Pender v. Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 4th 1940), cert. denied, 60 Sup. Ct. 1103
(1940); Wieboldt v. Comm'r, 113 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 7th 1940); Harold R. Smith,
39 B. T. A. 892 (1939) ; C. L. Gransden & Co., 39 B. T. A. 985 (1939). Cf. Philips v.
Comm'r, 112 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 3d 1940). But cf. Park Chamberlain, 41 B. T. A.
10 (1940) (NA), on appeal, C. C. A. 7th (taxpayer, personally liable on mortgage,
voluntarily surrendered his interest to co-adventurer, who hoped to rehabilitate it; Board
found no agreement by transferee to assume liability, hence no consideration and no sale,
but rather an abandonment of a worthless asset; held, an ordinary loss). An additiotal
payment by the debtor on account of a deficiency is held, however, to be an ordinary
loss. C. L. Gransden & Co., supra.
If property is taken by foreclosure, and a personal liability is satisfied thereby, the
cases are in disagreement whether the involuotary transfer is equivalent to a sale or
exchange. The Second Circuit holds it a sale, resulting in a capital loss. Comm'r v.
Electro-Chemical Engraving Co., 110 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 2d 1940), cert. granted, 310
U. S. 622, 60 Sup. Ct. 1097 (1940). The Sixth Circuit and the Board hold it an ordinary
loss. Comm'r v. Hammel, 108 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 6th 1940), cert. granted, 310 U. S.
619, 60 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1940) ; C. Griffith Warfield, 38 B. T. A. 907 (1938) (NA) ; H. L.
Rust, Jr., 38 B. T. A. 910 (1938) (NA), appeal dismissed, 105 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A.
4th 1939); Lloyd Jones, supra; Sherwin A. Hill, 40 B. T. A. 376 (1939) (NA) ; John
0. Fowler, 40 B. T. A. 1292 (1939) (NA). Cf. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co.,
40 B. T. A. 40 (1939) (NA) ; Street v. Welch, 30 F. Supp. 394 (D. Mass. 1939) (in-
volving tax foreclosures). If, following foreclosure, the taxpayer quitclaims in order to
cut off his right of redemption or perfect the title, the loss is nevertheless treated by the
Board as an ordinary loss by foreclosure. Sherwin A. Hill, supra. When the extinction
of taxpayer's title is accomplished by a forfeiture declared by the vendor under a land
contract, rather than by a voluntary reconveyance, the loss is held to be an ordinary loss,
irrespective of whether the parties subsequently exchange a quitclaim for a release of
liability (both purposes having been accomplished by the forfeiture itself). C. G. Gano-
puls, 39 B. T. A. 1120 (1939) (NA).
If the taxpayer holds merely subject to a mortgage and is not personally liable for the
debt, it is held than an ordinary loss results whether the transfer is voluntary or by fore-
closure, since there is no release of liability to constitute a consideration for the extinction
of the taxpayer's equity. Comm'r v. Freihofer, 102 F. (2d) 787, 125 A. L. R. 761 (C.
C. A. 3d 1939), aff'g Sol Greisler, 37 B. T. A. 542 (1938) (NA) (foreclosure); Street
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Court, at the present term, may be expected to clear up the conflicts and
the subtle distinctions which now exist.251
Negotiable Instruments. 25
2
Property: When an action involves the right to property, even though con-
nected with one's business, the deductibility of payments made or liabilities
incurred by the taxpayer, if they result in the acquisition or retention of the
property, is denied on the ground that they are capital expenditures, to be
added to the cost.253  Amounts paid in settlement of a will contest also are
v. Welch, 30 F. Supp. 394 (D. Mass. 1939) (foreclosure); Commonwealth, Inc., 36 B.
T. A. 850 (1937) (NA) (vpluntary conveyance); Realty Operators, Inc., 40 B. T. A.
1050 (1939) (NA) (after foreclosure was commenced, taxpayer's directors voted to
surrender title, and so notified mortgagee, but no formal transter was made until fore-
closure). Cf. Polin v. Comm'r, (C. C. A. 3d 1940) 114 F. (2d) 174 (terms of mortgage
limited liability to the mortgaged property; voluntary surrender held not a sale). 1-ow-
ever, if any actual consideration is given for a voluntary transfer, the transaction is
converted into a sale and the entire loss is a capital loss. Harry C. Aberle, 41 B. T. A.
863 (1940) (mortgagee assumed property taxes which accrued during negotiations,
which are a personal liability in Pennsylvania). A consideration covering merely the
stamps for the deed and the personal property left upon the premises does not make the
transaction a sale of the mortgaged property (if taxpayer was not personally liable).
Commonwealth, Inc., supra. A formal recital of one dollar as consideration is immaterial
if there is no actual consideration. Park Chamberlain, 41 B. T. A. 10 (1940) (NA), on
appeal, C. C. A. 7th.
The Bureau holds that in all cases such losses are "capital losses, deductible only sub-
ject to the restrictions of Section 117 of the Code. G. C. M. 12737, XIII-1 Cum. BULL.
120 (1934) (foreclosure where there was personal liability) ; and non-acquiescence in
above cases, as indicated.
Of course, when the assets concerned are not "capital assets", the losses are not capital
losses in any event. This applies to stock in trade, property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of trade or business, and (since 1938) property used in
trade or business which is subject to a depreciation allowance. Internal Revenue Code
§ 117 (a) (1) ; Regulations 103, sec. 19.117-1.251Certiorari has been granted on two conflicting cases relating to loss by foreclosure
where the taxpayer was personally liable for the debt (supra note 250). No case is be-
fore the Court in which the taxpayer held property subject to a mortgage, but it is to be
hoped that the Supreme Court will lay down a principle which will cover such cases.2 5 2 See Suretyship and Guaranty, infra.25 SMurphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 25 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), aff'd of other
grounds, 287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932) (seller sued taxpayer-purchaser to rescind
for fraud; settled and taxpayer kept land upon paying more; although rescission was
asked, settlement affirmed sale to taxpayer and was "deferred payment" for land);
Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) (compromise
of title dispute) ; Brawner v. Burnet, 63 F. (2d) 129, 61 App. D. C. 352 (1933) (com-
promise of suit to set aside transfer for incapacity and undue influence) ; Earl M. Palmer,
3 B. T. A. 403 (1926) (A) (taxpayer held title for another, was accused of abusing
trust, settled suit by payment whereby full title was acquired) ; Shaw-Hayden Bldg. Co.,
18 B. T. A. 949 (1930); Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 23 B. T. A. 829 (1931); R. S.
Goforth, 32 B. T. A. 1206 (1935) (NA), appeals dismissed, 84 F. (2d) 1003 and 86 F.
(2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 10th 1936) (payment in settlement of title suit held part of cost
basis); A. R. R. 6972, 111-1 Cum. BuLL. 203 (1924). But cf. Grace McBride Crile, 26
B. T. A. 1020 (1932) (NA) (defense of suit to invalidate trust for violation of rule
against perpetuities; settlement held deductible).
The property is deemed to have been acquired, for purposes of the capital gain and
loss provisions, at the time it was purchased and not when a further sum was paid in
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so treated.2 54 When a person to whom an alleged fraudulent conveyance
has been made settles by making a payment to the protesting creditors, the
payment merely reduces the property to its unencumbered value and is not a
loss.255 However, when a building owner, having paid his contractor, is
compelled to make further payments to lift materialmen's liens, the payments
add nothing to the cost or value of the building and are not capital expendi-
tures; the taxpayer is paying the debts of another, against whom he has a
right of reimbursement, and he may deduct a bad debt if and when he ascer-
tains that right to be worthless and charges it off.256
Suretyship and Guaranty: When a surety, guarantor, or indorser dis-
charges his secondary liability, it does not per se give rise to a deductible
loss or expense. He has a right of reimbursement against the principal
debtor, and he must ascertain that that right is worthless and charge it off
as a bad debt.2 57 That rule benefits the taxpayer, however, in that one who
indorses or guarantees another's note from purely personal, non-profit motives
or who is compelled to pay off materialmen's liens upon his residence is
enabled to take a deduction, whereas he could not do so if the payment were
deemed a loss or expense.2 58 If, on the other hand, the taxpayer assumed
settlement of a title dispute. See R. S. Goforth, supra, at 1214.
If the settlement is made after the property is disposed of, it may not be related back
to reduce the gain or increase the loss upon the disposition but must be taken as a loss
when the settlement is made. Frederick S. Buggie, 32 B. T. A. 581 (1935).2 54 Klein v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 7th 1936) (even though payment was
spread as an annuity, there was no basis for taking an annual deduction).
When a legatee, to forestall a will contest, agrees to pay over to the contestant a
portion of the income of a trust, the income is nevertheless taxable to the legatee, in the
absence of an assignment of a property interest. Brewster v. United States, 9 F. Supp.
688, 80 Ct. Cl. 614 (1935) ; but cf. Shellabarger v. United States, 38 F. (2d) 566 (C. C.
A. 7th 1930). An assignment of a property interest, even though framed as an assign-
ment of income, will prevent taxability of the income to the assignor, and no question of
deduction will arise. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937).
255Langford Investment Co. v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A. 5th 1935), aff'g 28
B. T. A. 222 (1933).2 5 6Leichner & Jordan Co., 4 B. T. A. 133 (1926) (A); Lena G. Hill, 8 B. T. A.
1159 (1927) (A).- But cf. 0. D. 925, 4 Cum. BULL. 213 (1921) (payment held part of
cost of building; presumably superseded by acquiescence in the Leichner case).2 5 7Milton H. Bickley, 1 B. T. A. 544 (1925) (A) (payment on guaranty gives rise
to deduction when principal subsequently becomes insolvent, not when payment was
made); Leichner & Jordan Co., 4 B. T. A. 133 (1926) (A) (building owner paid ma-
terialmen, to avoid foreclosure of liens; deductible at once since contractor insolvent) ;
J. P. Badenhausen, 7 B. T. A. 910 (1927); Lena G. Hill, 8 B. T. A. 1159 (1927) (A)
(similar to Leichner case but no showing of insolvency of contractor; not deductible) ;
H. Rodney Sharp, 38 B. T. A. 166 (1938) (A) (guaranteed brokerage account for
friend, paid off when friend insolvent; deductible as bad debt, since reimbursement had
been expected and no gift was intended) ; Whitcher v. Welch, 22 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass.
1938); A. R. R. 479, 5 Cum. BULL. 146 (1921).
258H. Rodney Sharp, 38 B. T. A. 166 (1938) (A) ; D. W. Pierce, 41 B. T. A. 1261
(1940) (A) ; Alice du Pont Ortiz, 42 B. T. A. 173 (1940) (A).
With respect to the effect of the distinction upon the time for taking the deduction,
see infra notes 340-342.
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secondary liability when there was at the time no prospect of payment by
the principal debtor, it is deemed a gift, although it may be that a loss could
be deducted if good business reasons could be shown for the transaction. 259
Similarly, if a contract is simply one of indemnity against loss, carrying with
it no right of reimbursement or subrogation, a payment thereon gives rise
only to a loss, which may be deducted if the transaction was entered for
profit or in the course of one's business, but not otherwise.260  If a surety,
guarantor, or indorser, instead of paying his obligation, merely purchases his
release therefrom, so that the creditor retains the principal obligation and
the taxpayer has no right of subrogation, there is no debt which he can
charge off, and he must deduct the payment, if at all, as a loss.
261
Taxatio.n.: With the exceptions specified in the statute,2 6 2 all taxes paid
or accrued are, of course, deductible whether or not the liability was liti-
gated, 26 at least if the tax was constitutionally levied.26 But penalties
2 59 M. A. Burns Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 504 (C. C. A. 9th 1932) (loss allowed,
where obligation was assumed to help taxpayer's own credit). But cf. Welch v. Helver-
ing, 290 U. S. 111, 54 Sup. Ct. 8 (1933), where the Court disallowed a loss to a cor-
porate officer who paid the debts of his bankrupt corporation, declaring that the payment
of another's debt to establish one's own credit is not ordinary business conduct.
260 Yoder v. Nauts, 34 F. (2d) 450 (N. D. Ohio 1928) (deductible as business loss);
Howell v. Comm'r, 69 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 8th 1934) (not deductible as bad debt).
Cf. Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B. T. A. 214, 222 (1939) (details of transaction
not clear; held deductible as loss in transaction entered into for profit).2 61John P. Dillon, 9 B. T. A. 177 (1927) (NA) (taxpayer guaranteed new investors
in bank against loss upon assets taken over; later bought release, leaving bank with the
beneficial interest in the assets). But if the taxpayer makes the settlement as part of
the rehabilitation of the principal debtor, in which he has the dominant interest, the pay-
ment is a capital expenditure rather than a loss or expense. Menihan v. Comm'r, 79 F.
(2d) 304 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 651, 56 Sup. Ct. 368 (1935). But
cf. D. W. Pierce, 41 B. T. A. 1261 (1940) (A) (indirect benefit to investment, where
guaranty of another stockholder's debt prevented sale of securities depressing market;
held, not a capital expenditure, hence deductible).2 6 2 1nternal Revenue Code § 23 (c). No distinction is made between personal and busi-
ness taxes or between capital and current transactions.26 3A tax for which liability is assumed, or for which one becomes liable as a trans-
feree, is not deductible, however. An assumed liability is part of the cost of the property;
and transferee liability represents merely the repayment of property received subject to
a trust. Falk Corp. v. Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 7th 1932). See Sigmund
Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931). Cf. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 27 B. T. A. 160 (1932).
But cf. Comm'r v. Coward, 110 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 3d 1940).2 64 The Board formerly declared that an 'unconstitutional tax is void ab initio and
might not be deducted as a tax, even though not refunded, although such a tax (if not
refunded) might be taken as a loss or expense, subject to the restrictions imposed upon
such deductions. E. L. Bruce Co., 19 B. T. A. 777 (1930) (A) ; Guitar Trust Estate, 34
B. T. A. 857, 873 (1936). But cf. Charles F. Fawcett, 30 B. T. A. 908 (1934) (A). See
similar declarations by the Bureau in S. M. 4683, V-1 Cum. BULL. 59 (1926) ; I. T.
2578, X-1 Cum. BULL. 119 (1931); I. T. 2741, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 48, 50 (1933). See
Part One, note 72. The Board, however, has recently reversed its position, characterizing
the "void ab initio" rule as "sound legal metaphysics" but not to be taken without quali-
fication. It now holds that taxes paid pursuant to an unconstitutional law, and not re-
funded, are deductible as taxes. Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. No. 130 (1940).
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assessed in connection with taxes are ruled to be non-deductible upon the
same theory that deduction of fines in criminal cases is denied. 2 5
Torts:*6  In general, tort judgments against a taxpayer are deductible if
they proximately result from his trade or business. 267 An occasional dictum
has suggested that certain torts might involve such anti-social conduct that
a deduction would be denied even though it came within the statutory
language,2 68 but no case has actually denied a deduction upon this ground,
and the cases have gone far in permitting deductions of judgments for wilful
torts. Thus, it was declared in Helvering v. Hampton,2 69 in allowing the
deduction of a judgment for- fraud:
"Even if unethical conduct in business were extraordinary, restitu-
tion therefor is ordinarily expected to be made from the person in the
course of whose business the wrong was committed."
270
Although public policy forbids the deduction of criminal fines and penalties,
the revenue will not sit in judgment upon the ethical quality of a private
wrong.2 71
Accordingly, a judgment or settlement arising out of the negligent oper-
ation of an automobile, whether the negligence is that of a servant or of the
taxpayer himself, is deductible if the automobile was being operated on
The treatment of tax refunds is discussed in Part One, (Feb. 1940) 25 CoRNELL L. Q.
221, 231-3. See also Mim. 3958, XI-2 Cum. BuLL. 33 (1932).
Unconstitutional taxes which are resisted and never paid may not be accrued and
deducted. J. A. Dougherty's Sons, Inc., 42 B. T. A. No. 129 (1940) ; Estate of David
Davies, 42 B. T. A. No. 140 (1940).
265G. C. M. 11358, XII-1 Cum. BuLL. 29 (1933) (ruling that tax penalties are de-
ductible neither as taxes nor as ordinary business expenses, whether imposed for fraud,
delinquency, or mere negligence); Helen B. Achelis et al., Exec'rs, 28 B. T. A. 244
(1933). In United States v. Jaffray, 97 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th 1938), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Bertelsen & Peterson Co., 306 U. S. 276, 59 Sup. Ct.
541 (1939), it was said that certain degrees of negligence mnight be sufficiently "ordinary
and necessary" to permit a deduction of the penalties therefor, but that the burden is
upon the taxpayer to establish the fact. Cf. B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930)
(NA) (levy held a tax rather than a penalty).266See note (1936) 104 A. L. R. 680, 686.267Respecting torts by directors and officers of corporations, see Corporations, supra.26sSee Anderson v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 457, 460 (C. C. A. 10th 1936); Blackwell
Oil & Gas Co., 20 B. T. A. 661, 665 (1930), aff'd, 60 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) ;
International Shoe Co., 38 B. T. A. 81, 95 (1938) ; I. T. 1853, 11-2 Cum. BULL. 124
(1923). Square holdings to the contrary are found in Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F.
(2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) ; Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).
26979 F. (2d) 358, 361 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).
27OThe argument rests upon Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 114, 54 Sup. Ct. 8
(1933), in which it was said that although lawsuits are relatively rare in the life of a
particular business, it is the ordinary course to retain an attorney when such a situation
does arise.271Compare the rule respecting criminal fines and penalties. See Crimes, supra. That
a civil liability for a tort against the Government may be treated like a fine rather than




business at the time P72 but if it was not being operated on business, the
liability may not be deducted.273 Liabilities to employees for injuries con-
nected with one's business are deductible.2 74  But a judgment against a tax-
payer for injuries resulting from the plaintiff's tripping over an obstruction
in.front of his residence may not be deducted.275
Liabilities resulting from the infringement of patents 2 7  from unfair com-
petition,277 and from malpractice 278 normally are connected with the tax-
payer's business and hence are deductible. A judgment for trespass or con-
version resulting from acts in the course of one's business is deductible.2 79
A statutory liability for usury, or a settlement on account of such liability,
is not in the nature of a fine or penalty, since it is sued for by the borrower
rather than by the State, and it is therefore deductible as a loss incurred in
business or in a transaction entered for profit.
28 0
A judgment for restitution or damages on account of the fraud of the
taxpayer has been held deductible if the fraud was proximately connected
with his business,281 unless as a result of the judgment or settlement the
272 Anderson v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 457, 104 A. L. R. 680 (C. C. A. 10th 1936). The
court declared that although careless driving is not a part of one's business, driving is,
and lapses seem to be inseparable incidents of driving.273it is not a loss of property from casualty, and therefore may not be deducted, even
though the taxpayer's mmin property damages may be deducted (see supra note 216).
L. Oransky, 1 B. T. A. 1239 (1925); B. M. Peyton, 10 B. T. A. 1129 (1928); Samuel
E. Mulholland, 16 B. T. A. 1331 (1929); W. S. Dickason, 20 B. T. A. 496 (1930).
In San-Knit-Ary Textile Mills, Inc., 22 B. T. A. 754 (1931), a corporation was de-
nied a deduction for such a liability although corporate loss deductions are not ex-
pressly restricted; however, it appears that the only judgment was rendered against the
driver, which the corporation settled; lacking evidence that he was driving upon the
business of the corporation, it could not be said that any corporate liability existed, and
the payment appeared a voluntary one.274Regulations 103, sec. 19.23 (a) -9.
2750. D. 779, 4 Cum. BULL. 155 (1921). It is not a loss of property from casualty.
See mpra note 216.276Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. Zd 1925); Malleable Iron
Range Co. v. United States, 65 Ct. Cl. 441 (1928).2771nternational Shoe Co., 38 B. T. A. 81 (1938) (A). The Board rested in part
upon the fact that the suit was settled to avoid bad publicity, and no illegal acts were
actually proven.
27sCf. S. M. 4078, V-1 Cum. BULL. 226 (1926), relating to attorney fees in such
actions.279Provident Coal Mining Co. v. Lucas, 39 F. (2d) 109 (W. D. Ky. 1930), rev'd on
other grounds, 60 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 6th 1932) (judgment for mining coal under an-
other's land). Cf. Bliss v. Comm'r, 57 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 5th 1932) (adverse pos-
sessor, when ejected, was awarded his oil drilling expenses, including the cost of dry
holes, on the theory of implied authority; held that the cost of drilling the dry holes
might be deducted just as if the drilling had been authorized.)
280W. R. Hervey, 25 B. T. A. 1282 (1932) (A). The case involved a non-business
transaction entered for profit, and thus is square authority for deductibility of the judg-
ment as a loss, not subject to the more restricted requirements for the deduction of ex-
penses.281Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F. (2d) 358 (C. C. A. 9th 1935); H. M. Howard, 22
B. T. A. 375 (1931) (NA) ; 0. D. 978, 5 Cum. BULL. 135 (1921); I. T. 1789, 11-2
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taxpayer reacquires or retains the property to which the fraud related, in
which case the liability is added to the cost of the property and no present
loss is sustained.2 8 2
A liability resulting from a suit for an accounting for a matter arising out
of one's business may be deducted if it is income which is accounted for,2 n
but not if the plaintiff sought capital belonging to him which had been en-
trusted to the taxpayer 2 34 (unless the taxpayer had previously properly re-
ported it as income under the "claim of right" rule).285
Trust and Estates:2s6 When a trustee, executor, or administrator is sur-
charged for improper investments or incurs other liabilities, he may deduct
the loss if he is engaged in the business of handling trusts and estates (or of
handling the particular trust or estate if he is sufficiently active) .287 If he
merely manages a trust or estate for a relative without compensation, or if
his activities are not sufficient to constitute a business, he may not take a
deduction.288 Whether a payment by a beneficiary to induce a trustee or
administrator to resign, in order to avoid litigation over his management of
the estate, may be deducted, even if the trust or estate is engaged in business,
is unsettled.2 19
When a judgment or a settlement covers two or more claims, the treat-
ment of which for income tax purposes is different, the burden is upon the
taxpayer to adduce evidence from which it may be determined how much is
attributable to the deductible liability and, in the absence of such evidence, all
Cum. BULL. 121 (1923). The cases and rulings all involved business transactions, and
there is no authority respecting non-business transactions entered for profit.2S2Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 25 (C. C. A. 9th 1932) (taxpayer pur-
chased land; seller sued to rescind for fraud, but as a result of settlement taxpayer re-
tained the land upon paying damages; damages held to be in the nature of a deferred pay-
ment for the land).283Frederick McLean Bugher et at., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A. 1155 (1928) (A).2 84 Gwathmey v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 2d 1935); Frederick McLean
Bugher et at., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A. 1155 (1928) (A).2 85Supra, Part 2 (a).
28 6Respecting the restoration of income which the taxpayer has improperly received
from a trust, see mspra note 191.2SJohn Abbott, 38 B. T. A. 1290 (1938) (A).
2 8 8Stuart v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 1st 1936), aff'g 32 B. T. A. 574
(1935), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 575, 57 Sup. Ct. 38 (1936) ; Stephen H. Tallman, 37 B.
T. A. 1060 (1938) (taxpayer was engaged in banking business but did not act in that
capacity, managing finances of relative voluntarily).
Respecting when the management of investments constitutes a business, see cases cited
infra notes 369-372.2 8 9 Payment was allowed as a deduction in Mary D. Moore Holifield, 7 B. T. A. 1302
(1927), where administratrix had been mismanaging an estate consisting of business
property and the estate was being wasted in litigation. A similar payment was disallowed
in Lewis Spencer Morris, Trustee, 40 B. T. A. 987 (1939), holding that even if it were
a business expense, it was not "ordinary and necessary."
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doubts will be resolved against the deduction.290 In any settlement where the
defendant is in a position to do so, he should insist that the settlement be
apportioned.
Interest upon indebtedness is deductible, with an exception not here ma-
terial, irrespective of the origin of the debt,2 91 and a judgment is a debt;
hence, interest upon a judgment is deductible whether or not the judgment
itself is of a deductible kind.292 The interest included in a judgment may, of
course, be deducted if the judgment- itself is deductible, but not otherwise
unless the claim upon which the judgment is based is in the nature of
a debt.293
When the defendant is held liable upon an obligation which he has assumed
in connection with the acquisition of assets, the liability is of a capital nature
and may not be deducted; it must be 'added to the cost of the property in
connection with which the obligation was asstmned. 94 However, it may be
290In Frederick McLean Bugher et al., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A. 1155 (1928) (A), the
Board was presented with sufficient extraneous evidence to apportion a lump sum settle-
ment of capital and income claims. In O'Day Investment Co., 13 B. T. A. 1230 (1928)
(A), the taxpayer was sued upon certain notes (non-deductible) and other claims of a
business nature; a lump sum settlement of all claims was made; although he had denied
liability upon the notes, there was no evidence of how much of the settlement was
allocable thereto, and the Board subtracted the maximum (i.e., face) as allocable to
the notes and allowed deduction of the balance. In Blackwell Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r,
60 F. (2d) 257, 258 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) and Luther Wallin, 32 B. T. A. 697 (1935),
there was no basis in the evidence for apportioning between deductible and non-deductible
liabilities, so no deduction was allowed. Cf. Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Comm'r,
95 F. (2d) 900 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 615, 59 Sup. Ct. 74 (1938),
giving weight to the practical construction of a settlement agreement by the parties in
their subsequent dealings-at least when it is unfavorable to the taxpayer's contention;
no apportionment question was involved, however.
Cf. Burnet v. Houston, 283 U. S. 223, 228, 51 Sup. Ct. 413 (1931) ; Cohan v. Comm'r,
39 F. (2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A. 2d 1930). See also infra note 452 (apportionment of
attorney's fees) and Part One, notes 106 and 107 (apportionment of recoveries by plain-
tiff).29 lnternal Revenue Code § 23 (b). The sole exception is interest connected with
the purchase or carrying of certain tax-exempt securities.292Joseph W. Bettendorf, 3 B. T. A. 378 (1925) (A). But cf. Longyear v. Helvering,
77 F. (2d) 116, 64 App. D. C. 238 (1935), holding that interest upon an alimony obliga-
tion partakes of the nature of the alimony and is not deductible.293joseph W. Bettendorf, 3 B. T. A. 378 (1925) (conversion of trust property; since
trust relationship is not debt, interest accrued prior to judgment is not deductible);
Harvey M. Toy, 34 B. T. A. 877 (1936) (NA) (executor's personal liability for estate
tax, when he pays other debts without paying tax, held to be a debt; interest thereon
from time he thus incurred liability, but before judgment, held deductible). Interest,
to be deductible, must be upon the taxpayer's own debt, and when the taxpayer becomes
responsible for another's liability, the interest accrued prior to the incurring of such
liability by the taxpayer is prhwipal of the taxpayer's debt. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 27
B. T. A. 160 (1932) , Helen B. Sulzberger, 33 B. T. A. 1093 (1936) ; Harvey M. Toy,
34 B. T. A. 877 (1936).
294Athol Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 230 (C. C. A. 1st 1931); Falk Corp. v.
Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 7th 1932); Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v. Helvering,
84 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th 1936); Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, 91 F. (2d) 710,
67 App. D. C. 256 (1937); F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1 B. T. A. 799 (1925); Sigmund
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that where there is not merely a sale of assets but a merger or consolidation
of corporations in which "the corporate personality of the transferor is
drowned in that of the transferee," with the debts assumed by operation of
law (whether or not there is also a contractual assumption), the successor
may deduct any loss which the predecessor might have deducted. 9 5 When
the taxpayer is given money or its equivalent in consideration of his assump-
tion of liability which is then in litigation or otherwise contingent, the deter-
mination of gain or loss to the taxpayer upon the transaction is postponed
until it is completed by the termination of the litigation; although cash may
have been received at the time of the assumption, it was merely the first
step in a transaction entered for profit, which is completed at the conclusion
of the litigation. 9 6
There is another kind of loss which litigation may entail, apart from the
judgment itself. The question of the deductibility of the loss sustained through
the execution sale of the defendant's property does not appear to have arisen
Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931) ; Caldwell & Co., 26 B. T. A. 790 (1932), aff'd w.o. op.,
65 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d 1933); Watab Paper Co., 27 B. T. A. 488, 505 (1932),
appeal dismissed, 68 F. (2d) 1021 (C. C. A. 8th 1933).
It is immaterial that the liability was-in litigation or otherwise contingent at the time
of the transfer. Bermont Oil Co. v. Helvering, supra (taxpayer agreed to hold seller
harmless from suits arising from his prior ownership of property; payment in later
litigation against seller held not deductible but added to cost as a contingent part of
price); F. Tinker & Sons Co., supra, at 803; Caldwell & Co., supra; Watab Paper Co.,
supra (patent litigation; so far as settlement related to predecessor's infringements, held
not deductible).
The person whose obligation was assumed in connection with his disposition of property
must include the amount of such obligation in the proceeds of the property, in determin-
ing gain or loss, but (even on the cash basis) may deduct the amount paid by the assumer
as if it had been paid by the taxpayer himself (if the obligation was of a deductible
kind). Norman Cooledge, 40 B. T. A. 1324 (1939) (A).295Although some doubt is cast upon this proposition by the Athol Mfg. Co. and Mer-
chants Bank cases, supra note 294, the conclusion in the text seems to follow from the
recent cases of Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U. S. 522, 59 Sup. Ct. 634(1939), and General Gas & Electric Corp. v. Helvering, 306 U. S. 530, 56 Sup. Ct. 638(1939), which held that unamortized bond discount, which a debtor may take as a loss
upon the premature redemption of bonds. may be so taken by a successor corporation
under the circumstances mentioned in the text. A de facto merger, not following statu-
tory forms, was held to fall within the rule if in fact the successor becomes liable for
the predecessor's obligations by operation of law.
It appears that the mere fact that a transaction falls withinr the reorganization pro-
visions of Internal Revenue Code § 112 is not material. Merchants Bank Bldg. Co. v.
Helvering, 84 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th 1936). Cf. American Gas & Electric Co. v.
Comm'r, 85 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 2d 1936). The identity of the old company must be
lost in the new one and the liabilities must be assumed by operation of law.
Of course, in the absence of direct authority, one can only speculate upon whether the
rule respecting bond discount will be extended to litigation losses.29GTaylor v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 7th 1937), aff'g 34 B. T. A. 347(1936), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 727, 58 Sup. Ct. 48 (1937). Cf. 0. B. Barker, 3 B. T. A.
1180 (1926) (A) (stockholder received liquidating dividend; he was held liable for taxes
as transferee in later years; permitted to offset liability against gain in year of dividend;
as a leading case for constructive trust theory, supra note 184, its present authority is
doubtful since that theory seems to be dying).
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in the cases. Since it may often occur that property not used in trade or
business or held for profit may be sold to satisfy a business judgment, or
vice versa, the question of the deductibility of such losses is not free from
doubt. Upon principle, it would seem that the deductibility of the loss, at
least so far as it is traceable to the forced sale and not to depreciation and
market decline,29 7 should depend upon the nature of the transaction from
which the judgment results rather than upon the purpose for which the prop-
erty was held; for the loss, to that extent, was proximately caused by the
judgment.2 9 I
e. Adverse judgments: when deductible
Assuming that the taxpayer's liability upon a particular cause of action
would be deductible, at what time may the deduction be taken? A great
volume of litigation has concerned this problem, since the tax saved by the
deduction may be greater if the loss or expense is taken in a year in which
the tax rates are higher, or when the taxpayer's income is in the higher
brackets, and the benefit of the deduction may be lost if it is allocated to a
year in which he has no net income against which to offset it.
When the taxpayer makes his return upon the cash receipts and disburse-
ments basis, it is, of course, clear that no deduction may be taken for a dis-
puted claim which is not adjudicated and paid until a later year.2 99 For it
is necessary that payment be made in cash or its equivalent. The taxpayer's
note is not the equivalent of cash,30 0 and a deduction may not be taken when
The question involved in this footnote and the related text concerns the gain or loss
realized upon the receipt of money or property in liquidation or in a taxable exchange;
it is distinct from the question in the two preceding footnotes and related text, namely,
whether the payment or accrual of the liability can give rise to a loss deduction while
property received in consideration of its assumption is still held.
297Cf. Helvering v. Owens, 305 U. S. 468, 59 Sup. Ct. 260 (1939), relating to the
casualty loss of non-business property. To segregate the casualty loss from the non-
deductible personal loss, the Court used as the basis the market value at the date of the
casualty (thus excluding prior depreciation and market decline from consideration).298The loss to be so treated would be determined, under this formula, by deducting
from the market price at the time of execution sale (the basis, supra note 297), the
amount realized and applied upon the judgment. The judgment loss would be separately
treated.
By analogy to the cases on mortgage foreclosures, supra note 250, the Board and the
Sixth Circuit would probably hold it an ordinary loss if the property was sold under
execution, a capital loss if voluntarily transferred in full or partial satisfaction of the
obligation; the Bureau and the Second Circuit would hold it a capital loss in either case,
if the property so sold is within the definition of a "capital asset" [Internal Revenue
Code § 117 (a) (1)].299Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Heiner, 34 F. (2d) 350 (W. D. Pa. 1929) ; Frank L.
Orth, 9 B. T. A. 249 (1927) (A).300Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 140, 51 Sup. Ct. 373 (1931) ; Helvering v. Price, 309
U. S. 409, 60 Sup. Ct. 673 (1940) ; Hart v. Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 1st 1932) ;
S. E. Thomaston, 33 B. T. A. 576 (1935), appeal dismissed, 90 F. (2d) 1019 (C. C. A.
7th 1937); Frank Kuhn, 34 B. T. A. 274 (1936); T. Harvey Ferris, 38 B. T. A. 312(1938), aff'd w.o. op., 102 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 2d 1939).
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the taxpayer gives the claimaiit his note,801 even though it may be that the
judgment or other liability is legally discharged by the act and a new liability,
with different incidents, is created. 30 2 The giving of collateral is not pay-
ment, for the collateral remains the taxpayer's property and merely secures
payment at a later time.3 03 On the other hand, it was held that payment
with money borrowed from a third party permits a deduction.30 4 The Board
has held that the taking over of one's assets by a bankruptcy trustee con-
stitutes payment at that time, just as if it were a composition with
creditors. 3 0 5
When the accrual basis is used, the deduction is taken in the year in which
occur all the events which fix the amount and determine the liability to pay
it.30 6 Nevertheless, it is not necessary that the exact amount of liability
upon a cause of action be fixed if there is a definite admission of liability,
negotiations for settlement are begun, and a reasonable estimate of the
amount of the loss is accrued upon the books.30 7 Accrual upon the books,
alone, is not enough, in the absence of a communicated admission of lia-
bility.3 08 A mere offer of settlement, without an admission of liability, also is
30 1The note, if negotiable and marketable, is income to the plaintiff on the cash basis,
to the extent of its fair market value. See Part One, note 111. But the defendant has
parted with nothing.30 2 1t has at last been settled that a mere change in the nature of a liability to the same
creditor, as from secondary liability to primary, is not a payment for income tax purposes,
no matter what forms are adopted to discharge the old obligation and create a new one.
Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409, 60 Sup. Ct. 673 (1940), rev'g 106 F. (2d) 336 (C. C.
A. 4th 1939). See cases cited supra note 300. Cf. contra: Jenkins v. Smith, 21 F. Supp.
433 (D. Conn. 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 99 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).3 O3Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409, 60 Sup. Ct. 673 (1940) ; Frank Kuhn, 34 B. T.
A. 274 (1936). Cf. Insurance Finance Co. v. Commr, 84 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 3d
1936) (collateral deposited with surety on appeal bond; no deduction until surety sold
collateral and paid judgment).3 0 4Crain v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A. 8th 1935); Humphrey v. Comm'r, 91
F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) ; Robert B. Keenan, 20 B. T. A. 498 (1930). But cf.
Quinn v. Comm'r, 111 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
3 0 5 Charles R. Stuart, 38 B. T. A. 1147 (1938). The amount of the deduction, of
course, is the proportion of his net assets which will be applied to the deductible liability.
3 0 6United States v. Auderson, 269 U. S. 422, 441, 46 Sup. Ct 131 (1926).3 07See Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 450, 50 Sup. Ct. 202, 67 A. L. R.
1010 (1930), approving a long line of Board of Tax Appeals cases. Landers Bros.-Co. v.
Comm'r, 60 F. (2d) 85 (C. C. A. 6th 1932) ; Producers Fuel Co., 1 B. T. A. 202 (1924)
(A) (deliberate breach of contract, for which taxpayer recognized liability and began
negotiating settlement; estimated liability on books) ; Raleigh Smokeless Fuel Co., 6 B. T.
A. 381 (1927) (A) (same facts, but other party sued in next year; taxpayer, however,
did not defend) ; Beacon Coal Co., 9 B. T. A. 280 (1927) (A) ; Fraser Brick Co., 10 B.
"T. A. 1252 (1928) (A). Cf. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 456 (C. C.
A. 4th 1935) ; Anderson-Clayton Securities Corp., 35 B. T. A. 795, 802 (1937).3 0 8Ledbetter Mfg. Co., 12 B. T. A. 145 (1928). But see H. Northwood & Co., 4 B. T.
A. 697, 703 (1926) (A) (taxpayer accrued liability on books and deducted expense,
but resisted suit therefor; case contains statements implying that the accrual was proper
at that time, but the only holding is that he may not shift the deduction to the year
judgment was entered against him, since he appealed; it would seem that the proper time
is the date of final affirmance, and that accrual on the books is immaterial in such cir-
cumstances). With respect to reserves, see infra note 328.
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not sufficient.30 9 If accrual is properly made at the time of the admission of
liability, then when the actual amount of the liability is finally determined,
the return for the year in which the liability accrued is corrected accordingly;
no adjustment should be reflected in the return for the year in which the
amount was agreed upon.310
However, if the taxpayer does not admit liability for the breach of con-
tract or other injury, even if suit is commenced therefor, no deduction may
then be taken.31 ' Such a liability, which for many reasons may never have
to be paid, is considered too contingent to accrue.312 The taxpayer will be
denied a deduction in the year in which the cause of action arose, even
though he realizes that he is liable, if he fails to communicate to the other
party his willingness to make reparation;313 but it seems that when the
309New Process Cork Co., 3 B. T. A. 1339 (1926) ; Standard Brewing Co., 6 B. T. A.
980 (1927) ; Lynchburg Colliery Co., 7 B. T. A. 282 (1927).3 1OProducers Fuel Co., 1 B. T. A. 202 (1924) (A); Beacon Coal Co., 9 B. T. A. 280
(1927) (A); Fraser Brick Co., 10 B. T. A. 1252 (1928) (A).
1l1Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 50 Sup. Ct. 202, 67 A. L. R. 1010
(1930) ; Daniels & Fisher Stores Co. v. United States, 56 F. (2d) 477, 74 Ct. Cl. 233
(1932); J. N. Pharr & Sons v. Comm'r, 56 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 5th 1932) ; Clark
Dredging Co. v. Comm'r, 63 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 5th 1933), aff'g 23 B. T. A. 503
(1931) ; P. C. Tomson & Co. v. Comm'r, 82 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 3d 1935) ; Schwartz
v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 5th 1936); Crown Cork & Seal Co. *v.
United States, 4 F. Supp. 525 (E. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd w.o. op., 73 F. (2d) 997 (C. C.
A. 2d 1934); Brighton Mills, 1 B. T. A. 392 (1935); New Process Cork Co., 3 B. T. A.
1339 (1926) ; Bump Confectionery Co., 4 B. T. A. 50 (1926) ; Louis Kratter, 4 B. T. A.
52 (1926) ; Hamler Coal Co., 4 B. T. A. 947 (1926) ; Lane Construction Co., 4 B. T. A.
1133 (1926); Empire Printing & Box Co., 5 B. T. A. 203 (1926); Humble & Gplf
Coast Oil Co., 5 B. T. A. 328 (1926) ; Nice Ball Bearing Co., 5 B. T. A. 484 (1926) ;
Gopher Granite Co., 5 B. T. A. 1216 (1927); Lynchburg Colliery Co., 7 B. T. A. 282
(1927); Hidalgo Steel Co., 8 B. T. A. 76 (1.927) ; Ledbetter Mfg. Co., 12 B. T. A. 145
(1928); Thorne, Neal & Co., Inc., 13 B. T. A. 490 (1928) (NA); Lehigh & Hudson
River Ry., 13 B. T. A. 1154 (1928), affd on this point, 38 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d
1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 748, 50 Sup. Ct. 35 (1930) ; J. G. Curtis Leather Co., 13
B. T. A. 1259 (1928) (NA) ; Lane Construction Co., 17 B. T. A. 826 (1929), aff'd w.o.
op., 49 F. (2d) 1080 (C. C. A. 2d 1931) ; Sunset Color Works, 21 B. T. A. 304 (1930) ;
Estate of Wilton J. Lambert, 40 B. T. A. 801, 809 (1939) (liabilities which were disputed
at time of death may not be deducted from decedent's income) ; I. T. 2843, XIV-1 Cut.
BuLL. 77 (1935).
A mere offer of settlement without an admission of liability is not sufficient. Sup.ra
note 309. Even the deposit in court of a sum as an offer of compromise is not sufficient
to'permit an accrual until the offer is accepted, for it may be rejected and the litigation
continue. Standard Brewing Co., 6 B. T. A. 980 (1927).
The fact that the disputed property is already in the possession of the claimant, on
loan or trust, does not give rise to a deduction prior to a settlement and relinquishment
of the taxpayer's interest. Davidson v. Comm'r, 91 F. (2d) 516 (C. C. A. 5th 1937),
aff'q 34 B. T. A. 479 (1936).312See Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 450-451, 50 Sup. Ct. 202 (1930).
Sl3 Bump Confectionery Co., 4 B. T. A. 50 (1926) (clear breach of contract but io
admission of liability; negotiations failed, leading to suit in next year; deduction denied
in year of breach) ; Louis Kratter, 4 B. T. A. 52 (1926) ; Hamler Coal Co., 4 B. T. A.
947 (1926) (taxpayer realized he was liable for breach but Board requires recognition of
liability communicated to the other, and an estimate entered upon the books); Empire
Printing & Box Co., 5 B. T. A. 203 (1926) (clear breach, but taxpayer threatened to
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taxpayer rather than the Commissioner is seeking to postpone the deduction
to a year later than that in which the claim arose, he must show that he
disputed liability in good faith and upon reasonable grounds, for otherwise
he could use flimsy pretexts to shift a deduction to the year in which he
could use it to best advantage. 314 The cases are not entirely clear respecting
the time of accrual when liability is admitted but the amount thereof is not;
it seems that when the amount of the liability can reasonably be estimated
from existing facts and the parties are amicably negotiating to liquidate it,
accrual is not postponed,315 but if the amount is in litigation, an element of
contingency is introduced which prevents accrual until final determination. 316
When a deduction is not permitted in the year in which the cause of action
arose, because of the taxpayer's failure to admit liability, it is taken, on the
accrual basis, when liability is finally determined by settlement or judg-
ment.3 1 7  A judgment of a lower court does not give rise to a deduction if
an appeal is taken,318 for liability is still contingent as long as the litigation
stand suit rather than pay; no deduction allowable at that time) ; J. G. Curtis Leather
Co., 13 B. T. A. 1259 (1928) ; Sunset Color Works, 21 B. T. A. 304 (1930).314McCabe Lathe & Machinery Co., 9 B. T. A. 1137 (1928) (liability contested, but
evidence before Board showed no sound reason for contest; taxpayer's attempt to post-
pone deduction to date of settlement denied) ; Thorne, Neal & Co., Inc., 13 B. T. A. 490
(1928) (NA) (dispute in good faith and upon reasonable grounds held sufficient to permit
taxpayer to postpone deduction).315Supra note 307. See Helvering v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 66 F. (2d) 633, 634(C. C. A. 8th 1933).31OCentral Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 922, 60 App. D. C. 4 (1930) (liability
for fraud determined by court, but auditor's accounting not made final until much later;
held, deduction may not be taken until decree is final and litigation is closed) ; cf. J. N.
Pharr & Sons v. Comm'r, 56 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 5th 1932) (litigation concerned basis
for determining damages; however, it appears from the report in 21 B. T. A. 245 (1930)
that liability was also in dispute).3 17 Regulations 103, sec. 19.43-2. See notes (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1283, (1939) 121 A. L.
R. 715.
Cf. N. Sobel, Inc., 40 B. T. A. 1262 (1939) (NA), in which taxpayer bought bank
stock in 1929, giving his note to the bank; in 1930, taxpayer defended a suit upon the
note and asked' rescission, claiming the transaction was illegal; stock became worthless
in 1930; settled suit in 1935; held, loss should be taken, not in 1930 when stock became
worthless, but in 1935, because until that time it was uncertain that the taxpayer would
suffer any loss from the worthlessness of the stock.
818 Consolidated Tea Co. v. Bowers, 19 F. (2d) 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Columbus
Plate & Window Glass Co. v. Miller, 38 F. (2d) 509 (S. D. Ohio 1930) (judgment
affirmed on appeal not deductible when application for certiorari had been made to United
States Supreme Court and not acted upon) ; Malleable Iron Range Co. v. United States,
62 Ct. Cl. 425 (1926); H. Northwood & Co., 4 B. T. A. 697 (1926); Farmers Nat'l
Bank, Exec'r, 6 B. T. A. 1036 (1927) ; Frank J. Jewell, 6 B. T. A. 1040 (1927) ; Le-
high & Hudson River Ry., 13 B. T. A. 1154 (1928), aff'd on this point, 38 F. (2d) 1015
(C. C. A. 2d 1930), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 748, 50 Sup. Ct. 353 (1930).
If the taxpayer does not plan to appeal, no'case has passed upon the question whether
he may deduct at once or must wait until time to appeal expires. Cf. H. Liebes & Co. v.
Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 932, 938 (C. C. A. 9th 1937) (income accrues to plaintiff only at
expiration of time to appeal). A definite acknowledgment of -liability would probably
permit accrual before expiration of time to appeal.
An award of back wages by the National Labor Relations Board, from which no
1940]
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continues.3 19 A settlement agreement gives rise to a deduction although
it may be discharged and the litigation reinstated by the taxpayer's failure
to perform.3 20 But when a settlement made by or for a minor requires court
approval before it is binding, no deduction may be taken until the settle-
ment is made final by such approval.32 1 The deduction of a disputed lia-
bility may never be related back to a prior year, either to offset prior income
which by the judgment or settlement is turned over to the plaintiff, 22 or
to allocate expenses to the years in which benefits were enjoyed,32 or to
increase the cost of goods sold, to which the disputed liability related.3 24
It has been held, however, that, at least on the accrual basis, a. deposit in
escrow to stay execution pending appeal is sufficient to permit a deduction
at that time.3 25  A mere deposit of collateral to protect one's own surety is
not sufficient, however.3 26 Attachment or garnishment of one's property does
appeal is taken, gives rise to a deduction at the time of the decision. I. T. 3412, (Sept.
23, 1940) 1. R. BULL No. 39, p. 5.
An interlocutory judgment or other non-final action of the court does not justify ac-
cruing a deduction. Central Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 922, 60 App. D. C. 4 (1930).
319S. R. 5498, IV-Z Cum. BULL. 154 (1925). See supra note 312.
320Cf. Helvering v. Russian Finance & Constr. Corp., 77 F. (2d) 324 (C. C. A. 2d
1935) (condition subsequent does not prevent accrual of expense); Estate of G. A. E.
Kohler, 37 B. T. A. 1019 (1938) (A). But cf. Walker v. Comm'r, 88 F. (2d) 170 (C.
C. A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 30Z U. S. 692, 58 Sup. Ct. 11 (1937) (performance con-
strued to be condition precedent).
32 1Cf. Mary D. Moore Holifield, 7 B. T. A. 1302 (1927).
822Trippensee Mfg. Co., 15 B. T. A. 15 (1929) (NA) (overcharges returned after
parties agreed upon different interpretation of contract) ; Arabol Mfg. Co., 26 B. T. A.
1068 (1932) (NA) ; Frederick S. Buggie, 32 B. T. A. 581 (1935) (settlement of title
suit may not be related back to reduce profit on the property, which has meanwile been
sold). See Part 2 (a), supra.3 23John R. Lankenau Co. v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 158 (D. Mass. 1930) (suit for
salary of employee; judgment may not be spread over years in which services rendered) ;
Safe Guard Check Writer Corp., 10 B. T. A. 1262 (1928) (A) (settlement of patent suit
may not be spread over years of infringement). But see Maney Milling Co., 14 B. T. A.
1001 (1929) (Commissioner voluntarily spread settlement, and Board was "not inclined
to disturb" his action).3 24 Price Iron & Steel Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 921, 60 App. D. C. 3 (1930) (scrap
purchased from Director General of Railroads; subsequently, additional price was claimed
because of erroneous classification; settlement may not be related back as added cost
of goods sold); Lucas v. Providence Coal Mining Co., 60 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 6th 1932)
(taxpayer wrongfully mined coal under adjoining land; subsequent settlement may not
be related back as cost of coal removed and sold) ; Providence Coal Mining Co., 5 B. T.
A. 1179 (1927) (same).3 25Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F. (2d) 3 (C. C. A. 2d 1925) (escrow deposit
pending appeal held deductible when made, but at the amount to which it was reduced
on appeal; accounting basis not stated) ; Malleable Iron Range Co. v. United States,
65 Ct. Cl. 441 (1928) (accrual basis). Cf. contra, on cash basis: Insurance Finance
Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 3d 1936) (to get appeal bond, purchased
and deposited securities with surety; no deduction until, after affirmance, surety sold col-
lateral and paid judgment).
On the other hand, ndeduction may be accrued when one makes a deposit as an offer
in compromise, until it is accepted. Standard Brewing Co., 6 B. T. A. 980 (1927).3 2 6 Clark Dredging Co., 23 B. T. A. 503 (1931), aff'd, 63 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 5th
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not give rise to a deduction prior to the close of the litigation.3 27 Of course,
even though good accounting practice may dictate the setting up of a reserve
to provide against the probable loss of a lawsuit, payments into such reserves
may not be deducted.3 28
When the taxpayer is on the completed contract basis,3 29 it has been de-
clared by the Board that a contract should be held open and no gain or loss
reported thereon until a lawsuit against the taxpayer, growing out of the
contract, has been concluded, since the ultimate gain or loss from the contract
cannot be determined until that time.330 The Court of Claims, on the other
band, has held that the contract may not thus be held open after the work
is completed and paid for.3
Although the principles above stated apply to private causes of action
against the taxpayer, they are not applied to liabilities to a government for
taxes or fees. It is denied that such liabilities are rendered contingent merely
because the taxpayer disputes them, and their accrual is not postponed by
1933) (accrual basis) ; Insurance Finance Corp. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A.
3d 1936) (cash basis).3 27Arthur A. Cocke, 5 B. T. A. 606 (1926).32sLucas v. American Code Co., 280 U. S. 445, 50 Sup. Ct. 202 (1930) ; Consolidated
Tea Co. v. Bowers, 19 F. (2d) 382 (S. D. N. Y. 1927) ; Bump Confectionery Co., 4
B. T. A. 50 (1926); Hidalgo Steel Co., 8 B. T. A. 76 (1927) ; Maney Milling Co., 14
B. T. A. 1001 (1929); Leo Oppenheimer, 16 B. T. A. 993 (1929) (segregated bank
account as reserve) ; Lane Construction Co., 17 B. T. A. 826 (1929), aff'd w.o. op., 49
F. (2d) 1080 (C. C. A. 2d 1931) (expert testimony that reserve is good accounting, held
immaterial) ; Monroe Abstract Corp., 41 B. T. A. 5 (1940) (contract with insurer of
taxpayer's title searches required setting up reserve against liability). Cf. Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U. S. 193, 199, 54 Sup. Ct. 356 (1934); Comm'r v. Alamitos Land Co.,
112 F. (2d) 648, 651 (C. C. A. 9th 1940), cert. denied, 61 Sup. Ct. 46 (1940). Of course,
when an expense has accrued (i.e., undisputed) it is deductible even though the accrued
expense account is mislabeled a "reserve." Anderson-Clayton Securities Corp., 35 B. T.
A. 795, 802 (1937) (A).
Although when accrued expenses are ultimately not paid they are taken back into
income [infra Part 2 (f) 1, no income is realized when a reserve for litigation is elim-
inated from the books, since no deduction was allowable when the reserve was set up.
Peabody Coal Co., 18 B. T. A. 1081, 1091 (1930) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 55 F.
(2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 605, 53 Sup. Ct. 9 (1932) ; G. M.
Standifer Constr. Co., 30 B. T. A. 184 (1934) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 78 F. (2d)
285 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).329Regulations f03, sec. 19.42-4. See Part One, (Feb. 1940) 25 CoRNELL L. Q. 221,
246.330See Carolina Contracting Co., 32 B. T. A. 1171, 1176 (1935) (A). However, if the
taxpayer does close his books on the contract and report the income when work is com-
pleted and paid for, he may not include in the computation any deduction for liabilities
then in litigation. Cf. National Contracting Co. v. Comm'r, 105 F. (2d) 488, 495 (C. C.
A. 8th 1939) (relating to liabilities to the taxpayer; the same principle would apply to
a defendant-taxpayer).
S3lCf. Grays Harbor Motorship Corp., 45 F. (2d) 259, 280, 71 Ct. Cl. 167, 211-212
(1930), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 627, 52 Sup. Ct. 11 (1931) (relating to liabilities to the
taxpayer). This case seems more consistent with the regulations, which require report-




a dispute or litigation. 3 2 If the taxpayer later settles for a less amount, it
has been held that income should then be reported to the extent of the saving
rather than making an adjustment in the prior accrual of the tax;83 the
better view, however, seems to be that, so long as the tax liability for the
year of accrual has not been conclusively determined, adjustment should be
made in that year's return rather than in the return for the year of set-
tlement.8 3 4
The principles previously stated likewise do not apply to a beneficiary's
reimbursement of a trust for prior erroneous distributions. Because of the
rule that the beneficiary is taxable in the first instance only upon such income
as a subsequent court decree holds was properly distributable to him,83 5 the
reimbursement must be dealt with by an adjustment in the return for the
year of the erroneous distribution rather than deducted at the time of the
judgment or repayment.3 36
Since a surety, guarantor, or indorser, in the normal case, takes a bad
debt deduction rather than a loss,8s7 different principles apply to their liabili-
ties than to others. On the one hand, even though the taxpayer may make
payment or lose a judgment, he may not take a deduction until he ascertains
38 2Russell-Miller Milling Co. v. Helvering, 69 F. (2d) 392, 63 App. D. C. 74 (1934)
(taxpayer was assessed foreign income taxes; he denied liability but finally settled for
less; accrual may not be postponed to settlement) ; Continental Baking Corp. v. Helvering,
77 F. (2d) 119, 64 App. D. C. 242 (1935) (taxpayer claimed exemption from capital
stock tax because not doing business; paid when Commissioner disallowed claim; dispute
does not postpone accrual) ; Bartles-Scott Oil Co., 2 B. T. A. 16 (1925) (oil inspection
fee; refrained from payment pending test case on validity; accrual not postponed);
Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 22 B. T. A. 507, 527 (1931), aff'd on other grounds, 62 F.(2d) 505 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) (contest of valuation for property tax) ; Hygienic Products
Co., 37 B. T. A. 202, 207 (1938), aff'd, 111 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 6th--940) (like
Russell-Miller case) ; Cartex Mills, Inc., 42 B. T. A. No. 130 (1940) (unconstitutional
A.A.A. taxes, if not refunded, deductible when incurred).
But see Commissioner's letter of November 1, 1939 [1940 Prentice-Hall 11 66039],
subsequently, rescinded pending reconsideration [1940 Prentice-Hall 1 66123], ruling that
an intangible property tax for prior years accrued when liability therefor was com-
promised following a Supreme Court decision in a test case.
333Comm'r v. Central United Nat'l Bank, 99 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), aff'g 33
B. T. A. 588 (1935) (NA).884Joseph V. Horn, 23 B. T. A. 1131 (1931); Elsie S. Eckstein, 41 B. T. A. 746
(1940) (involving settlement of property taxes covering two years; the saving for one
year, income tax liability for which was still open, was applied as a correction in the
year of accrual; the saving for another year, with respect to which the statute of limita-
tions had passed, was treated as income of the year of settlement). The Central United
Bank case, supra note 333, is inconsistent (although perhaps distinguishable on its facts),
since liability for the year of accrual was before the court but was not adjusted. The
rule stated in the text follows from the rule respecting refius of taxes. See Part One,
(Feb. 1940) 25 CORNELL L. Q. 221, 231-233.
33 5 See supra notes 189-191.
SUGMary V. Pyle, 16 B. T. A. 218 (1929); Marguerite Hyde Suffolk & Berks, 40
B. T. A. 1120 (1939) (A).
S33Supra note 257.
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that his right of reimbursement is worthless and charges it off his books.3 8
On the other hand, although the principal debtor may be insolvent, the person
secondarily liable may not make a charge-off until there exists a debt to be
charged off ;339 it has been held that, even on the accrual basis, no debt exists
from the principal to the person secondarily liable until he has made actual
payment, and the mere recovery of judgment against a surety for an in-
solvent principal gives rise to no deduction. 340 In those cases where a guar-
antor or indenmitor gets no right of reimbursement, so that he deducts a
loss rather than a bad debt, the time for making the deduction is the same as
for other liabilities.3 4 1
Special considerations also affect the deduction of a defendant's loss through
foreclosure. 342  When a mortgage or similar lien is foreclosed, state laws fre-
quently give a period within which the property may be redeemed. It is now
settled that, irrespective of technical questions of who has title during that
period, the mortgagor has sufficient interest in the property so that there is
no "completed transaction" divesting him of his interest and establishing the
loss. The loss may not be deducted until the redemption period expires. 3 43
When the mortgagor contests the validity of the foreclosure sale, so that
there is a possibility that he may not yet lose the property, the loss is held
to be deductible when it becomes final through the settlement or other con-
8
-=Milton H. Bickley, 1 B. T. A. 544 (1925) (A); Lena G. Hill, 8 B. T. A. 1159
(1927) (A); Haxton v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 506 (W. D. N. Y. 1939).
3H. Rodney Sharp, 38 B. T. A. 166 (1938) (A) (principal known to be insolvent
long before taxpayer-guarantor made payment; deductible when paid and charged off) ;
A. R. R. 479, 5 Cum. BuLL. 146 (1921) (similar) ; and cases cited in the next footnote.34OAccrual basis: J. P. Badenhausen, 7 B. T. A. 910 (1927), disapproved in M. A.
Burns Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 59 F. (2d) 504, 507 (C. C. A. 9th 1932). But cf. Fraser
Brick Co., 10 B. T. A. 1252 (1928) (A) (guarantor for insolvent contractor admitted
and accrued liability; held deductible prior to payment).
Cash basis: The giving of a new note assuming primary liability, although the old
note is discharged thereby and is legally regarded as "paid", is not sufficient. Eckert v.
Burnet, 283 U. S. 140, 51 Sup. Ct. 373 (1931) ; Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409, 60
Sup. Ct. 673 (1940), rev'g Price v. Comm'r, 106 F. (2d) 336 (C. C. A. 4th 1939) ; Frank
Kuhn, 34 B. T. A. 274 (1936) ; T' Harvey Ferris, 38 B. T. A. 312 (1938), aff'd w.o. op.,
102 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). But it has been held that payment with money
borrowed from a third party is sufficient. Crain v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A.
8th 1935). Giving collateral does not constitute payment. Helvering v. Price, mspra;
Frank Kuhn, supra.341Yoder v. Nauts, 34 F. (2d) 450 (N. D. Ohio 1928) (accrue when liquidated);
Schwartz v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 637 (C. C. A. 5th 1936) (bail bondsman not
allowed to deduct liabilities which had only reached preliminary stage and had not been
admitted).842See Paul, Federal Income Tax Problems of'Mortgagors and Mortgagees (1939)
48 YALE L. J. 1315, 1318-1322, for the historical development of the rules herein stated.
343J. C. Hawkins, 34 B. T. A. 918 (1936) (A), aft'd, 91 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A. 5th
1937) ; Derby Realty Corp., 35 B. T. A. 335 (1937) (A), appeal dismissed, 92 F. (2d)
999 (C. C. A. 6th 1937); Shelden Land Co., 42 B. T. A. 498 (1940) (A); see Nickoll
v. Comm'r, 103 F. (2d) 619. 621 (C. C. A. 7th 1939). The Bureau at first took a contrary
view. G. C. M. 12737, XIII-1 Cum. BuLL. 120 (1934) ; G. C. M. 12860, XIII-1 Cum.
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clusion of the dispute.844 However, it has been held that even the mere com-
mencement of foreclosure proceedings may be sufficient, when added to
other factors, to show complete and permanent worthlessness giving rise to
a deduction before the foreclosure is completed. 345  If the mortgagor himself
buys the property on foreclosure, no loss may be deducted since it is, in
effect, a sale to himself ;3 46 but where one or more, but less than all, of joint
mortgagors purchase at a foreclosure sale, it has been held that the old
transaction is dosed and a new transaction, with fewer joint owners, is en-
tered, so that a loss is realized upon the prior transaction.34 7
The mere adjudication that one's title to property is defective does not
give rise to a deductible loss prior to the disposition of the property. 47,
When a defendant faced with the threat of execution upon his property
conveys it to another on a secret trust, the Board has held that there is no
completed gift, for income tax purposes, and that the taxpayer may still
realize a loss upon the subsequent disposition of the property, at least if by
BULL. 123 (1934) ; G. C. M. 13360, XIII-2 Cum. BULL. 194 (1934). But the rule herein
stated is now accepted. G. C. M. 19367, 1937-2 Cum. BULL. 115.
The same rule applies to tax sales. Frederick Krauss, 30 B. T. A. 62 (1934) ; T. 3.
Bosquett, 39 B. T. A. 763 (1939); I. T. 2711, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 51 (1933) ; G. C. M.
15669, XIV-2 Cum. BULL. 154 (1935). Cf. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 40
B. T. A. 40 (1939) (NA), in which filing of certificate by clerk was required in order
to pass title finally to state; filing was delayed until year after redemption period ex-
pired; although an ambiguous and unconstrued statute left some doubt whether taxpayer
could redeem after period expired but before filing, an attempt to do so would have
entailed a lawsuit; held, therefore, that loss may be deducted when redemption period
expired, not postponed until certificate was filed.3 44Morton v. Comm'r, 104 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 4th 1939). The loss was held to be
contingent as long as there was a possibility that the court would invalidate the sale
and the taxpayer regain the property.345Rhodes v. Comm'r, 100 F. (Zd) 966 (C. C. A. 6th 1939); W. W. Hoffman, 40
B. T. A. 459 (1939) (NA), on appeal, C. C. A. 2d; Realty Operators, Inc., 40 B. T. A.
1050 (1939) (NA). Cf. Shoolman v. Comm'r, 108 F. (2d) 987 (C. C. A. 1st 1940),
cert. denied, 310 U. S. 637, 60 Sup. Ct. 1080 (1940) (no abandonment found). The cases
cited, and those distinguished therein, should be consulted to determine what fact situa-
tions are or are not deemed sufficient to permit a deduction while an interest in property
is still retained. The Bureau does not accept the rule of the cases cited.
Cf. Morris Polin, 39 B. T. A. 951 (1939) (NA), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F. (2d)
174 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) (loss sustained when surrendered property to mortgagee, although
mortgagee then proceeded to foreclose).3 46See Tompkins v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 396, 401 (C. C. A. 4th 1938) ; H. L. Rust,
Jr., 38 B. T. A. 910, 912 (1938) (NA), appeal dismissed, 105 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A.
4th 1939) ; Ferdinand Hotz, 42 B. T. A. 432 (1940).
347Tompkins v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 4th 1938); H. L. Rust, Jr., 38
B. T. A. 910 (1938) (NA), appeal dismissed, 105 F. (2d) 1017 (C. C. A. 4th 1939).
The condition is imposed that the transaction must be bona fide and with no taint of
motives of tax avoidance.
But cf. Ferdinand Hotz, 42 B. T. A. 432 (1940) (joint mortgagor, acting alone, re-
deemed before expiration of trust period; held, no loss sustained).347
'Georie C. Beidleman, 7 B. T. A. 899 (1927). Cf. Davenport v. United States, 34
F. Supp. 290 (S. D. W. Va. 1940) taxpayer relinquished a clearly severable portion of
certain property in compromise of a dispute over his title to the whole; loss of its value
allowed).
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local law his equitable interest may be proved by parol against a stranger
(the Commissioner). 348
f. Claims settled or not paid
If the defendant settles for less than the amount demanded, or does not pay
a claim because his defense is successful or because the other party fails to
sue or fails to collect a judgment, is income realized to the extent of the
amount saved? 49 The answer depends less upon the merits of his defense
than upon whether the defendant has received benefits which have not been
previously taxed. If the claim is for a matter in the nature of an expense
which the defendant has never deducted, either because he is on the cash basis
or because accrual was prevented by the existence of the dispute or because
it was not deductible, .n.o income is realized when he fails to pay or settles
for a smaller sum than had been demanded350
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer has properly deducted expenses or
has obtained assets, and the obligation is subsequently settled for a smaller
amount, income is realized. 38 8 The courts have developed exceptions to
that rule, however, and hold that no income is realized in such a case if
the defendant is then insolvent so that the settlement actually makes no assets
available to him, freed from the claims of creditors, 352 or if the entire trans-
348Park Chamberlain, 41 B. T. A. 10 (1940) (NA), on appeal, C. C. A. 7th.
349 See full discussion in Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Incoine
Tax (April 1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 977.35OPeabody Coal Co., 18 B. T. A. 1081, 1091 (1930) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 55
F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 605, 53 Sup. Ct. 9 (1932) (reserve
set up for lawsuits which failed to materialize) ; G. M. Standifer Construction Co., 30
B. T. A. 184 (1934) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 78 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 9th 1935)
(balance left in litigation reserve after settlement) ; N. 'Sobel, Inc., 40 B. T. A. 1262
(1939) (NA) (taxpayer gave note for stock, later sued to rescind; settled by paying half
price; stock meanwhile had become worthless; since Board held no loss was deductible
uoon stock until settlement, because of contingency, taxpayer had had no benefit of a
deduction and had no asset left, so no income was realized by settlement). Cf. Comm'r
v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 2d 1932). If such reserves or expenses
were improperly deducted, the correction must be made in the year of the deduction.
See cases cited supra. Cf. Dallas Title & Guaranty Co., 40 B. T. A. 1021 (1939) (NA).
See Darrell, loc. cit. supra note 349, at 980-982.
3 5 1United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 4th 1939).
Cf. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, 52 Sup. Ct. 4 (1931) ; Helvering
v. Jane Holding Corp., 109 F. (2d) 933 (C. C. A. 8th 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 653,
60 Sup. Ct. 1102 (1940) ; I. T. 1547, II-1 Cum. BuLL. 58 (1923). The principle has been
applied to taxes properly accrued although disputed (supra note 332), treating the saving
upon a settlement as income. Comm'r v. Central United National Bank, 99 F. (2d) 568
(C. C. A. 6th 1938). But see supra note 334.
The discharge of an obligation arising out of the marital relationship for less than
the other party might have been entitled to does not result in income, for no taxable
gain or loss may arise from that relationship. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lucas,
11 F. Supp. 537 (W. D. Ky. 1935), aff'd on other grounds, 89 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A.
6th 1937).
85 2 Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F. (2d) 487, 60 App. D. C. 197 (1931) ; Dallas
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action in which the obligation was incurred has resulted in a loss.3 53
When an obligation is not paid at all, the question whether the saving is
taxable depends upon the same circumstances as does the taxability of savings
through settlements. But, in cases where the saving would be taxable, a
further difficulty arises from the fact that there is no agreement to fix
definitely the time at which income is realized. The saving becomes taxable,
if at all, when the prospect of having to pay the obligation appears so remote
that it is no longer a true liability. There is no clearly defined test for deter-
mining when that occurs,3 54 and the Commissioner has a reasonable discretion
Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r, 70 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 5th 1934) ;
Transylvania R.R. v. Comm'r, 99 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 4th 1938) ; F. W. Sickles Co. v.
United States, 31 F. Supp. 654 (Ct. Cl. 1940) ; Madison Railways Co., 36 B. T. A. 1106
(1937) (NA). If the insolvent debtor makes a .settlement which leaves him solvent,
with net assets above liabilities, he realizes income to the extent of the assets thus relieved
of the claims of creditors. Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B. T. A. 289 (1937). Cf. Walker
v. Comm'r, 88 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 692, 58 Sup. Ct.
11 (1937) (taxpayer insolvent when settlement was made but solvent when it became
effective; held taxable). The Bureau does not recognize this exception.
See Darrell, loc. cit. supra note 349, at 988-990.
For discharges made after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1939 (June 29, 1939),
in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1938 and not later than December 31, 1942,
the law provides for non-taxability of income from the discharge of indebtedness where
the debtor is in "unsound financial condition", if the debt discharged is represented by any
evidence of indebtedness of a corporation, which was outstanding on June 1, 1939. Revenue
Act of 1939, § 215. See H. R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 23. Provision
is made for adjusting the cost basis of the debtor's property so that ultimately he will not
escape taxation upon the benefits of the settlement. See Darrell, loc. cit. supra note 349,
at 1001-1005.
Respecting discharges under the Chandler Act, see Darrell, loc. cit. supra note 349, at
1005-1011. See also Regulations 103, sec. 19.22(a)-14; I. T. 1564, II-1 Cum. BULL. 59
(1923). And see the amendments to the Chandler Act by the Act of July 1, 1940
(Public, No. 699, 76th Congress) ; T. D. 5003, (1940) I. R. BULL. No. 35, p. 4.3 53 Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct 449 (1926) (borrowed
funds had been lost in operations, so payment of less than had been received resulted in
no income) ; Hextell v. Huston, 28 F. Supp. 521 (S. D. Iowa 1939), appeal dismissed,
107 F. (2d) 1016 (C. C. A. 8th 1939) (mortgage refinanced, part of debt forgiven, but
land had so depreciated in value that it was worth only the amount to which debt was
reduced; held, no gain realized). Cf. N. Sobel, Inc., 40 B. T. A. 1262 (1939). But cf.
Comm'r v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 1st 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 595, 55 Sup. Ct. 110 (1934) ; L. C. Coddon, 37 B. T. A. 393 (1938) ;
Kalman Hirsch. 41 B. T. A. 890 (1940) (all being contrary to the Hextell case on
similar facts).
The Kerbaugh-EmPire case, however, has been much criticized and the view has been
expressed that the exception might be abandoned in a subsequent case. MAGiLL, TAXABLE
INcOmE (1936) 215; Rottschaefer, The Concept of Inconse in Federal Taxation (1929)
13 MiNN. L. REv. 637, 660; notes (1932) 20 CALnr. L. RFv. 441, and (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
960. Cf. also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 150 (1931),
%which seems inconsistent with the Kerbaugh-Empire case, although it attempts to draw
a distinction.
See Darrell, loc. cit. supra note 349, at 983-988.3 54 When the taxpayer, under rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission or under
his own 'consistent policy, credits unpaid obligations to surplus after a certain period,
even short of the statute of limitations, the saving may be taxed at that time; the book
entry has at least the force of an admission which the Commissioner may avail of.
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in determining the time; the burden is then upon the taxpayer to show that
such determination is in error.355 It is clear, however, that when a suit is
actually pending or is threatened against the taxpayer, he may not, on the
basis of his denial of liability, credit the contested debt to income (to offset
a net loss, with the intention of adjusting it by a balancing deduction when
lie loses the suit and can make more advantageous use of the deduction) ;36
it is only when no claim is likely to be made, not when a claim is contested,
that the possibility of payment becomes so remote as to justify a charge
to income.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 618, 52 Sup. Ct. 7 (1931) (checks not presentedin two years, credited to profit
and loss under I. C. C. rules) ; Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 342, 60
App. D. C. 192 (1931) (credited unclaimed wages to profit and loss after three years,
although policy was not to raise statute of limitations; held taxable) ; Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 23 B. T. A. 888 (1931) (same); Republic Bank & Trust Co., 36 B. T. A. 680
(1937) (collateral deposited with Comptroller of Currency to secure liability for un-
claimed deposits was released after four years and credited to surplus; held taxable) ;
Creamette Co., 37 B. T. A. 216 (1938) (obligation expired by its terms and reserve on
books was eliminated). Cf. Dallas Title'& Guaranty Co., 40 B. T. A. 1021 (1939)
(NA). But cf. National Railway Time Service Co. v..Comm'r, 88 F. (2d) 904 (C. C. A.
7th 1937) (taxpayer consistently reported certain unpaid obligations as income at end of
second year after they arose; when affiliation necessitated two partial returns in one
year, Commissioner sought to apportion the amount so reported between the two returns;
but held that it did not become income in so short a period, and under the circumstances
there existing, except by the voluntary act of the taxpayer approved by the Commissioner;
no income is realized, therefore, prior to that act). Income may be realized upon the
dissolution and liquidation of a corporate taxpayer, freeing its assets from unpaid obli-
gations, so far as the corporation is concerned. G. M. Standifer Construction Co., 30
B. T. A. 184 (1934), aff'd on other grounds, 78 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 9th 1935). The
passage of the statute of limitations, on the other hand, does not necessarily establish
that the obligation will not be paid. North American Coal Corp. v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d)
325 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), aff'g 32 B. T. A. 535 (1935) (charged back to income long
after statute of limitations had expired) ; G. M. Standifer Construction Co., supra
(same).
If money is received subject to an obligation to account for it, and that obligation is
recognized (i.e., taxpayer makes no claim of right), income may nevertheless be realized
at once if the possibility of being called to account is very remote. Chicago, R. I. & P.
Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 7th 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 618, 52 Sup.
Ct. 7 (1931) (short-changing of customers) ; J. R. Knowland, 29 B. T. A. 618 (1933)
(receipt by employer of funds in which former employees had an interest, received forty
years later so unlikely that any would appear to claim it).
355North American Coal Corp. v. Comm'r, 97 F. (2d) 325 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), aff'g
32 B. T. A. 535 (1935).5G6United States v. Little War Creek Coal Co., 104 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 4th 19393,
rev'g 25 F. Supp. 764 (S. D. W. Va. 1938). Taxpayer disputed liability upon a note
(for a loan received, hence not ordinarily deductible). Pending litigation, it decided that
it didn't owe the debt and reported it as income (offset by losses). It later settled and
claimed deduction. District court allowed it, as converse of treatment of bad debts, per-
mitting charge to income when taxpayer decides he will never have to pay, balancing
it by a deduction when payment has to be made after all; court also drew analogy to
"claim of right" rule, supra part 2 (a), calling it income when taxpayer claims that
no liability exists. Circuit court held thaf there is no authority for a taxpayer to decide
for himself that he does not owe a litigated claim and to charge it to income, and hence




Income, other than trust income, which a defendant receives under a
claim of right and without restriction upon its disposition is taxable although
his right to retain it is in dispute. But if it is impounded by a receiver or
otherwise made unavailable to him, it has been held that its taxability is
postponed until the right is determined, although the question is not free
from doubt. A receiver of one's entire property, in any event, himself pays
tax when the income is received, and no further tax is payable when the
funds are released.
When a defendant loses in an action, he may deduct the judgment, in
general, only if it is directly connected with business or with a transaction
entered into for profit, and only if it is not in the nature of a capital ex-
penditure. Upon grounds of public policy, criminal fines and penalties are
not deductible even though connected with business. A surety, guarantor,
or indorser who is compelled to pay for the principal debtor may take a
bad debt deduction if the principal is insolvent, even though the obligation
had no connection with business.
If a liability is deductible, no deduction may be taken, even on the accrual
basis, until the liability is fixed by a settlement or by a final judgment from
which no further appeals are possible, unless liability is admitted and a
reasonable estimate of its amount may be made from available facts. The
accrual of tax liabilities, however, is not postponed by the fact that the
taxpayer denies liability.
When one fails to pay an obligation for which assets had been received or
in respect of which expenses had been accrued, or when such an obligation
is settled for less than the amount of such benefits, taxable income is realized
except possibly in special circumstances in which no assets are actually made
available to the taxpayer thereby.
3. Legal Expenses
Plaintiffs, defendants, and th6se who seek legal advice apart from any
litigation are all interested in the question whether their legal expenses may
be deducted from their taxable income. Legal expenses are never deductible
unless connected with trade or business, and the mere fact that taxable income
may be produced thereby does not permit a deduction if the matter does
not concern one's business3 57 The power to tax income extends to the gross
35TVan Wart v. Comm'r, 295 U. S. 112, 55 Sup. Ct. 660 (1935) ; Comm'r v. Field, 42
F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d 1930); Lansill v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 512, 61 App. D. C. 107
(1932) ; Monell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; Morse v. Helvering,
85 F. (2d) 262, 66 App. D. C. 96 (1936) ; Dorr v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 92 (D.
Mass. 1937). But cf. A. L. Voyer, 4 B. T. A. 1192 (1926) (A), and dissent therein.
MONTGOmERY, FEDERAL IxcoiE TAX HANDBOOK, 1938-39, 326, attacks this rule and
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income, and deductions may be taken only if they are provided for by stat-
ute. s8  Legal expenses not connected with capital transactions are not
losses, 359 and hence the only provision for their deduction is that for the
"ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any
trade or business."3 60
The legal expenses connected with the day-to-day operations of a business
are, of course, deductible.3 1 But it is not necessary that the matter be of a
kind frequently arising in the taxpayer's business. Lawsuits may be rare
occurrences in the life of a particular businessman, but the employment of
attorneys is a common and accepted means of conducting such matters when
they do occur; although perhaps unique in the life of the individual, they
are not so in the life of the group.3 62 It is sufficient if the expense proxi-
mately resulted from the conduct of the taxpayer's business36 3 and is not
suggests the possibility of a person subject to maximum income tax rates, retaining an
attorney on a contingency basis (for a percentage of the recovery), and having to pay
more than 100% tax upon the balance above attorney's fees. He suggests that such
persons should assign a portion of their cause of action, a property interest, to the at-
torney, rather than merely agree to pay him a fee computed upon the recovery. The
possibility of doing so was recognized in Lansill v. Burnet, supra, and United States
Trust Co., Exec'r, 27 B. T. A. 1260 (1933), but in both cases no assignment was found.
Cf. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937) ; Shellabarger v. Comn'r, 38
F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th 1930); Brewster v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 688, 80 Ct.
Cl. 614 (1935). The cause of action which is to be partially assigned must, of course,
be assignable under local law. Quaere, whether, since benefits are to be received in
return for the assignment, taxable income might be realized upon the transfer to the
extent of the excess of the value of the services over the cost basis of the cause of action,
if any; taxability presumably would be postponed until the value of the services can be
known at the conclusion of the action [Burnet v. Logan, 283 U. S. 404, 51 Sup. Ct. 550
(1931)], and the net result might be the same as if there had been no assignment. See also
Helvering v. Horst, U. S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 25, 1940.3 58New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 435, 440, 54 Sup. Ct. 788 (1934);
Monell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). But see Helvering v. F. &. R.
Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252, 254, 60 Sup. Ct. 209 (1939).
3 59 See Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 152, 48 Sup. Ct. 219 (1928) ("We
think it is obvious that the expenditure [for attorney's fees in an accounting suit] is not
a loss").
Litigation is not in itself a transaction entered into for profit, in which the legal
expenses could enter into the computation of gain or loss; in theory, litigation only
obtains or protects what is rightfully one's own, and no profit is involved. Merriman v.
Comm'r, 55 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 1st 1932) (the court, somewhat naively, applied that
principle to a will contest) ; Gertrude D. Walker, 31 B. T. A. 1146 (1935).
If legal expenses are so connected with a capital transaction as to become a part of
the cost of capital, the benefit of a deduction may, in effect, bee.njoyed through a dimin-
ished gain or increased loss upon the disposition of the property, even though not con-
nected with business. See supra note 223.
Legal expenses in a merger that failed were. denominated a business loss in Portland
Furniture Co., 30 B. T. A. 878 (1934) (NA), apparently on the theory that an asset,
the merger plans, became worthless; but the same kind of outlay was held a business
expense in Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 30 B. T. A. 973, 986 (1934) (A).3 0 Internal Revenue Code § 23 (a) (1).
36 10hio Sheep & Wool Growers Ass'n Co., 14 B. T. A. 911 (1928) (A).
3 6 2 See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 111, 114. 54 Sup. Ct. 8 (1933); 3 PAUL &
MERTENs, LAW or FEDERAL Ixco7i, TAXATION (1934) § 23.38.3 63 Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 153, 48 Sup. Ct. 219 (1928).
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so connected with a capital transaction as to be a non-deductible capital
expenditure. An officer or employee, even of a non-business enterprise, is
himself engaged in business if he actively devotes time to his position,364
but care must be taken to distinguish the expenses arising from his employ-
ment, as such, from those incurred solely for the employer's benefit (with
possible indirect benefits to the taxpayer as a stockholder).365
Legal expenses directly connected with capital transactions are not de-
ductible even though incurred in trade or business, but the expenditure may
usually be added to the cost basis of property for purposes of computing
depreciation, depletion, or the gain or loss upon its disposition, provided the
expenditure bears some reasonable relation to the asset concerned. 36
Attorneys' fees in connection with purely personal matters, of course, are
not deductible,367 irrespective of any possible remote or indirect connection
of the matter with one's business.3 68
It is not necessary that one still be engaged in the business at the time the expense is
incurred if it proximately resulted from his business. I. T. 3325, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 151
(suit for retirement payY.
Sums paid to a third party who finances litigation for the taxpayer stand upon the
some footing as attorneys' fees. Lido Bldg. Co., Inc., 31 B. T. A. 461 (1934) (A).
Similarly, the reimbursement of others who conduct a test case in which the taxpayer
has an interest. Findley v. United States, 28 F. Supp. 715 (W. D. La. 1939) ; Indepen-
dent Brewing Co., 4 B. T. A. 870 (1926) (A) ; George Ringler & Co., 10 B. T. A. 1134
(1928) (A). But one may not deduct his expenses in a lawsuit which he voluntarily
entered, having no interest. Sigmund Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931).3 64 Comm'r v. Peoples-Pittsburg Trust Co., 60 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 3d 1932) ; Foss
v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 1st 1935) (large stockholder taking active part
in management) ; E. L. Potter, 20 B. T. A. 252 (1930) (NA) ; H. M. Howard, 22
B. T. A. 375 (1931) (NA) ; Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B. T. A. 467 (1931) ; Mrs. A. B. Hurt
et al., Exec'rs, 30 B. T. A. 653 (1934) (A) (corporate director) ; George S. Groves, 38
B. T. A. 727 (1938) (A) ; I. T. 3325, 1939-2 Cum. BULL. 151 (army officer). But cf.
McGinn v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 680 (C. C. A. 9th 1935), arising under the provision for
the carry-over of losses.
3 65 Deputy v. du Pont, 60 Sup. Ct. 363 (1940). Cf. Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U. S. 404,
53 Sup. Ct. 205 (1932) ; Malcolm G. Gibbs, 34 B. T. A. 1028 (1936).3 6 6Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-2. See supra note 223.
Not all capital expenditures may be added to the cost of assets, for to be so treated
they must bear some reasonable relationship to the asset and must be made with respect
to that property. 2 PAUL & MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmFs TAXATION (1934)
§ 18.170. See infra notes 418, 420, 421 and 437. See also the dissent of Justice Roberts
in Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 502, 60 Sup. Ct. 363, 370 (1940), declaring that
to call an expenditure a capital expenditure, under circumstances where it could not be
added to the cost of an asset, was "to keep the word of promise to the ear and break
it to the hope."
36 71nternal Revenue Code § 24 (a) (1).
368The Board and the courts have shown scant sympathy for ingenious arguments
intended to assign a business purpose to personal legal expenses. See Lloyd v. Comm'r
55 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 7th 1932) (slander respecting taxpayer's integrity, reliability,
and sobriety, brought to the attention of his customers and competitors at a trade con-
vention; sued solely to clear his business reputation: held, injury is personal and expense
is not deductible) ; Croker v. Burnet. 62 F. (2d) 991, 61 App. D. C. 342 (1933) (fight
over property between taxpayer and her deceased husband's son by former marriage;
although business property was concerned, controversy did not arise from business;
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On the borderline between business and personal expenses are those legal
expenses, other than capital expenditures, incurred by investors and trustees
in the management of their properties. Until recently the rule appeared to
be that an investor or trustee is engaged in business, and may deduct current
expenses, if he takes an active part in the management of the business in
which he invests, or if the transactions concerning his investments are sub-
stantial and frequent rather than occasional and isolated; a passive investor,
trustee, or trust beneficiary is not engaged in business and his expenses are
personal and non-deductible.3 69 It is a question of fact in each case, and the
fact situation in each of the cited cases should be studied.3 7 0  However,
expenses not deductible) ; Pantages Theater Co. v. Welch, 71 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 9th
1934) (successful defense of prosecution for rape; although prosecutrix was applicant
for showgirl job, act charged was held to be purely personal and not connected with
business); David G. Joyce, 3 B. T. A. 393 (1926) (defense of attack on validity of
marital settlement; although taxpayer's business property would be reduced by loss of
the suit, the origin of the contest is controlling) ; Frank G. Robins, 8 B. T. A. 523 (1927)
(expense of settlement of separation suit claimed to be business expense because settle-
ment was necessary to silence wife's charges of adultery, which were bad for business) ;
George L. [Tex] Rickard, 12 B. T. A. 836 (1928) (successful defense of prosecution
for criminal offense against patron of swimming pool managed by taxpayer; act charged
held not to be an ordinary and necessary business act, immaterial that scandal cost him
his position and acquittal regained it for him) ; Walter S. Dickey, 14 B. T. A. 1295, 1309
(1929), petition for review denied, 56 F. (2d) 917 (C. C. A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 287
U. S. 606, 53 Sup. Ct. 10 (1932) (automobile stolen, alleged thief arrested but acquitted;
he sued taxpayer for malicious prosecution; although automobile was used partly for
business, the charge of theft, from which the suit arose, was too remote from business) ;
Fred S. Markham, 39 B. T. A. 465 (1939) (expense of assisting prosecution of person
who had made kidnap threats; although business property might have been reduced by
payment of ransom. the expenditure nevertheless did not result from business considera-
tions) ; Kerwin H. Fulton, 41 B. T. A. 1037 (1940) (expense of setting aside settlement
of non-business action, which had been made because of threat of introduction of evi-
dence damaging to business).
36 9Until recently, it appears to have been the Bureau's position that the ordinary and
necessary expenses of obtaining income and of managing, protecting, and conserving
income-producing property were bushess expenses. I. T. 2124, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 138
(1925); I. T. 2238, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 49 (1925); I. T. 2579, X-2 Cum. BULL. 129
(1931) ; I. T. 2751, XIII-1 Cum. BULL. 43 (1934). The past several years have seen a
reversal of that policy. Mim. 4580, 1937-1 CuAr. BurL. 62. The distinction made in the
text is set out in Miller v. Comm'r, 102 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 9th 1939), defining business
as whatever occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for purposes of profit, but
excluding the passive receipt of income and isolated transactions.3 7 0An investor, trustee, or trust beneficiary was held to be engaged in business in:
Washburn v. Comm'r, 51 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 8th 1931) ; Foss v. Comm'r. 75 F. (2d)
326 (C. C. A. 1st 1935): Kales v. Comm'r, 101 F. (Zd) 35 (C. C. A. 6th 1939): du
Pont v. Deputy, 103 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 3d 1939), ret/d on other arounds, 308 U. S.
4R,8. 60 Sup. Ct. 363 (1940) : Kenan v. Bowers. 48 F. (2d) 263, 266 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) ;
O'Neal v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 799 (M. D. Ga. 1940); Pyne v. United States,
35 F. Sunn. 81 (Ct. Cl.. Oct. 7. 1940) (estate) : Grace M. Knox et al.. Exec'rs, 3 B. T. A.
143 (1925) (A) (trustee) : Henrietta Bendheim, 8 B. T. A. 158 (1927) (trustee):
Caroline T. Kissel, 15 B. T. A. 1270 (1929) (A) ; Florence Grandin. 16 B. T. A. 515
(1929) (NA) (trustee) ; Margaret B. Sparrow et al., Trustees, 18 B. T. A. 1 (1929)
(trustee) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. et al., Trustees, 18 B. T. A. 395 (1929) (NA)
(trustpe) : Alice P. Bachofen von Echt. B. T. A. mem. (1932) (ounted in Kales v.
Comm'r, stupra, at 38) reconsidering and reversing 21 B. T. A. 702 (1930) ; Samuel D.
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prompted by the concurring opinion of Justices Frankfurter and Reed in
Deputy v. duPont, 71 the Second Circiit has now held that a man who merely
looks after his investments, no matter how actively, and who does not hold
himself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services, is not
carrying on a business and may not deduct his investment expensesY 2 The
Supreme Court may be expected to settle the question at the present term.
The question of the deductibility of legal expenses has arisen many times,
and illustrative cases are legion.
Thus, the legal expenses involved in obtaining business income, including
Leidesdorf, 26 B. T. A. 881 (1932) (A)'; Grace McBride Crile, 26 B. T. A. 1020 (1932)
(NA) (trust) ; L. T. Alverson, 35 B. T. A. 482 (1937); Austin D. Barney et al.,
Exec'rs, 36 B. T. A. 446 (1937); Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B. T. A. 214
(1939) (trust beneficiary who took active part in management of trust) ; 0. L. Burnett, 40
B. T. A. 604 (1939) (NA) (same); Alice duPont Ortiz, 42 B. T. A. 173 (1940) (NA).
Cf. Augusta Bliss Reese, 29 B. T. A. 565 (1933) (A) (trust) ; Bessie B. Hopkinson,
42 B. T. A. 580 (1940). Respecting speculators, see Ignaz Schwinn, 9 B. T. A. 1304
(1928) (A); Sam J. Reckford, 40 B. T. A. 899 (1939) ; I. T. 1818, 11-2 Cum. BULL.
39 (1923); G. C. M. 9958, X-2 Cum. BULL. 158 (1931); Mim. 3883, X-2 Cum. BULL.
180 (1931). Early cases in the Board, especially those involving trusts, should be used
with caution, even though acquiesced in, in view of recent developments; little question
was raised in those cases respecting the nature of the activities, and it seems to have
been assumed that since a trustee did not act for himself, his expenses were not personal
and therefore must be business expenses. Cf. Comm'r v. Wurts-Dundas, 54 F. (2d) 515
(C. C. A. 2d 1931), disapproved in Van Wart v. Comm'r, 295 U. S. 112, 55 Sup. Ct.
660 (1935). See City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v Comm'r, 112 F. (2d) 457, 459 (C. C.
A. 2d 1940).
An investor, trustee, or trust beneficiary was held not engaged in business in: Moynier
v. Welch, 97 F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; Kane v. Comm'r, 100 F. (2d) 382 (C.
C. A. 2d 1938), aff'g Helen W. Heilbroner, 34 B. T. A. 1200 (1936) ; Miller v. Comm'r,
102 F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 9th 1939); Higgins v. Comm'r, 111 F. (Zd) 795 (C. C. A.
2d 1940), cert. granted, 61 Sup. Ct. 34 (Oct. 14, 1940) ; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Comm'r, supra, aff'g 39 B. T. A. 29 (1939) (trust) ; Kenan v. Bowers, 48 F. (2d) 263
(S. D. N. Y. 1930) (trust beneficiary) ; Dorr v. United States, 18 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass.
1937) (trust); Squier v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 917 (D. N. J. 1937) (former
trustee) ; Leo P. Bergin, 20 B. T. A. 1002 (1930) (trust beneficiary) ; Grace McBride
Crile, 26 B. T. A. 1020 (1932) (trust beneficiary); Augusta Bliss Reese, 29 B. T.
A. 565 (1933) (A) (trust beneficiary) ; Malcolm G. Gibbs, 34 B. T. A. 1028 (1936) ;
Estate of Henry N. Brawner, 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937); George Vanderbilt Trust,
36 B. T. A. 967 (1937) (trust); Lewis Spencer Morris, Trustee, 40 B. T. A.
987 (1939) (trust) ; Estate of C. R. Hubbard, 41 B. T. A. 628 (1940) (estate) ; Lillie
S. Wedgeforth, 42 B. T. A. 633 (1940) (trust beneficiary with reserved right to advise
on investments).
Whether a trust may deduct expenses depends not upon whether the trustee is in the
business of managing trusts but whether the management of the particular trust is suffi-
ciently active to constitute a business. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Comm'r, supra.
And the test is not what the trustee has power to do under the trust instrument but what
he actually does. George Vanderbilt Trust, supra; Lewis Spencer Morris, supra.
371308 U. S. 488, 499, 66 Sup. Ct. 363, 369 (1940). Justices Frankfurter and Reed
limited the term "business" to "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling
of goods and services." The majority, resting the case on other grounds, assumed
arguendo that the taxpayer was engaged in business in "conserving and enhancing his
estate."
372Higgins v. Comm'r, 111 F. (2d) 795 (C. C. A. 2d 1940), cert. granted, 61,Sup. Ct.
34 (Oct. 14, 1940).
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the collection of business debts and compensation and the prosecution of
accounting suits against business agents, are deductible.373 Likewise the
defense of an action for a business debt, the defense of one's right to business
income, and an agent's defense of an accounting suit give rise to deductible
expenses.37 4 The expenses of patent litigation, other than an interference pro-
ceeding, may be deducted if it is connected with the taxpayer's business and
if it does not result in perfecting the title or prolonging the life of the
patent.3 7 5 The expenses of a court test of the constitutionality of legislation
373E. C. Miner Lithographing Co., 1 B. T. A. 588 (1925) (A) (cost of getting judg-
ment for business debt) ; Charles Henry Mattlage, 3 B. T. A. 242 (1925) (A) (cost of
unsuccessful attempt to recover misappropriated funds from bookkeeper) ; E. S. Briant,
Adm'r, 6 B. T. A. 651 (1927) (NA) (collection of business debt) ; Richard Croker,
Jr., 12 B. T. A, 408 (1928) (A) (agent's suit against principal for advances) ; Bula
E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933) (A) (accounting suit against business agent) ; Ulster
& Delaware R. R., 25 B. T. A. 109 (1932) (A) (expense of negotiating settlement with
Director General of Railroads) ; I. T. 3325, 1939-2 Cu . BuLL. 151 (retired army
officer's suit for increased retirement pay). See Umsted v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 328
(C. C. A. 8th 1934) and Swastika Oil & Gas Co., 40 B. T. A. 797 (1939) (A), in which
the Commissioner sought to tax only the net recovery after legal expenses, presumably
because business matters were involved.
Expenses of special proceedings for the discovery of a business debtor's property, or
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance by him, are deductible. H. R. MacMillan, 14 B. T.
A. 1367 (1929), appeal dismissed, 67 F. (2d) 1003 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) ; Swastika Oil
& Gas. Corp., supra.
The expense of collecting a business debt as assigntee is held to be a business expense
rather than a capital expenditure. Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc., 64 F. (2d) 424 (C. C.
A. 4th 1933); H. R. MacMillan, supra.374Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct. 219 (1928) (defense of
accounting suit by partner, for prior earnings) ; Lena G. Hill, 8 B. T. A. 1159 (1927)
(A) (defense against claims of materialmen, in business) ; Richard Croker, Jr., 12 B. T.
A. 408 (1928) (A) (agent's defense of accounting suit); O'Day Investment Co., 13 B.
T. A. 1230 (1928) (A) (former minority stockholder of closed corporation sued for ac-
counting; corporation may deduct expenses of defense) ; I. T. 3412, (Sept. 23, 1940) I. R.
BuLL. No. 39, p. 5 (defense of N.L.R.B. proceeding).
It has been suggested that such expenses should not be held deductible unless the de-
fense is made in good faith, since the unjustifiable resistance of a claim is not "ordinary
and necessary" business conduct. 3 PAUL & MERTENS, LAw oF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXA-
TION (1934) § 23.55. But cf. Foss v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. 1st 1935) (ex-
pense of unsuccessful defense of action for milking corporation, allowed).
Respecting the expense of defending against liabilities of another which have been
assumed, cf. infra note 394.
375F. Meyer & Bro. Co., 4 B. T. A. 481 (1926) (A) (defense); A. R. R. 98, 2 CuM.
BULL. 105 (1920) (prosecution). Cf. Ward v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 743 (D. Mass.
1940) (denying right to spread expense over life of patent, on ground it was current
business expense). Although in effect incurred in defense of title to the patent, such
expenses are not held to be capital expenditures. In a later Bureau ruling, the former rul-
ing, supra, was distinguished and apparently left in full force; it was declared that the ele-
ments which enter into the cost basis of a patent, to be amortized 6ver its life, are
expressly enumerated in the regulations (now Regulations 103, sec. 19.23 (e)-7), and at-
torneys' fees subsequent to the granting of the patent were said not to be included and,
therefore, were currently deductible if connected with business. S. M. 2423, 111-2 Cum.
BULL. 157 (1924). On the other hand, leaal exnenses in obtaining the patent and in inter-
ferences are capital expenditures. Hazeltine Corp. v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 513, 522 (C.
C. A. 3d 1937).
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affecting one's business are deductible, 376 but the legal and other expenses
of promoting or defeating legislation are usually denied deduction.3 77
The expenses of prosecuting and defending tort actions arising out of one's
business are deductible.378 The right to deduct is not affected by the fact
that the acts were done on behalf of one's employer, or in connection with
such employment, since the officer or employee is himself engaged in the
business of serving the employer and the liability arose from that business. 379
876Independent Brewing Co., 4 B. T. A. 870 (1926) (A); George Ringler & Co., 10
B. T. A. 1134 (1928) (A).
377Regulations 103, secs. 19.23(o)-i and 19.23(q)-i; Old Mission Portland Cement
Co. v. Comm'r, 69 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 9th 1934), aff'd on other grounds, 293 U. S.
289, 55 Sup. Ct. 158 (1934) ; Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A.
9th 1936) ; Adler Co., 10 B. T. A. 849 (1928) ; Mrs. William P. Kyne, 35 B. T. A. 202
(1936) ; Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B. T. A. 578 (1937), rood. on. other grounds, 102 F. (2d)
115 (C. C. A. 5th 1939).
Cf. contra: Lucas v. Wofford, 49 F. (2d) 1027 (C. C. A. 5th 1931) (permitting de-
duction of fee of attorney to prepare a bill and present it to Governor and legislative
committees) ; Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R., 18 B. T. A. 168 (1929) (NA) ; Textile
Mills Securities Corp., 38 B. T. A. 623 (1938) (NA).
378Bliss v. Comm'r, 57 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 5th 1932) (evicting trespassers from
oil lands) ; Foss v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 326 (C. C. A. Ist 1935) (defending suit for
milking corporation managed by taxpayer) ; Anderson v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 457, 104
A. L. R. 676 (C. C. A. 10th 1936) (damage suit arising from driving automobile on
business) ; E. S. Briant, Adm'r, 6 B. T. A. 651 (1927) (NA) (defense of suit to cancel
business debt for usury) ; Peter Frees, Jr., 12 B. T. A. 737 (1928) (A) (defense against
liability for funds embezzled by clerk) ; H. M. Howard, 22 B. T. A. 375 (1931) (NA)
(mismanagement of corporation) ; Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B. T. A. 467 (1931) (same);
Matson Navigation Co., 24 B. T. A. 14 (1931) (defense of suit for conspiracy to obtain
business property from Alien Property Custodian at inadequate price) ; Mrs. A. B. Hurt
et al., Exec'rs, 30 B. T. A. 653 (1934) (A), appeal dismissed, 90 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A.
5th 1937) (alleged misappropriation of corporate funds by director) ; International Shoe
Co., 38 B. T. A. 81 (1938) (A) (defense of suit for unfair competition) ; 0. D. 1117,
5 Cum. BULL. 121 (1921) (defense of personal injury suit connected with business);
S. M. 4078, V-1 Cua!. BULL. 226 (1926) (malpractice, etc.).
Cf. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 26 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), aff'd on. other
grounds, 287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932) (expense of defense of fraud action held
to be a capital expenditure when property obtained by alleged fraud is retained in settle-
ment) ; Crowley v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) (taxpayer was sued for
mismanagement of corporation; settled by buying plaintiff's stock; defense expenses held
to be a capital expenditure) ; Clark Thread Co., 28 B. T. A. 1128 (1933), aff'd, 100 F.
(2d) 257 (C. C. A. 3d 1938) (expense of prosecuting suit for trade name infringement
held to be a capital expenditure when settlement resulted in elimination of such competi-
tion, producing intangible benefits of indefinite duration) ; J. I. Case Co. v. United States,
32 F. Sipp. 754 (Ct. Cl. 1940) (similar).
It appears that the public policy which forbids the deduction of the expenses of an un-
successful criminal defense, infra note 397, does not apply to private wrongs, and tort
defense expenses are deductible no matter what the result of the suit. Foss v. Comm'r,
supra. Cf. Helvering v. Hampton, supra note 269 (involving deduction of fraud liability,
legal expense question not having been properly raised). The Foss case, however, was
expressly disapproved on this point, by dictum, in National Outdoor Adv. Bureau v.
Helvering, 89 F. (2d) 878, 881 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). Respecting civil liabilities to the
Government, see infra notes 399 and 400.
In general, see note (1936) 104 A. L. R. 680. 689.
37 9Foss v. Comm'r, H. M. Howard, Isaac P. Keeler, Mrs. A. B. Hurt, supra note 378.
Cf. George S. Groves, 38 B. T. A. 727 (1938) (A). See supra note 364.
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The expenses of defending disbarment proceedings against an attorney38 0 and
quo warranto proceedings against a corporation 3s are deductible business
expenses, at least if no criminal acts are established. On the other hand, the
expenses of suits for torts not connected with one's business may not be
deducted, even from the income produced by the suit.
38 2
The expenses of marital actions and similar matters are, of course, per-
sonal and non-deductible.3 3
As has already been suggested, the expenses of suits to secure non-business
income are not deductible. In this category fall suits to obtain or accelerate
income from trusts and legacies. 38 4 Likewise the legal expenses connected
with the management of one's'income or estate, at least by one not suffi-
ciently active in that respect to be considered engaged in business, are not
deductible.38 5 When a trustee is surcharged for improper investments, he
380. T. 2252, V-1 CuM. BULL. 227 (1926), overruling I. T. 2168, IV-1 Cuma. BULL.
140 (1925). But cf. Payson Tinkoff, B. T. A. Mem. Docket No. 80156, Aug. 2, 1938,
19384 C. C. H. ff 7620-G (disbarment for crime; expense not deductible).38lG. C. M. 19976, 1938-1 Cumt. BULL. 120 (s uccessful defense of proceeding by State
to revoke right to do business in state, for alleged violation of law). The ruling implies
that the expenses would be non-deductible if violations of law were established.3 8 2Lloyd v. Comm'r, 55 F. (2d) 842 (prosecution of slander suit, not deductible al-
though business reputation was affected) ; Sanderson v. Burnet, 63 F. (2d) 268, 61 App.
D. C. 377 (1933) (divorced wife sued husband for accounting for his handling of her
finances during marriage; defense expenses not deductible) ; L. Oransky, 1 B. T. A.
1239 (1925) (defense of action for injuries in automobile accident; expense held not to
be a loss of property from casualty) ; Walter S. Dickey, 14 B. T. A. 1295, 1309 (1929),
petition for review denied, 56 F. (Zd) 917 (C. C. A. 8th 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
606, 53 Sup. Ct. 10 (1932) (defense of malicious prosecution suit brought by accused
thief; held, not a loss from theft) ; Samuel E. Mulholland, 16 B. T. A. 1331 (1929)
(like Oransky case).3 83 Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-1; Sanderson v. Burnet, supra note 382; David G. Joyce,
3 B. T. A. 393 (1926) (defense against wife's attack upon validity of property settle-
ment); Frank G. Robins, 8 B. T. A. 523 (1927) (separation suit); I. T. 1804, H1-2
Cum. BULL. 61 (1923) (breach of promise to marry). Cf. George D. Mann, 33 B. T. A.
281 (1935) (divorce; corporation paid expenses).3 84 Van Wart v. Comm'r, 295 U. S. 112, 55 Sup. Ct. 660 (1935) ; Comm'r v. Field,
42 F. (2d) 820 (C. C. A. 2d 1930); Walker v. Comm'r, 63 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 3d
1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 746, 53 Sup. Ct.-690 (1933) ; Morse v. Helvering, 85 F.
(2d) 262, 66 App. D. C. 96 (1936); Gertrude D. Walker, 31 B. T. A. 1146 (1935);
Charles S. Davis, Trustee, 35 B. T. A. 1001 (1937) (beneficiary's expenses in suit for
breach of trust) ; Adolph Bernard Spreckels, 37 B. T. A. 709 (1938), rev'd oit other
grounds, 101 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 9th 1939) (legal expenses in contesting executor's
accounting, seeking to reduce his fees and those of his attorney) ; Gloria Laura Morgan
Vanderbilt, 39 B. T. A. 43 (1939), aff'd w.o. op., 107 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U. S. 683, 60 Sup. Ct. 723 (1940).
It was formerly held that when a trustee or guardian thus sought income, having no
personal interest in the matter, it was a business exoense. Comm'r v. Wurts-Dundas, 54
F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 2d 1931), overruled by the Van Wart case, spra.
Resnecting will contests, see infra note 424.
3 8 5Dorr v. United States, 18 F. Sunn. 92 (D. Mass. 1937) (drafting trust instrument;
investment advice) ; Helen S. Pennell, 4 B T. A. 1039 (1926) (preparation of will;
investment advice); Esther Rentie, 21 B. T. A. 1230 (1931) (defense of incompetency
proceedings) ; Robert Lyons Hague, 24 B. T. A. 288 (1931) (investigation of proposed
investment; not a loss in transaction entered into for profit, for transaction not entered) ;
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may deduct the expense of his defense only if he is deemed actively engaged
in the business of managing the trust or trusts.38 6 The legal and other ex-
penses of managing a decedent's estate, even though its activities are sufficient
to constitute a business, are not deductible business expenses2 8 7 but are ad-
ministrative expenses, to be deducted from corpus for estate tax purposes,888
so long as they are a part of the normal and usual processes of administration
and of preparing the estate for distribution; however, if the estate is required
to be kept intact beyond the usual period of administration, the expenses
connected with the current business of the estate may be deducted for income
tax purposes.3 19
When a taxpayer employs an attorney or other expert to aid in the prepa-
ration of a tax return, the expense is not deductible unless the tax is con-
nected with the taxpayer's trade or business.8 90 Similarly, the deductibility
Bula E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588, 591 (1933) (settlement of estate, etc.) ; Estate of Henry
N. Brawner, 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937) (investigation of prospective investment) ; Fred S.
Markham, 39 B. T. A. 465 (1939) (investigation of threat to kidnap taxpayer's child,
and assistance in prosecution and conviction; not deductible although ransom would have
depleted income-producing property) ; Mim. 4580, 1937-1 Cum. BuLL. 62, revoking I. T.
2124, IV-1 Cum. BuLL. 138 (1925), as of Jan. 1, 1937 (securing appointment of guardian
to receive minor's share of estate). Contra (under former broad interpretation of "busi-
ness") : I. T. 2238, IV-2 Cum. BULL. 49 (1925) (expenses of committee for incompetent,
in managing and preserving income-producing property, allowed).8s6Stuart v. Comm'r, 84 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 1st 1936), aff'g 32 B. T. A. 574 (1935),
cert. denied, 299 U. S. 575, 57 Sup. Ct. 38 (1936) (denying deduction) ; John Abbott, 38
B. T. A. 1290 (1938) (A) (granting deduction to one actively engaged in trusteeships) ;
Kerwin H. Fulton, 41 B. T. A. 1037 (1940) (denying deduction). Cf. Margaret B.
Sparrow et al, Trustees, 18 B. T. A. 1 (1929) (trust deducted expenses of defense of
suit for accounting and to upset accumulation provisions) ; Squier v. United States, 20
F. Supp. 917 (D. N. J. 1937).
387Hartley v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 352, 356 (C. C. A. 8th 1934), aff'd on other grounds,
295 U. S. 216, 55 Sup. Ct. 756 (1935) ; B. Mahler, 32 B. T. A. 644 (1935) ; George W.
Oldham et al., Exec'rs, 36 B. T. A. 523 (1937) (full discussion) ; Estate of C. R. Hub-
bard, 41 B. T. A. 628 (1940) ; A. R. R. 284, 3 Cum. BULL. 208 (1925) ; I. T. 2238, IV-2
Cum. BULL. 49 (1925).388Internal Revenue Code § 812 (b).
It has been held that there is no necessary inconsistency in allowing such expenses
as deductions both to the executor as a business expense for income tax purposes, if
his activities on behalf of the estate constitute a business, and to the estate as admin-
istrative expenses, for estate tax purposes. Adams v. Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 578, 583
(C. C. A. 8th 1940). But see Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-2.
889William W. Mead et aL., Exec'rs, 6 B. T. A. 752 (1927) (A); George W. Selig-
man, Exec'r, 10 B. T. A. 840 (1928) (A); Thomas H. Franklin et al., Exec'rs, 11
B. T. A. 148 (NA). See George W. Oldham, Exec'r, supra note 387. Cf. Adams v.
Comm'r, 110 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th 1940) (estate tax case; abnormal period of
administration, per se, does not require disallowance of expenses if actually engaged in
settling up estate and if expenses are necessary and reasonable) ; Estate of William G.
Peckham, 19 B. T. A. 1020 (1930) (estate tax case, disallowing administrative expenses
after first three years).
39ONot deductible: Hutchings v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 514, 61 App. D. C. 109 (1932)
(income tax return concerning royalties of passive investor) ; Dorr v. United States,
18 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1937); Charles Henry Mattlage, 3 B. T. A. 242 (1925);
Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B. T. A. 467 (1931) (denied even though taxpayer's income was
derived from a partnership business) ; Cornelia W. Roebling, 37 B. T. A. 82, 86 (1938) ;
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of the expenses of contesting tax liability or suing for a refund depends upon
whether the tax was incurred in trade or business -31 the test is not whether
the taxpayer is engaged in trade or business but whether the particular
matter with respect to which the additional assessment or the claim for refund
I. T. 2819, XIII-2 Cum. BULL. 129 (1934) (passive investor).
Deductible: J. W. Forgeus, 6 B. T. A. 291 (1927) (A) (engaged in business);
O'Neal v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 799 (M. D. Ga. 1940) (active investor).391Expenses of" estate and inheritance tax contests are not deductible even though the
property involved is business property, since the tax does not result from any business
transaction. Leach v. Comm'r, 50 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 1st 1931) ; Lindley v. Comm'r,
63 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) ; Hall v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 284, 63 App. D. C.
118 (1934); Monell v. Helvering, 70 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1934); James C. Ayer
et al., Trustees, 26 B. T. A. 9 (1932), appeal dimnissed, 63 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 2d
1933), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 752, 53 Sup. Ct. 696 (1933) ; Elmon C. Gillette, 29 B. T. A.
561 (1933), aff'd on other grounds, 76 F. (2d) 6, (C. C. A. 2d 1935) ; B. Mahler, 32
B. T. A. 644 (1935) ; Estate of Ida B. Stone, 40 B. T. A. 814 (1939). Contra:
Florence Grandin, 16 B. T. A. 515 (1929) (NA) (holding duty of trustee to preserve
and protect trust property makes it part of his business to recover excessive estate
taxes); Chicago Title & Trust Co. et al., Trustees, 18 B. T. A. 395 (1929) (NA)
(same). Cf. John A. Loetscher et al., Exec'rs, 14 B. T. A. 228, 233 (1928), rev'd on
other grounds, 46 F. (2d) 835, 60 App. D. C. 38 (1931) (cost of estate tax contest
deductible from estate as administrative expense, for estate tax purposes).
Expenses of income tax contests are deductible only if the item in suit is connected
with one's business. Held deductible in: Kales v. Comm'r, 101 F. (2d) 35, 122 A. L. R.
211 (C. C. A. 6th 1939) (active investor; contest concerned dividends) ; Caroline T.
Kissell, 15 B. T. A. 1270 (1929) (A) (active investor; contest concerned loss on bonds
and other items connected with investments); Flemmon E. Gloyd, 19 B. T. A. 966
(1930) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 63 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th 1933), cert. denied,
290 U. S. 633, 54 Sup. Ct. 52 (1933) (corporate income tax) ; Louise C. Slack et al.,
Exec'rs, 35 B. T. A. 271 (1937), appeal dismissed, 91 F. (2d) 1011 (C. C. A. 9th 1937)
(business of renting real estate; contest concerned business income, including gains on
sales, and whether it should be taxed to taxpayer alone or to marital community);
Estate of Henry N. Brawner, 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937) (A) (business income) ; 0. L.
Burnett, 40 B. T. A. 604 (1939) (NA) (beneficiary of trust took active part in its
management, so trust income held business income, and deducted expense of contest
over tax upon such income) ; 0. D. 849, 4 Cur. BULL. 123 (1921). Cf. Estate of
Henry E. Huntington, 36 B. T. A. 698, 728 (1937) (expense of estate's contest of
decedent's income tax held deductible from corpus as administrative expense, for estate
tax purposes) ; Ruby W. C. Jones, Exec'x, 32 B. T. A. 728 (1935) (estate's contest of
decedent's income tax held to .be related to corpus and not deductible from current
income). Held not deductible in: Frank C. Hermann, 20 B. T. A. 899 (1930) (no
proof of connection with business) ; A. C. Barnes, 21 B. T. A. 690 (1930) (even though
income came from salaries, etc., from active management of corporation; contested item
not stated) ; Louis Kuhn, 22 B. T. A. 975 (1931) (capital gain contest; sale of stock
not incident to business of inanaging corporation; not ail active investor) ; B. Mahler,
32 B. T. A. 644 (1935) ; Malcolm G. Gibbs, 34 B. T. A. 1028 (1936) (same as Kuhin
case); G. C. M. 263, V-2 Cum. BuLL. 162 (1926) (contest concerned charitable con-
tribution),
Expenses of contesting other business taxes have been held deductible in Comm'r v.
Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 84 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 7th 1936) (special assessment
upon business property) ; B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930) (liquor tax) ; E. L.
Bruce Co., 19 B. T. A. 777 (1930) (A) (intangible tax on corporation) ; Mim. 3958,
XI-2 Cum. BULL. 33, 35 (1932) (customs duties).
See note (1939) 122 A. L. R. 218.
It should be noted that taxes, with specified exceptions, are deductible whether or not
connected with business rInternal Revenue Code § 23 (c)], but the cost of a contest
must be deducted, if at all, as a business expense.
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is made arose out of the taxpayer's trade or business.3 92 Although taxes paid
for a predecessor enterprise as a result of transferee liability or assumption
of liability are non-deductible capital expenditures,- 93 the expense of defending
against such liability is held to be currently deductible, if incurred in trade
or business. 394
The deductibility of the expenses of defending a criminal prosecution in-
volves an additional consideration, the public policy against the deduction
of the expenses of crime. Therefore, in order to deduct such expenses, the
taxpayer must establish both that the acts done or alleged to have been
done, which gave rise to the prosecution, were proximately connected with
his business, and that he was not convicted. 395 If the acts charged were
not thus connected with his business, the expenses are, of course, personal
and non-deductible ;396 and if the taxpayer was convicted and it is thus
established that his acts were criminal, the acts cannot be regarded as arising
from the ordinary and proper conduct of his business. 397  If, on the other
3 92G. C. M. 263, V-2 Cum. BULL. 162 (1926).
393See mtpra note 263.
394H. E. Bullock, 16 B. T. A. 451 (1929) (NA) (partnership succeeded corporation,
defended tax penalty suit against corporation) ; Benjamin Paschal O'Neal, 18 B. T. A.
1036 (1930) (A) (stockholder defended against corporate tax after liquidation; question
whether he was engaged in business not discussed) ; Flemmon E. Gloyd, 19 B. T. A.
966 (1930) (A), aff'd on other grounds, 63 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th 1933) (same) ;
Isabel G. Sproehnle, Exec'x, 20 B. T. A. 417 (1930) (NA) (like Bullock case) ; Fred
T. Ley, 21 B. T. A. 216 (1930) (NA) (shareholder defended against tax on business
trust after liquidation); Joshua C. Kelley, 38 B. T. A. 1292 (1938) (A) (partnership
succeeded business trust and assumed liabilities). Cf. contra: Baxter D. Whitney &
Son, Inc., 20 B. T. A. 380 (1930) (corporation took over assets of another, assuming
all taxes arising out of transaction; expense of contest of those taxes not deductible) ;
Caldwell & Co., 26 B. T. A. 790 (1932), aff'd w.o. op., 65 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 2d
1933) (similar); Ida B. Stone, 40 B. T. A. 814 (1939) (legatee was sued for estate
tax deficiency, as transferee; Board rests largely upon personal expense ground, but also
calls it capital expenditure). Cf. also Sigmund Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931) (nothing
in record to show how taxpayer would have been liable for tax upon dissolved corpora-
tion, which he defended; hence, held to be a voluntary expenditure).
See note (1939) 122 A. L. R. 218, 221.3995See note (1936) 104 A. L. R. 680, 683.396Pantages Theater Co. v. Welch, 71 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) (applicant
for position as showgirl charged rape; acquitted, but act charged was not a business
act) ; John Stephens, 2 B. T. A. 724 (1925) (acquitted of fraud; failed to establish
connection with business) ; George L. [Tex] Rickard, 12 B. T. A. 836 (1928) (acquitted
of criminal offense against patron of swimming pool under his management; held, not
a business act, and immaterial that the scandal cost him his job).397Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 2d 1931)
(pleaded guilty under state price-fixing law) ; Gould Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d)
698 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) (pleaded nolo contendere in anti-trust prosecution) ; Norvin R.
Lindheim, 2 B. T. A. 229 (1925) (convicted under Trading with the Enemy Act);
Columbus Bread Co., 4 B. T. A. 1126 (1926) (pleaded guilty under state anti-trust law) ;
Wolf Mfg. Co., 10 B. T. A. 1161 (1928) (convicted of conspiracy to defraud Govern-
ment) ; B. E. Levinstein, 19 B. T. A. 99 (1930) (pleaded guilty to liquor violation) ;
Sanitary Earthenware Specialty Co., 19 B. T. A. 641 (1930) (convicted under Sherman
Act) ; John W. Thompson Estate, 21 B. T. A. 568 (1930), appeal dionissed, 62 F. (2d)
1082 (C. C. A. 8th 1932) (convicted of conspiracy-to defraud Government) ; 0. D. 952,
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hand, the acts charged are proximately connected with his business, and
he was not found guilty of any criminal acts, the courts have held, after early
wavering, that the expenses of a criminal defense are deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses. 39 8 A civil suit by the Government for the
purpose of enjoining or penalizing a violation of law is treated in the same
manner as a criminal prosecution, and the expenses of defense are not de-
ductible unless the suit proved unjustified.39 9 It also appears that a civil action
by the Government for fraud is so treated400 and is not assimilated to the
rule respecting actions for private torts, in which public policy is not
involved. 40 1
The question of the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in corporate
matters by the corporation and its officers and stockholders requires con-
4 Cum. BULL. 209 (1921) (druggist convicted of narcotic violation).
Although an attorney's expenses in resisting disbarment are ordinarily deductible
[I. T. 2252, V-1 CuM. BULL. 227 (1926)], they are not so deductible when the disbar-
ment results from a criminal conviction. Payson Tinkoff, B. T. A. Mem. Docket No.
80156, Aug. 2, 1938, 1938-4 C. C. H. 7620-G.398Comm'r v. Continental Screen Co., 58 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 6th 1932) (Federal
Trade Commission investigation of alleged violation of Sherman Act; dismissed for
lack of proof) ; Comm'r v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 60 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 3d
1932) (corporate officer indicted for fraudulently preparing corporation's income tax
returns; acquitted; prosecution resulted from acts in course of his business of serving
as an officer, so deductible) ; Citron-Byer Co., 21 B. T. A. 308 (1930) (NA) (indict-
ments for conspiracy to defraud Government, one dismissed for want of prosecution,
the other for failure of proof) ; William C. Kottemann, B. T. A. Mem. (1934) (quoted
in Kottemann v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 621, 622 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), which affirmed on
other grounds) ; Hal Price Headley, 37 B. T. A. 738 (1938) (A) (indictment for
"doping" race horses, dismissed after suopression of evidence; taxpayer's business was
breeding and racing horses, so deductible).
Early cases and rulings had held that expenses of a criminal defense were always
personal, irrespective of result. Sarah Backer, 1 B. T. A. 214 (1924) (acquitted of
perjury in connection with business investigation; not deductible) ; Atlantic Terra Cotta
Co., 13 B. T. A. 1289 (1928) (Sherman Act prosecution; Board does not state result
of prosecution, denying deduction in any event) ; S. R. 3137, IV-1 Cum. BULL. 170
(1925) (holding expenses of criminal defense "under no circumstances" deductible).
Acquiescence in the HTeadley case indicates that the rule stated in the text is now accepted.
399Gould Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 72 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; National Outdoor
Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F. (2d) 878 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), rev'g 32 B. T. A.
1025 (1935) ; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Helvering, 89 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A.
2d 1937), rev'g 32 B. T. A. 1011 (1925). A consent decree establishes the justification
for the suit, even though (as in the two last named cases) it contains no finding that
wrongful acts had been done, for it shows that resistance to the decree forbidding
threatened 'violations was unjustified.
Respecting actions for penalties, compare the cases cited supra notes 237 and 238,
concerning non-deductibility of the penalties themselves.40 0 McDuffie v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 239. 85 Ct. Cl. 212 (1937) (no discussion,
but citation of Gould Paper case, supra note 399, suggests that this is the basis for
denying deduction). In Mrs. A. B. Hurt et al., Exec'rs, 30 B. T. A. 653 (1934) (A),
appeal dismissed, 90 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), expenses of defending an action
by the United States Government against a director for misappropriating funds which
it had paid to his corporation to finance a construction contract were allowed, the suit




sideration of the capital expenditure question, as well as of the separate
entities of the corporation and its stockholders and managers.40 2
Thus, legal expenses incurred in an effort to get control of a business are
non-deductible capital expenditures if they result in the acquisition of an
increased interest in the enterprise, 40 3 but there is authority to the effect that
such expenses are currently deductible if they merely maintain the status quo
or if the effort to increase one's interest is unsuccessful, provided they are
directly connected with one's business of actively managing the enterprise.404
The expense of bringing a stockholder's bill on behalf of a corporation
would not be deductible unless the stockholder was actively engaged in
managing the corporation or in managing his investments and the action
was directly connected with such management, for a stockholder, merely as
such, is not engaged in business. But if, by court order, the corporation
pays the expense of such a suit in its behalf, the corporation may deduct such
expense if the suit is connected with its current business. 40 5 The corporation's
expenses in resisting such an action would also be deductible, since such
actions are an ordinary risk of business. 4
0 6
It has been held that when the result of a suit against a corporation will
directly and substantially affect an active officer or employee (other than
402As stated supra notes 364 and 379, a corporate officer or employee is engaged in
business as such, and expenses arising out of that status are his business expenses.
Respecting expenses incurred by such officers solely in their capacity as stockholders,
arising from the corporation's business and not from the officer's business of management,
see Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U. S. 488, 60 Sup. Ct. 363 (1940).
So far as an attorney's fee paid by a corporation represents services rendered to a
predecessor corporation, it is a capital expenditure representing a cost of the corporate
assets acquired by the successor. Pidgeon-Thomas Iron Co., 27 B. T. A. 642 (1933).
The rule may be otherwise if the identity of the corporation is substantially unchanged
and the obligation was assumed by operation of law. Supra note 295.
Respecting torts by corporate officers, see supra note 379; quo warranto proceedings,
see supra note 381; violations of anti-trust acts, see supra notes 397, 398 and 399.403Crowley v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 6th 1937) (minority stockholder's
action against taxpayer for mismanagement; taxpayer settled by having corporation
retire plaintiff's stock; although taxpayer then had no more shares, his proportionate
interest was greater; held, legal fees not deductible) ; Laemmle v. Eisner, 275 Fed. 504
(S. D. N. Y. 1920) (taxpayer got another stockholder to sell out to him in violation
of contract with a third party; third party sued; taxpayer kept stock in settlement;
attorney fee held capital expenditure); Dwight W. Williamson, 17 B. T. A. 1112 (1929).
Cf. Newark Milk & Cream Co., 23 B. T. A. 14 (1931) (taxpayer paid. opponerit's
attorney fees as part of settlement).
4'4S. Cupples Scudder, Exec'r, 22 B. T. A: 1294 (1931) (NA) (similar to Laeminle
case, supra note 403, except that taxpayer did not keep contested stock; held, deductible
loss) ; Charles J. Weber, B. T. A. Mem. Docket No. 85429, July 29, 1938, 1938-4 C. C. H.
ff 7319-F (defense of management, protecting position as officer; deductible). Cf. Samuel
D. Leidesdorf, 26 B. T. A. 881 (1932) (A) (seller of stock to taxpayer unsuccessfully
alleged agreement to hold it in trust; legal expense deductible).
405Udolpho Wolfe Co., 15 B. T. A. 485 (1929) (A) (Board found that, by Rhode
Island law, equity court had power to make such an order).4 0 60'Day Investment Co.. 13 B. T. A. 1230 (1928) (A). See 3 PAUL & MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1934) § 23.51.
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in his capacity as a stockholder), as, for example, by substituting a receiver
for his management and depriving him of his position, legal expenses per-
sonally incurred by him in opposing the suit are deductible by him as expenses
of his business. 40 7 However, the legal and other expenses incurred by a
deposed officer in carrying his case to the stockholders are not deductible,
at least if he is "acting solely in the interest of the corporation and its stock-
holders," and disclaims the motive of regaining his position.408 If a corpo-
ration assumes the expense of defending a suit against an officer or director,
not arising out of the ordinary business of the corporation, the expense is,
of course, not deductible, even though the suit may have impaired the prestige
and good will of the corporation or prevented its officer from giving full
attention to its management. 40 9
The legal and other expenses connected with the organization of a corpo-
ration, its reorganization, its reincorporation in another jurisdiction, and
the amendment of its charter are capital expenditures and may not be de-
ducted as business expenses.410 Nor may they be added to the cost basis of
any physical property of the corporation, to be recovered by depreciation or
from the proceeds of a sale.4 11 However, it has been held that such expenses
407E. L. Potter, 20 B. T. A. 252 (1930) (NA).
40SRalph C. Holmes, 37 B. T. A. 865 (1938). The Board held that he had been
engaged in the business of managing the corporation but the campaign carried on after
he resigned was not proximately connected with it. Although he remained as a director,
the Board avoided opinion whether that was a business in his case, for it was an extra-
ordinary, not an ordinary, expense for a director to conduct such a campaign out of
his own pocket. The Board expressed no opinion on what the rule would be if he had
not disclaimed the motive of regaining his position.4 09Forty-Four Cigar Co., 2 B. T. A. 1156 (1925) (family fight); Blackvell Oil &
Gas Co., 20 B. T. A. 661 (1930), aff'd, 60 F. (2d) 257 (C. C. A. 10th 1932) (alleged
conspiracy by directors to prevent performance of contract for transfer of stock) ; San-
Knit-Ary Textile Mills, Inc., 22 B. T. A. 754 (1931) (automobile accident; corporation
defended officer, but no evidence that he had been driving on its business; corporation
was not sued, but feared it would be); George D. Mann, 33 B. T. A. 281 (1935)
(divorce). But cf. Matson Navigation Co., 24 B. T. A. 14 (1931) (conspiracy suit
against stockholders of corporation; they conducted unified defense through corporation
and paid legal expenses by checks to corporation, which paid attorney; legal expenses
were actually borne by stockholders who were sued, and they may deduct since suit
arose out of their business).4 1OGuarantee Bond & Mortgage Co. v. Comm'r, 44 F. (2d) 297 (C. C. A. 6th 1930)
(organization expense) ; Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 3 B. T. A. 932 (1926) (A)
(amendment of charter); Weber-Bunke-Lange Coal Co., 11 B. T. A. 503 (1928) (A)
(reorganization) ; Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., 11 B. T. A. 1192 (1928) (A)
(organization) ; Udolpho Wolfe Co., 15 B. T. A. 485 (1929) (A) (reincorporation
in Holland); W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B. T. A. 1192 (1932), appeal dis-
missed, 68 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th 1934) (organization) ; Pacific Coast Biscuit Co.,
32 B. T. A. 39 (1935) (A) (amendment of charter); T. D. 2499 (Int. Rev. 1917)
(organization).
It should be noted, in this connection, that taxes are deductible even though connected
with capital transactions, but fees are not. Logan-Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B. T. A. 647
(1925) (held to be a fee) ; Clarence Whitman & Sons, Inc., supra (A) (tax) ; Borg
& Beck Co., 24 B. T. A. 995, 1004 (1931) (A) (tax).
4 1 1 H-otel de France Co., 1 B. T. A. 28 (1924); Malta Temple Ass'n, 16 B. T. A.
409 (1929) (A); T. D. 2499 (Int. Rev. 1917).
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are the cost of an intangible asset, the corporate franchise, and may be taken
as a loss upon the dissolution of the corporation 12 or written off over the
life of the corporation if its existence is limited.413 On the other hand, organi-
zation expenses are not deductible as a loss upon the mnerger of the corpora-
tion, for its corporate rights and powers are not extinguished but live on
in the merging corporation. 14
The expenses connected with a merger or consolidation of corporations
are also not deductible by either corporation as ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses, 415 although it has been held that the expenses are immediately
deductible as a loss or expense if the project is abandoned. 416
The expenses of dissolution and liquidation are also held not to be ordinary
and necessary business expenses,417 and it has also been declared that they
may not be deducted at any time as a loss. 41 8
412Mdlta Temple Ass'n, 16 B. T. A. 409 (1929) (A); Pacific Coast Biscuit Co.,
32 B. T. A. 39 (1935) (A); Liquidating Co., 33 B. T. A. 1173 (1936) (NA). The
Board held in the Liquidating Co. case that the loss was incurred when statutory dis-
solution was completed and the corporation could no longer carry on business, even
though it remained in existence for the purpose of winding up its affairs. On the other
hand, no loss may be claimed until dissolution is effected, even though the corporation
has voted to liquidate and is selling out. City & Suburban Mortgage Co., 22 B. T. A.
179 (1932).
Cf. Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932) (organization expenses disallowed as a loss
on dissolution in absence of evidence that a loss was actually suffered upon the transfer
to a successor company).
413Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 43 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 10th 1930). The Board
has refused to follow that rule. Surety Finance Co. of Tacoma, 27 B. T. A. 616 (1933),
aff'd on other grounds, 77 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).4l4Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Comm'r, 80 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 2d 1936)
Citizens Trust Co., 20 B. T. A. 392 (1930) (involved New York law -on effect of
merger).415Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Comm'r, 80 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 2d 1936);
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Handy, 92 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 3d 1937) ; First
National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B. T. A. 807 (1926) ; Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355(1932) ; Clara B. Parker, Exec'x, 30 B. T. A. 1231, 1248 (1934), appeal divnissed,
75 F. (2d) 1010 (C. C. A. 9th 1935).
Presumably the expenses would be recoverable in the same manner as organization
expenses. See First National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B. T. A. 807, 808 (1926). But cf.
Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932) (supra note 412).416Portland Furniture Mfg. Co., 30 B. T. A. 878 (1934) (NA) (held to be a loss
even though attorney's reports on abandoned merger were later used as starting point
for new, successful negotiations) ; Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 30 B. T. A. 973, 986 (1934)
(A) (called an expense).417Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932) ; Ernest DuPont, 34 B. T. A. J059, 1061(1936) (the facts are found in 33 B. T. A. 643 (1935), which was reversed upon
reconsideration), aff'd sub nor. Pier v. Comm'r, 96 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ;
State ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 225 Iowa 638, 281 N. W. 172
(1938) (attorney for liquidating receiver).
Contra: Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B. T. A. 39, 42 (1935) (NA), holding that
since no asset was acquired or protected through the expenditures in dissolution, they
are not capital expenditures; and, although (like a lawsuit) it may occur only once
in the business life of a particular taxpayer, dissolution and the expenses thereof are
normal incidents of the business world and the expense is deductible. Cf. Welch v.
Helvering. 290 U. S. 111. 114. 54 Sun. Ct. 8 (1933).418See Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932); Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B. T. A.
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The expenses connected with the corporate franchise must be carefully
segregated and distinguished from those relating to the capital structure.
The latter are no more deductible currently than the former, 41 9 but it is also
invariably held that the expenses of issuing stock, changing its par, and the
like, may not be amortized over the life of the stock or of the corporation 420
and may not be taken as a loss at any time ;421 on the other hand, the expenses
of issuing bonds may be amortized, at least on the accrual basis.422
It has been held, however, that when an attorney is regularly employed
on a salary as the general counsel for a corporation, even though a part
39, 42 (1935). The former case went off on failure to prove that the transaction was
not beneficial; the latter rested upon the fact that the expenses were not incurred in
the acquisition or intended acquisition of any asset which could be the subject of a loss,
but the dictum is weakened because it was held to be a deductible expense in any event;
furthermore, it is not always required that a loss be related to the cost of some asset.
See s'upra note 222.419Simmons Co. v. Comm'r, 33 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 1st 1929), cert. denied, 280
U. S. 588, 50 Sup. Ct. 37 (1929); Coming Glass Works v. Comm'r, 37 F. (Zd) 798,
59 App. D. C. 168 (1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 742, 50 Sup. Ct. 348 (1930) ; Logan-
Gregg Hardware Co., 2 B. T. A. 647 (1925) ; Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 3 B. T. A.
932 (1926); Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B. T. A. 547 (1928); Borg & Beck Co., 24
B. T. A. 995, 1004 (1931) (A) (changing stock from par to no par, and floating neiv
stock) ; Commercial Investment Trust Corp., 28 B. T. A. 143 (1933) (A), aff'd w. o. op.,
74 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d 1935); James I. Van Keuren, 28 B. T. A. 480 (1933);
I. T. 1198, 1-1 Cum. BULL. 275 (1922) ; A. R. R. 6048, 111-1 CUm. BULL. 293 (1924).
All the cases cited involved legal or other expenses of floating stock. The same is held
of the cost of floating a loan. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B. T. A. 1192
(1932), appeal dismissed, 68 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th 1934) ; see Helvering v. Union
Pacific R.R.', 293 U. S. 282, 286, 55 Sup. Ct. 165 (1934).420Barbour Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 74 F. (2d) 163 (C. C. A. 10th 1934), cert. denied,
295 U. S. 731, 55 Sup. Ct. 643 (1935) ; Surety Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 221
(C. C. A. 9th 1935); Columbian Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 688,
695, 80 Ct. Cl. 622, 638 (1935) ; Commercial Investment Trust Corp., 28 B. T. A. 143
(1933) (A), aff'd w. o. op., 74 F. (2d) 1015 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
It is held"that no wasting asset is acquired by such expenditures with respect to which
an allowance for exhaustion may be taken under Internal Revenue Code § 23 (1).
The fact that the stockholders expect to get their investment back at a certain time does
not convert the cash received into a wasting asset, and there is no other asset against
which the expenses can be applied.421American Loan Co. v. Handy, 16 F. Supp. 107 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd w. o. op.,
92 F. (2d) 74 (C. C. A. 3d 1937) (not deductible when consolidated) ; James I. Van
Keuren, 28 B. T. A. 480 (1933) (not a loss upon dissolution); Pacific Coast Biscuit
Co., 32 B. T. A. 39 (1935) (A) (same) ; I. T. 1198, I-1 Cum. BULL. 275 (1922) (not
a loss upon redemption).
The regulations, impliedly approved by the Congress by repeated re-enactment of the
statute without change, provide, in effect, that no gain or loss is realized upon the
issuance of stock, nor upon the reacquisition thereof, unless the corporation is trading
in it. Regulations 103, sec. 19.22 (a)-16.422Helvering v. Union Pacific R.R., 293 U. S. 282, 55 Sup. Ct. 165 (1934). The
same result should follow on the cash basis, with respect to attorney fees, for even on
that basis capital expenditures must be spread over the period in which the benefits are
enjoyed. Cf. I. T. 3251, 1939-1 Cum. BULL. 113.
Although logically the rule of the above case might apply equally to stock issues, the
distinction is rested upon the regulations as impliedly approved by the Congress (supra
note 421). Columbian Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 688, 696, 80
Ct. Cl. 622, 639 (1935).
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of his services are of a capital nature, his salary is currently deductible.42 3
The deductibility of legal expenses connected with the ownership and use
of property depends not only upon proximate relation to business but 11pon
the distinction between current and capital expenditures. Of course, if the
matter does not arise from trade or business, the expenses are not deductible
in any event.424 If the expenses are connected with trade or business, deduc-
tion may nevertheless be denied if the payment is considered to be in the
nature of a capital expenditure, which must be capitalized as part of the
cost of the property.
Thus, it is settled that the legal and other expenses connected with the
obtaining of property are not currently deductible, whether the taxpayer is
on the cash or the accrual basis, and whether or not the taxpayer is in the
business of buying and selling such property, but such expenditures must
be added to the cost of the property.42 5 Similarly, the attorney's fees incident
to procuring a leasehold must be capitalized and deducted over the life of
the lease. 42 6 If, however, the property is not acquired or the lease is not
423Saks & Co., 20 B. T. A. 1151 (1930) (NA).
424Will contests and construction suits are personal matters even -though business
property may be involved. Merriman v. Comm'r, 55 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 1st 1932)
(taxpayer very frankly claimed expense as a loss in a "transaction entered into for
profit," but the court held that a successful will contest would obtain for him only what
was found justly his, and no "profit" could be anticipated from the transaction) ; Lansill
v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 512, 61 App. D. C. 107 (1932) ; Hutchings v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d)
514, 61 App. D. C. 109 (1932); George P. and Bessie P. Douglas, 1 B. T. A. 372
(1925) ; I. T. 1689, 1I-1 Cum. BULL. 122 (1923) ; United States Trust Co., Exec'r, "27
B. T. A. 1260 (1933) (legatee's defense of will contest) ; A. R. R. 284, 3 Cum. BULL.
208 (1920) (same) ; George Vanderbilt Trust, 36 B. T. A. 967 (1937) (will construc-
tion suit) ; Gloria Laura Morgan Vanderbilt, 39 B. T. A. 43 (1939), aff'd w. o. op.,
107 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 683, 60 Sup. Ct. 723 (1940)
(same).
Other instances include Croker v. Buret, 62 F. (2d) 991, 61 App. D. C. 342 (1933)
(stepson's suit to set aside transfer by deceased father to second wife; although it was
business property, suit did not arise from business) ; Croker v. Helvering, 91 F. (2d)
299, 67 App. D. C. 226 (1937) (attorney's fee connected with sale of non-business prop-
erty) ; Fred J. Hughes, 1 B. T. A. 944 (1925) (recovering personal stock of liquors
seized by police; not a loss from "casualty") ; Thomas F. Gurry, 27 B. T. A. 1237
(1933) (prosecution before Mixed Claims Commission of claim for seizure of pleasure
car in Germany).425 Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 45 (1938) ; Seletha 0. Thompson,
9 B. T. A. 1342 (1928) (A) ; Stephens Fuel Co., 13 B. T. A. 666 (1928) (A) (denied
attempt to write off the expense over arbitrary ten-year period, since not an exhaustible
asset) ; W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B. T. A. 1192 (1932), appeal dismissed,
68 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th 1934) (fee for examining title, recording deed, etc.);
I. T. 1689, I1-1 Cum. BULL. 122 (1923) ; G. C. M. 15430, XIV-2 Cum. BULL. 59 (1935)
(even dealers and traders must capitalize purchase commissions).4 26 Meyram v. Comm'r, 63 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 3d 1933) (cash basis); Griffiths
v. Comm'r, 70 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 7th 1934) (spread over 99-year lease); Sigmund
Spitzer, 23 B. T. A. 776 (1931) ; Watson P. Davidson, 27 B. T. A. 158 (1932); Edward
T. Blair, 31 B. T. A. 1192, 1205 (1935), rev'd on other grounds, 83 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A.
7th 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 300 U. S. 5, 57 Sup. Ct. 330 (1937) (when trustee
makes such expenditures, "distributable" income taxable to the beneficiary may not be
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entered into, the attorneys' fees preparatory thereto have been held currently
deductible if conneced with one's trade or business.4 7
In the treatment of legal and other expenses incurred in connection with
the sale or other disposition of property, there is serious disagreement.
Fundamentally, the expenses of a sale, like those of a purchase, are of a
capital nature, chargeable against the profit on the transaction, or increasing
the loss therefrom. But where the detail of accounting on that basis, allo-
cating expenses to every sale, would be so burdensome as to be impracticable,
the Bureau makes an exception and permits accounting for selling expenses as
ordinary business expenses. The Bureau confines the exception strictly to
dealers,428 but the cases have extended it to anyone in the business of buying
and selling, including traders and active investors.429 Of course,' for those
not engaged in the business, selling expenses must be capitalized.4 30 Legal
reduced by the amount thereof, except over term of lease; in effect, for income tax
purposes, such expenses are charged to corpus, whatever is in fact done by the trustee).427Seletha 0. Thompson, 9 B. T. A. 1342 (1928) (A); Watson P. Davidson, 27
B. T. A. 158 (1932) (NA). Cf. S. Cupples Scudder, Exec'r, 22 B. T. A. 1294 (1931)
(NA) (protection of option which others sought to have declared void; when lost suit,
held, a business loss, for no property was acquired through the expenditures).
If the intended purchase or lease was not connected with business but was for an
investment, no deduction is permitted. It is not a loss in a "transaction entered into
for profit," since the transaction was not entered. Robert Lyons Hague, 24 B. T. A.
288 (1931) ; Estate of Henry N. Brawner, 36 B. T. A. 884 (1937).
4281. T. 2305, V-2 Cum. BULL. 108 (1926) (real estate dealer) ; G. C. M. 15430,
XIV-2 Cum. BULL. 59 (1935) (securities). Since neither a trader (speculator) nor an
investor is permitted to account on an inventory basis (Regulations 103, sec. 19.22 (c)-5),
no added burden is placed on them by requiring separate accounting for the expenses
of each transaction. For the distinction between a trader and a dealer, see Trading
Associates Corp. v. Magruder, 112 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 4th 1940) ; Regulations 103,
sec. 19.22 (c)-5; G. C. M. 9656, X-2 Cum. BULL. 127 (1931) ; G. C. M. 9958, X-2 Cum.
BULL. 158 (1931).429Winmill v. Comm'r, 93 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), rev'd on other grounds,
305 U. S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 45 (1938) (trader) ; Neuberger v. Comm'r, 104 F. (2d) 649'
(C. C. A. 2d 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 61 Sup. Ct. 97 (1940) (trader) ; J. W.
Forgeus, 6 B. T. A. 291 (1927) (A) (real estate developer; expense of defending
action for commissions on sale) ; Adolph B. Spreckels, 41 B. T. A. 1204 (1940) (NA)
(securities trader) ; Alice du Pont Ortiz, 42 B. T. A. 173 (1940) (NA) (active in-
vestor) ; George W. Covington, 42 B. T. A. 601 (1940) (trader on commodities ex-
change). Cf. Smith v. Russell, 76 F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 8th 1935), cert. denied, 296
U. S. 614, 56 Sup. Ct. 131 (1935) (sale not completed until year after attorney's fee
was paid: although taxpayer was not in business of selling property, expense was held
deductible only when paid, and not to be deducted from sale price).4 30 Dalriada Realty Co., 5 B. T. A. 905 (1926) (A) (expenses of sale to be spread
over period for which profits reported, on installment basis) ; Hannibal Missouri Land
Co., 9 B. T. A. 1072 (1928) (expenses of surveying land for sale not deductible until
sale) ; W. A. Bahr, 10 B. T. A. 637 (1928) (A) ; Mrs. E. A. Giffin, 19 B. T. A. 1243
(1930) (like Dariada case) ; Odorono Co., 26 B. T. A. 1355 (1932) (expenses of sale
of property in non-taxable reorganization) ; Victoria Paper Mills Co., 32 B. T. A. 666
(1935), aff'd w. o. op., 83 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) (sale not completed until
year after attorney fee paid; not deductible in year of payment) ; I. T. 2305, V-2 Cum.
BULL. 108 (1926) ; I. T. 2340, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 43 (1927). See also infra note 432.
But cf. Smith v. Russell, supra note 429 (attorney fee connected with sale of corporate
property by one not a dealer, held a business expense).
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expenses connected with leasing the taxpayer's property are held to be
capital expenditures, to be amortized over the term of the lease, even though
the taxpayer's business is leasing such property.431
The expense of contesting the amount of an award in condemnation pro-
ceedings is a capital expenditure to be offset against the award in determining
gain or loss.02 On the other hand, the expense of successfully resisting
condemnation as unconstitutional has been held to be a current expense, de-
ductible if sustained in trade or business, since no sale resulted and the
taxpayer's title was not questioned.433 The expenses of getting a special
assessment reduced have also been held to be current rather than capital
expenditures, but the Bureau takes a contrary view.434
It is well established that the cost of defending or perfecting title is a
capital expenditure and may not be currently deducted. 435 It is generally
431Comm'r v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 84 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 7th 1936), aff'g
32 B. T. A. 231 (1935) (not currently deductible even though taxpayer's sole business
was leasing its property and many leases were made) ; I. T. 3251, 1939-1 Cum. BULL.
113 (same rule on cash balsis).432Williams v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 357, 61 App. D. C. 181 (1932) ; Washington Market
Co., 25 B. T. A. 576 (1932) (A).433L. B. Reakirt, 29 B. T. A. 1296 (1934), aff'd w.o. op., 84 F. (2d) 996 (C. C. A.
6th 1936).434Comm'r v. Chicago Dock & Canal Co., 84 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 7th 1936), aff'g
32 B. T. A. 231 (1935) (NA). Contra: 0. D. 739, 3 Cum. BULL. 192 (1920).435Regulations 103, sec. 19.24-2; Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 25 (C. C. A.
9th 1932), aff'd on other grounds, 287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932) (defense of
vendor's suit to rescind for fraud) ; Hutchings v. Burnet, 58 F. (2d) 514, 61 App. D. C.
109 (1932) (defense of title); Croker v. Burnet,. 62 F. (2d) 991, 61 App. D. C. 342
(1933) (defense of suit to set aside transfer by alleged incompetent) ; Brawner v.
Burnet, 63 F. (2d) 129, 61 App. D. C. 352 (1933) (similar) ; Moynier v. Welch, 97
F. (2d) 471 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) (defense of right to oil royalties) ; Consolidated Mutual
Oil Co., 2 B. T. A. 1067 (1925) ; Frederick McLean Bugher et al., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A.
1155 (1928) (A) ; North American Oil Consolidated, 12 B. T. A. 68, 94 (1928) (A),
rev'd on other grounds, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932) ; Phoenix Development
Co., 13 B. T. A. 414 (1928) ; 0. J. Morrison, 19 B. T. A. 635, 638 (1930) ; Esther
Rentie, 21 B. T. A. 1230 (1931) ; A. R. R. 284, 3 Cum. BULL. 208 (1920) (defense of
claim by decedent's partner that devised property was bought with firm funds) ; S. M.
2423, 111-2 Cum. BULL. 157 (1924).
But cf. Samuel D. Leidesdorf, 26 B. T. A. 881 (1932) (A) (successful defense against
claim of seller that taxpayer had agreed to hold in trust for him; expense held currently
deductible) ; Grace McBride Crile, 26 B. T. A. 1020 (1932) (NA) (defense of trust
against invalidation under rule against perpetuities, held deductible) ; Langford Invest-
ment Co., 28 B. T. A. 222 (1933) (NA), aff'd on other grounds, 77 F. (2d) 468 (C. C. A.
5th 1935) (holding that defense of suit to set aside fraudulent transfer is not a defense
of title and is currently deductible). See six-member dissent in Alice P. Bachofen von
Echt, 21 B. T. A. 702, 709 (1930), arguing that all the "defense of title" cases were
overruled by Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U. S. 145, 48 Sup. Ct. 219 (1928)
(relating to defense of right to previously-earned income), and that legal expenses should
be currently deductible if they serve to maintain only what the taxpayer has instead
of adding to his rights. Long-standing Congressional acquiescence in the regulations,
however, militates against this view. See Williams v. Burnet, 59 F. (2d) 357, 61 App.
D. C. 181 (1932).
Although patent litigation may be, in effect, a defense of title to the patent, expenses
of such actions, other than interference proceedings, are held not to be capital expendi-
tures. See supra note 375.
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held that such expenditures may be added to the cost basis of the property,436
although occasionally that has been doubted by the courts and the Board, on
the ground that the defense of title adds nothing to the value of the prop-
erty.437 There is some authority to the effect that, when the right to retain
the interim income is involved in the title suit, the attorney fee may be
currently deducted so far as it is allocable to the defense of the right to
retain the income, if evidence is available from which such an apportionment
can be made.4
38
The expenses of examining title,430 as well as the cost of registration of
title under the Torrens system, 440 even though connected with one's business,
are capital expenditures, not currently deductible. The same is true of the
expense of the partition of property.
441
The expehses of an action to recover property which had been seized have
been held to be currently deductible if connected with trade or business,
since no title question is involved, although the question cannot be said to
be settled.44 Of course, if the matter is not connected with one's business,
436Charles P. Hewes, 2 B. T. A. 1279 (1925) ; West End Consolidated Mining Co.,
3 B. T. A. 128 (1925) (A); North American Oil Consolidated, 12 B. T. A. 68, 94
(1928) (A), rezld on other grounds, 286 U. S. 417, 52 Sup. Ct. 613 (1932) (attorney
fee written off in depletion); Ida Wolf Schick, 22 B. T. A. 1067 (1931) (defense of
life estate, written off over life expectancy); R. S. Goforth, 32 B. T. A. 1206 (1935)
(NA), appeals dismissed, 84 F. (2d) 1003 and 86 F. (2d) 1000 (C. C. A. 10th 1936).
Cf. Lido Bldg. Co., Inc., 31 B. T. A. 461 (1934) (A) (amount given 'person who
financed defense of leasehold against attack, held additional cost of lease).
Cf. Internal Revenue Code § 113 (b) (1) (A), providing that there shall be added
to the basis any expenditures "properly chargeable to capital account."
But if the basis used is not cost but the value of a good title on March 1, 1913, or
at date of acquisition (see supra note 195), the cost of defending that title may not be
added to the basis even though incurred subsequent to the date to which the value
relates. Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 26 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), aff'd on
other grounds, 287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932).
43 7R. E. Nail et al., Exec'rs, 27 B. T. A. 33 (1932) (A) (expense of boundary dis-
pute held neither currently deductible nor added to cost, for expenditure did not serve
to enlarge, change, or acquire for the taxpayer any interest in property). Cf. Comm'r
v. Field, 42 F. (2d) 820, 822 (C. C. A. 2d 1930), in which Judge Learned Hand said
that the judgments of a court do not create rights but only declare and protect rights
which the party had already, and hence the expenses of defending title do not add value
to the property and may not be capitalized.43 8Frederick McLean Bugher et al., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A. 1155 (1928) (A) ; but see
Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (Zd) 17, 26 (C. C. A. 9th 1932), aff'd on other grounds,
287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932) (expressing doubt that apportionment would be
permitted even if proper evidence had been presented).
439W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B. T. A. 1192 (1932), appeal dismissed, 68
F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th 1934).4 4 0Lincoln L. McCandless, 5 B. T. A. 1114 (1927).
4 41 Lincoln L. McCandless, 5 B. T. A. 1114 (1927); Charles J. Livingood, Exec'r,
25 B. T. A. 585 (1932).4 4 2 Comm'r v. Speyer, 77 F. (2d) 8Z4 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), aff'g 30 B. T. A. 517
(1934). cert. denied, 296 U. S. 631, 56 Sup. Ct. 155 (1935) ; Comm'r v. Ullmann, 77
F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 2d 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 631, 56 Sup. Ct. 155 (1935).
Those cases involved bank accounts confiscated by the Germans, and a different result
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the expenses are not deductible.4 43 An expense incurred to evict trespassers
not claiming title, which expense thus serves to protect the present enjoyment
of the property rather than its ownership, is also held currently deductible
if it relates to one's business. 444 For the same reason, the expenses of pro-
curing the appointment of a receiver to prevent one's defaulting tenant from
continuing to collect rents from sublessees is a current expense.445 Likewise
the expense of procuring the forfeiture of a lease for the lessee's default is
held currently deductible.
446
There is no agreement with respect to expenses incurred in defense of
one's right to make what use he chooses of his property. The expense of
contesting a city's establishment of a building line has been ruled to be a
capital expenditure. 447 On the other hand, the cost of the defense of a suit
for an injunction to restrain taxpayer's proposed use of his land is a current
expense.4
48
The expenses of a mortgagee in foreclosing, at least if he acquires the
property thereby, are capital expenditures. 449 But the expense of defending
the attempted foreclosure of mechanics' liens is currently deductible if con-
nected with business, since it is incurred by the building owner in order to
avoid paying a contractor's debts and not to protect his title to property.
450
Similarly, the expense of bringing a proceeding to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance of property, having the primary object of collecting a business
debt, is deductible, at least if it is cash rather than the property which the
taxpayer obtains thereby.
451
might follow if physical property or securities were involved. In Alice P. Bachofen
von Echt, 21 B. T. A. 702 (1930), it was held that the expenses of regaining securities
seized by the Germans were not deductible; but the case was reconsidered and reversed
in an unpublished memorandum, which is quoted with approval in Kales v. Comm'r,
101 F. (2d) 35, 38 (C. C. A. 6th 1939).
Contra: 0. D. 1048, 5 Cum. BULL. 127 (1921).443The expense is not a loss from "casualty." Fred J. Hughes, 1 B. T. A. 944 (1925)
Thomas F. Gurry, 27 B. T. A. 1237 (1933).444Bliss v. Comm'r, 57 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 5th 1932).445Milton H. Friend et al., Trustees, 40 B. T. A. 767 (1939) (A).446Mary E. Evans, 42 B. T. A. 246 (1940) (NA) (held to be a loss incident to
default on contract; distinguished from payments made to purchase cancellation, which
must be amortized).
447I. T. 1382, 1-2 Cum. BULL. 146 (1922).448Memphis Memorial Park, 28 B. T. A. 1037 (1933) (A), aff'd w o. op., 84 F. (2d),
1008 (C. C. A. 6th 1936). But cf. Richard G. Babbage et al., Exec'rs, 27 B. T. A. 57
(1932), in which the injunction suit was founded upon'a restrictive covenant which the
taxpayer had violated by leasing his land for business purposes; the equity court balanced
the equities (the covenant was soon to expire) and allowed the lease to stand; held to
be a capital expenditure, to be spread over the life of the lease.449 Hadley Falls Trust Co. v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 887, 893 (C. C. A. 1st 1940);
Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 31 B. T. A. 887, 892 (1935), disapproving E. S.
Briant, Adm'r, 6 B. T. A. 651 (1927) (NA).45OLena G. Hill, 8 B. T. A. 1159 (1927) (A).451See Swastika Oil & Gas Co., 40 B. T. A. 797 (1939) (A) '(Commissioner only
sought to tax net recovery after legal expenses).
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It cannot be' overemphasized that an attorney performing a variety of
services for his client should itemize his fees and make available to his client
the evidence upon which the apportionment is based. For in many cases
taxpayers, who have the burden of showing how much of an attorney's fee
is of a deductible kind, have been denied any deduction at all for want of
such evidence.452
The year in which legal expenses may be deducted has frequently been
considered. On the cash basis, of course, legal expenses (if currently de-
ductible) are reported when paid.4 53 On the accrual basis, the deduction
is taken when the fee becomes fixed or determinable, rather than spread
452Where both services of a personal nature and others connected with business were
performed, and the fee was not apportioned, the entire expense was disallowed in Sander-
son v. Burnet, 63 F. (Zd) 268, 269, 61 App. D. C. 377 (1933) (single controversy
involving business and personal matters) ; Helen S. Pennell, 4 B. T. A. 1039 (1926) ;
Arthur Jordan, 12 B. T. A. 423 (1928) ; Louis Kuhn, 22 B. T. A. 975 (1931) ; Bula
E. Croker, 27 B. T. A. 588 (1933) ; Gloria Laura Morgan Vanderbilt, 39 B. T. A. 43(1939), aff'd w. o. op., 107 F. (2d) 1023 (C. C. A. 2d 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S.
683, 60 Sup. Ct. 723 (1940). Likewise, current deduction was denied when current and
capital matters were not segregated, in Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 55 F. (2d) 17, 26
(C. C. A. 9th 1932), aff'd on other grounds, 287 U. S. 299, 53 Sup. Ct. 161 (1932) ;
Crowley v. Comm'r, 89 F. (2d) 715 (C. C. A. 6th 1937); F. Tinker & Sons Co., 1
B. T. A. 799 (1925); Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 14 B. T. A. 769 (1928); State ex rel.
Gibson v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 225 Iowa 638, 281 N. W. 172 (1938).
Furthermore, no part of the expenditure may be added to the cost of property if capital
items of proper nature cannot be segregated from others. W. N. Stokes, 7 B. T. A. 375
(1927). Cf. Surety Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 221 (C. C. A. 9th 19"5)
(organization expenses not segregated from expense of issuing stock).
The Board apportioned an unitemized legal fee, upon being presented with sufficient
evidence respecting the services, in Frederick McLean Bugher et aL., Exec'rs, 9 B. T. A.
1155 (1928) (A), and George W. Seligman, Exec'r, 10 B. T. A. 840 (1928) (A). The
circuit court remanded cases to the Board for such apportionment in National Outdoor
Adv. Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F. (2d) 878 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) and General Outdoor
Adv. Co. v. Helvering, 89 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) (defense of anti-trust
injunction suit, successful in respect to some charges, while other acts were enjoined;
held, expenses should be apportioned). Cf. Burnet v. Houston, 283 U. S' 223, 228,
51 Sup. Ct. 413 (1931) (holding that the taxpayer is not relieved by impossibility of
proof); Cohan v. Comm'r, 39 F. (2d) 540, 543-4 (C. C. A. 2d 1930) (holding that
Board should make as close an approximation as it can, when it finds that an expense
of undetermined amount has been made, but that all doubts may be resolved against the
taxpayer). The Board applied the Cohan case to an unapportioned brokerage commis-
sion (analogous to an unapportioned legal fee) in George W. Covington, 42 B. T. A.
601 (1940).
The Board has allowed the entire salary of a corporation's general counsel, although
part of his services concerned capital matters. Saks & Co., 20 B. T. A. 1151 (1930)
(NA). However, a retainer would probably be disallowed unless all the services con-
cerned current business, since the lack of apportionment does not, in such a case, arise
from necessity, a factor which influenced the Board in the Saks case. Cf. 3 PAUL &
MERTENS, LAW.v OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1934) § 23.65, n. 95. A retainer paid
to an attorney by an active investor was held deductible in O'Neal v. United States,
32 F. Supp. 799 (M. D. Ga. 1940).




over the period in which the services are performed.45 4 When the fee is
contingent, that time will normally be at the conclusion of the litigation,
when all contingencies are removed and the facts upon which the amount
will depend are available 4 55 However, when the amount of the fee is to
depend upon services rendered, accrual is not permissible prior to the sub-
mission of a bill, even though the litigation is terminated, since the facts
from which a reasonable estimate of the liability could be made are not
available to the taxpayer.456 On the other hand, if legal expenses, or some
part thereof, are actually fixed or paid prior to the termination of the liti-
gation, they may be deducted without awaiting the conclusion of the suit
46 T
Sunfnary
Legal expenses may be deducted, in general, only when connected with
one's trade or business. The expenses of a criminal defense, even though
connected with business, are deductible only if the defense is successful. Legal
expenses connected with the acquisition or disposition of property or the
protection of its title, or with other capital transactions, are not deductible
but may in most instances be added to the cost of the property concerned,
to be recovered through depreciation or depletion or through increasing the
loss or decreasing the gain upon a sale.
454Noxon Chemical Products Co. v. Comm'r, 78 F. (2d) 871 (C. C. A. 3d 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 647, 56 Sup. Ct. 307 (1936) ; Joshua C. Kelley, 38 B. T. A. 1292
(1938) (A) ; I. T. 2972, XV-1 Cum. BULL. 108, 109 (1936). See also cases cited infra
notes 455-457. Cf. Regulations 103, sec. 19.42-1 (to effect that income from services is
not accrued until compensation is determined).
455In Carey Van Fleet, 2 B. T. A. 825 (1925) (A), attorney was paid contingent
fee when Supreme Court denied certiorari, but a motion to revoke that order was made
within the year, sQ that litigation was not finally concluded; attorney (taxpayer) recog-
nized that payment was premature and agreed to hold fee in trust pending outcome; held,
not income in that year; by analogy, it would probably not be expense to client. But
in Bonnie Bros., Inc., 15 B. T. A. 1231 (1929) (A), an action was apparently concluded
in the taxable year, and taxpayer accrued contingent fee; subsequently, the matter was
reopened and the recovery reduced; the fee was adjusted accordingly; held, all events
to fix liability occurred in the taxable year, and later events cannot postpone accrual;
but. since the tax liability for that year was still open, the amount was corrected to
reflect the final result.456Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. United States, 4 F. Supp. 525 (E. D. N. Y. 1933),
aff'd w. o. op., 73 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ; New Process Cork Co., 3 B. T. A.
1339 (1926) ; Joshua C. Kelley, 38 B. T. A. 1292 (1938) (A).457F. Meyer & Bro. Co., 4 B. T. A. 481 (1926) (A).
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